



Submission to the Police Pay and Remuneration Body

on behalf of

the Police Federation

of England and Wales

(PFEW)

and

the Police Superintendents'
Association

of England and Wales

(PSAEW)





Police Federation
of England and Wales

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and

Superintendents' Association

of England and Wales



9th January 2014

To: The Chair of the Police Remuneration Review Body.

Dear Mr Lebrecht,

We are pleased to enclose the first submission to the Police Remuneration Review Body. This is a joint submission provided on behalf of the Police Federation of England and Wales (PFEW), and the Police Superintendents' Association of England and Wales (PSAEW).

These are challenging times for officers. They face a changing social environment, with emerging crime patterns, at a time when government spending policy has meant "doing more with less". Recent amendments to the remuneration system - such as those introduced following the Winsor Review, and the change from a final salary to a career average pension scheme - coupled with pay uplifts that are well below inflation, have resulted in a significant reduction in officers' remuneration packages.

We are well aware of the government policy with regard to pay, and have shaped our recommendation for an uplift this year accordingly. However, we welcome the Police Remuneration Review Body's focus on an evidence base for remuneration. In our submission, we have offered constructive suggestions for future evidence requirements, and we identify priorities for the future, including issues within the current remuneration system that need to be addressed. We have provided evidence that makes a case for increased future uplifts.

We look forward to a productive working relationship in the years ahead.

Andy Fittes, General Secretary of PFEW

Tim Jackson, National Secretary of
PSAEW

Contents

1	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	8
1.1	Preparation	8
1.2	Core principles of our submission	8
1.3	Data quality and monitoring change.....	10
1.4	The Home Secretary's remit letter	13
1.5	The Home Secretary's remit letter – our response.....	15
1.6	The London Lead.....	18
1.7	Differentiation of pay and allowances at local and regional level	20
1.8	Observations.....	20
1.9	The five year remit	22
1.10	Staff Association overarching concerns.....	22
1.11	The Home Secretary's remit letter: list of priorities	24
1.12	Issues that relate to particular elements of the remuneration system ...	25
	SECTION 1: BACKGROUND TO POLICING AND CURRENT CONTEXT	26
2	What is the nature of policing in England and Wales?.....	27
2.1	Introduction	27
2.2	The Peelian principles and policing by consent	27
2.3	The Office of Constable	28
2.4	The framework within which officers serve	30
2.5	Skills and knowledge required to be a police officer	37
2.6	The day-to-day job	39
2.7	Summary	44
3	How has the nature of policing changed?.....	46
3.1	Introduction	46
3.2	Social context of policing and crime.....	46
3.3	Political influences and police reform.....	49
3.4	Economic influences	52
3.5	Police workforce numbers over time	54
3.6	Demand for policing over time	61
3.7	Summary	62

3.8	Questions arising	63
SECTION 2: OFFICIAL WORKFORCE DATA.....		64
4	Workforce data: are the current workforce data robust enough to evaluate pay against the outcomes of 'sufficient, capable and motivated' officers? ...	65
4.1	Introduction	65
4.2	Data comprehensiveness	66
4.3	Data accuracy and uniformity	79
4.4	Transparency	84
4.5	Summary	87
4.6	Questions arising	87
4.7	Recommendations	88
SECTION 3: KEY EVIDENCE 2014		90
5	Objective evidence regarding the numbers of officers recruited and retained	91
5.1	Introduction	91
5.2	Summary	97
5.3	Questions Arising.....	97
6	External context: Government pay policy and impact on police perception evidence: workforce surveys	98
6.1	Introduction	98
6.2	PFEW WORKFORCE SURVEY 2014	100
6.3	Survey Methodology	100
6.4	Police workforce profile.....	101
6.5	Officers' morale and motivation.....	102
6.6	Capability and training: opportunities for training and development.....	107
6.7	Indicators of future police workforce sufficiency.....	108
6.8	Police Officers' Psychological Contract with the police service.....	110
6.9	Psychological Contract breach and intention to leave.....	112
6.10	Differences between demographic groups	115
6.11	Benchmarking.....	118
6.12	PSAEW PERSONAL RESILIENCE SURVEY 2014	121
6.13	Survey Methodology	121
6.14	Motivation and Job Engagement	121

6.15	Training and development: indicators of future workforce capability ..	122
6.16	Indicators of current and future workforce sufficiency.....	123
6.17	Summary	125
6.18	Questions arising.....	127
7	External context: Government pay policy and impact on police pay	128
7.1	Introduction	128
7.2	Government pay policy	129
7.3	Impact on police pay: pay settlements	130
7.4	Impact on police pay: average earnings	134
7.5	Pension changes: impact on total and lifetime remuneration	143
7.6	Summary	144
7.7	Questions arising	145
7.8	Recommendations.....	146
8	The London Lead	147
8.1	Introduction	147
8.2	The case for the London Lead, and PFEW position.....	148
8.3	The PFEW position	153
8.4	Summary	154
8.5	Questions Arising.....	156
8.6	Recommendations.....	156
9	Regionalisation of pay: Observations	157
9.1	Introduction	157
9.2	Existing arrangements and their derivation.....	157
9.3	What is known about the benefits of the existing system?	159
9.4	What do other organisations do?	160
9.5	Other factors in pay systems	163
9.6	Risks of further pay regionalisation	164
9.7	Summary	167
9.8	Questions arising	168
9.9	Recommendations.....	169
SECTION 4: THE FIVE YEAR REMIT		170
10	The Remit Letter – five year considerations	171

10.1	Introduction.....	171
10.2	PFEW and PSAEW overarching concerns for the coming five years .	172
10.3	Conclusions	181
10.4	Pay uplifts in the next five years	182
10.5	Summary: Our overarching priorities for the next five years	182
10.6	The Home Secretary's remit letter: list of priorities	183
10.7	On-call	184
10.8	Summary	186
10.9	Questions arising.....	186
10.10	Recommendation 7a	187
10.12	Summary	189
10.13	Questions arising.....	189
10.14	Recommendation 7b	189
10.15	Buy-out of Sergeants' casual overtime	190
10.16	Previous overtime buy-out.....	191
10.17	Staff association position	194
10.18	Summary	194
10.19	Questions arising.....	195
10.20	Recommendation 7c.....	196
10.21	Management of officers on limited duties and the value of the deployment component of the x-factor	196
10.22	The x-factor payment.....	197
10.23	Summary	199
10.24	Questions arising.....	199
10.25	Recommendation 7d	199
10.26	Feasibility of attaining a greater degree of coherence between the terms and conditions of police officers and police staff	200
10.27	Summary	201
10.28	Questions arising.....	201
10.29	Recommendation 7e	201
10.30	Staff Association priorities: existing elements of the pay system.....	201
10.31	Constables' pay scale (for officers who joined after 1 April 2013)	202
10.32	Summary	203
10.33	Questions arising.....	204

10.34	Recommendation 7f	204
10.35	Pay progression.....	205
10.36	Summary	207
10.37	Questions arising.....	207
10.38	Recommendation 7g	207
10.39	Skills thresholds.....	208
10.40	Summary	209
10.41	Questions arising.....	209
10.42	Recommendation 7h	210
10.43	Away from home overnight allowance	210
10.44	Summary	211
10.45	Questions arising.....	211
10.46	Recommendation 7i.....	211
10.47	Motor Vehicle Allowances.....	212
10.48	Summary	212
10.49	Questions arising.....	213
10.50	Recommendation 7j.....	213
10.51	Equality issues.....	213
10.52	Summary	215
10.53	Questions arising.....	216
10.54	Recommendation 7k.....	216
Annex 1.1 - Police Remuneration Review Body (PRRB) remit letter		217
Annex 2.1 - Robert Peel's Nine Principles of Policing.....		219
Annex 4.1 Workforce planning evidence base: required data		221
Annex 4.2: Gender and BME reference list.....		226
Annex 4.3: Data sources for Graph 4.1 and Graph 4.2.....		228
Annex 10.1 - Legal context		229

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 Preparation

1.1.1 This submission has been prepared by the Police Federation of England and Wales (PFEW), and the Police Superintendents' Association of England and Wales (PSAEW)¹ for the Police Remuneration and Review Body (PRRB). Separate submissions may be made in whole or in part in future years, dependent on the scope of the remit letter.

1.1.2 This is the first year during which the PRRB has operated. In preparing our submission, we have taken into account the PRRB's request to provide education on the nature of policing; evidence to justify our case for a fair and meaningful pay rise for officers; the PRRB's broad Terms of Reference; and the remit letter from the Home Secretary to the PRRB Chair, dated 3rd November 2014.

1.2 Core principles of our submission

1.2.1 In July 2013 the Staff Associations were asked to outline what we would wish to see included in the remit letter to the PRRB. PFEW stated then:

“The core principles we would wish to see embedded in the pay and conditions of officers are as follows:

- *pay and conditions should support the advancement of a police service that is representative of the public it serves, with a pay system that attracts and retains officers of differing genders, ethnicity, and age groups;*

¹ Any use of the term “We” throughout this document refers to both organisations.

- *they should be designed so as to ensure that officers believe there to be organisational justice: such as fair pay, appropriately distributed;*
- *they should be designed based on evidence of need, (especially where changes are considered), and of what works in attracting, retaining, and motivating officers of the right calibre, and on objective evaluation.”*

The PSAEW supported these aims, and further stated:

“We are concerned that the public sector pay freeze followed by below-inflation pay rises together with the freeze on incremental progression has led to a reduction in the living standards of police officers when compared with other sectors. We would wish this to be considered and addressed by the PRRB at the earliest opportunity. We also consider it important that an effective comparison is made between the pay and conditions of service of police officers and those roles undertaken within other professions which are of similar significance and comparable responsibility, to ensure that police officers are not disadvantaged and are properly rewarded for what they do”.

The Staff Associations are united in wanting to have a pay system that reflects the responsibilities and workload carried, while facilitating the need for officers to be deployed across a broad spectrum of activities.

- 1.2.2 These remain the core principles behind our submission. They form themes that run throughout.
- 1.2.3 We believe that officers have had a turbulent period, (there having been significant changes following the Winsor Review, and a pay freeze for most of our members,) and that it is not in the interests of the service to continue this turbulence.
- 1.2.4 Furthermore, the reduction in numbers of officers over the last several years has meant significant changes to the role. We recognise the need for the public sector to make savings. However, we believe that too often the need for savings has been cited as being an imperative that overrides all others. We believe that it is important to also focus on the need to support the attraction and retention of officers of an appropriate calibre to serve the public interests, and to give stronger consideration to the impacts on public service, and on the likely make-up of the police service in the 5-10 year timeframe, rather than on simple number and cost reduction in the short-term.

1.3 Data quality and monitoring change

1.3.1 We further believe that the national evidence base of Human Resources data currently retained to manage the police service reward and recognition system is not fit for purpose. In particular, we believe:

- the data are not sufficiently comprehensive;
- the data lack transparency, especially at national level;
- the data are not consistently collated, resulting in potentially inaccurate interpretation.

- 1.3.2 We therefore make three recommendations regarding data and monitoring of change.
- 1.3.3 **Recommendation 1 (data):** We believe it is crucial that the Home Office adopt *an evidence based approach to workforce planning*, with the role that pay and conditions play in that clearly demonstrated.
- 1.3.3.1 For example, we would like to see transparent and appropriate national data regarding recruiting, selection, training and development, progression, and exit. This should include national collation of data on the numbers and calibre of applicants as well as actual recruits, to better understand the attractiveness of policing; promotions, to understand the scope for career progression and the impact of recruitment freezes on this; numbers passing promotion criteria who are not subsequently promoted; transfers between forces; gender and ethnic mix of officers; length of service of leavers by gender and ethnicity; the costs of replacing expertise when trained officers leave; and so on, as all these affect the degree to which the pay system can be designed so as to support sufficient, capable, and motivated officers with an appropriate demographic mix.
- 1.3.4 **Recommendation 2 (data):** Our second recommendation is that, should significant changes be suggested to the pay and conditions system, *appropriate modelling of the likely impacts should be undertaken in advance of changes.*
- 1.3.4.1 In the interests of transparency this modelling should be shared with the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and its successor body, the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC), and Staff Associations. The modelling should include consideration of impacts on recruitment and retention, (including costs of any loss of experience, and replacement / training costs); and consideration of impact on groups with protected characteristics.

1.3.5 **Recommendation 3 (data)**: Our third key recommendation, related to 1 and 2, is that *recent changes be monitored for their impact, to check whether the intended benefits have in fact accrued, and to check whether there have been unintended consequences*, before further significant change is embarked upon.

1.3.5.1 In the main body of this submission a number of changes that should be monitored are outlined. Two are cited in brief here:

Constables' pay scale: We believe the spine point move (worth £5.5 thousand to each officer, or approximately 18% of their salary) at the top end of the Constables' pay scale is disproportionate to the incoming Advanced Skills Threshold assessment, and creates an unjust pay scale. Further, we believe the reduction of pay at the bottom of the scale (to £19,000) may negatively impact the calibre of recruits.

Removal of final salary pension: We believe that the impact of pensions on the total remuneration package must also be considered. We believe the removal of the final salary pension schemes and replacement with the career average (Career Average Revalued Earnings: CARE) scheme will impact on aspirations with regard to length of service. We see no evidence that the Home Office have modelled the likelihood of officers choosing to leave mid-career, once the "golden handcuffs" of a final salary pension are removed. Whilst some turnover of officers is to be expected and creates opportunities for recruiting, we are concerned that this pension change will cause a loss of experience that is costly to replace. This is likely to result in additional training requirements for the police service, and will take supervisors away from the front-line in order to conduct assessments.

1.3.5.2 These – and other – recent changes need to be monitored using an appropriate data set, and action taken should the overall impact prove to be more negative than positive.

1.3.5.3 Considerations regarding the evidence base have shaped our response to several of those issues raised in the Home Secretary’s remit letter – both those noted for the first remit, and those aspects from the Winsor Review that the PRRB has been asked to consider in the longer term.

1.4 The Home Secretary’s remit letter

1.4.1 The remit letter is at Annex 1.1. The following issues were raised by the Home Secretary for the PRRB’s consideration:

(This year)

- What adjustments should be made to pay and allowances for officers up to and including Chief Superintendent (with regard to the Government policy that public sector pay awards in 2015/2016 average up to 1%)?
- Should the “London Lead” for Inspecting ranks in the London forces be retained?
- Observations on the level and scope of existing arrangements for differentiation of officer pay and allowances at the regional and local level.

(Longer term – five years)

- The review of the national on-call allowance.
- Consideration of the gap between the Constable and Sergeant pay scales, and between the Inspector and Chief Inspector scales.

- Whether there is a case for the buy-out of Sergeants' casual overtime.
- The impact of changes to the management of officers on limited duties, including review of the deployment component of the x-factor.
- The feasibility of creating a greater degree of coherence between the terms and conditions of police officers and staff.

1.5 The Home Secretary's remit letter – our response

- 1.5.1 In response to the remit letter, as to what adjustments should be made for officers up to and including Chief Superintendent, we have considered evidence of whether current pay and conditions attract sufficient, capable, and motivated officers, and evidence of the impact of recent pay freeze and austerity.
- 1.5.2 In the absence of clear evidence from the Home Office as to whether policies attract and retain the right calibre of officers, we have focused on survey responses and economic data. (The Home Office do not routinely collect and report on numbers of applicants and reasons for leaving. Despite the fact that more officers have left during the austerity cuts than were projected, there is no systematic analysis of why that has been the case).
- 1.5.3 In particular, we have collected evidence from members that demonstrate a link between the negative impact on morale of recent changes, including the Winsor Review and austerity measures, and intention to leave. Modelling of the impact on the psychological contract, and its relationship to intention to leave, shows that on a five point scale for each unit increase in perceived contract breach the odds of officers planning to leave the police increased by 89%. We also benchmarked police morale and perceptions of fairness of treatment against the Armed Forces, using the same questions, and the NHS. Both were substantially lower in the police (59% of police officers rated their own morale as low, while 28% Armed Forces personnel did; 51% of police were dissatisfied with basic pay, compared to 37% of Armed Forces personnel; 44% of police officers felt they were not treated fairly, compared to 15% of Armed Forces personnel).

- 1.5.4 It is not clear why the perceptions in the police differ so much from other organisations. However, there has been a period of significant change, with some decisions not evidenced or monitored, (e.g. the reduction in Constables' starting salary to £19,000) and others clearly different to treatment in other organisations (e.g. the pay freeze). We are concerned that there should be no further divisive changes to the pay system that are not evidenced, so that officers can understand the rationale for any change, and the Home Office can monitor impacts.
- 1.5.5 Our analysis of the wider economic climate shows that total real pay for federated ranks as a whole is estimated to have fallen 11.5% over the whole period, 2010-14, and Superintendents' pay by 11.7%. At the same time, officers are being asked to contribute a higher proportion of their income to their pensions, meaning that the overall reward package has reduced. The change to the career average pension scheme from the final salary scheme means that the lifetime earnings for officers will decline considerably.
- 1.5.6 We believe that to attract and retain the right calibre of officers, the police service needs to provide pay and conditions that are fair, reflect the nature and responsibilities of the role, and enable officers to maintain a responsible standard of living.

- 1.5.7 We believe that over the last few years a combination of a difficult economic climate and officers' own motivation to serve has protected the police service to large extent from officer wastage, (although the numbers leaving have been higher than HMIC projections). However, we also believe that the service is entering a period of challenging recruitment and retention with a more buoyant economy. Furthermore, we are concerned that the impact on service effectiveness and on costs of replacing expertise when trained officers leave has not been taken fully into account. We trust that the PRRB will consider these factors and will ensure that any determinations are in this context.
- 1.5.8 Over the coming years, we recommend that officers are given pay uplifts that enable them to maintain their standard of living, rather than falling behind, as has been the case in the last few years. However, for this financial year we have taken into account the Government's view that pay increases in the public sector should average 1%. We recognise the difficulties faced across the public sector. For that reason, we ask for an uplift in this financial year of 1% for all.
- 1.5.9 **Recommendation 4 (remit):** In this financial year we ask for *an uplift of 1% for all, including officers who receive an increment: to basic pay, existing regional allowances, and all allowances that are normally included in uplifts, such as Dog Handlers' allowance.* This is based on our recognition of the Government's intent, and the need for public sector austerity; and our concern that there should be no further divisive pay changes, such as increases for some but not others, without there being an evidence base modelling likely impact. However, *over time, we also recommend that the economic data we have provided be considered in future pay uplifts, as demonstrating the need to make appropriate adjustments to ensure officers are not left behind others when the UK economy is more buoyant. We ask that the PRRB consider this at the earliest opportunity.*

1.6 The London Lead

- 1.6.1 The London Lead has been reviewed in the past, and on each occasion it was considered that the role in London was sufficiently different to that outside to justify its continuance.
- 1.6.2 Evidence from reports provided by the Metropolitan Federation support this contention, arguing that the London area is the most complex to police. This is partly because of the need for specialised roles, and supervision of these; and the levels of responsibility, spans-of-control, complexity of issues and workloads of London Inspecting ranks are in excess of those elsewhere.
- 1.6.3 We acknowledge that Winsor stated that such considerations should be properly evaluated. We believe that to comply with Winsor's proposal, a study needs to be conducted systematically comparing London policing, using a systematic job evaluation scheme, and assessing knowledge, skills, and attributes required, to other forces and regions. PFEW is not aware of any such study, although there is a study that demonstrates that London Inspectors have lower well-being and job satisfaction than elsewhere. We believe that such a study is the responsibility of the Home Office: it should not be left to officers themselves to fund such work, through contributions to PFEW.
- 1.6.4 Until such time as data are supplied that provide a formal evaluation, we do not believe there is a case for removing the London Lead. To do so would further contribute to perceptions of unfairness in the pay system, and would cause considerable hardship to those officers affected.

1.6.5 **Recommendation 5 (remit):** We agree with Winsor that this issue needs systematic evaluation. Until such time as that is complete, we recommend *retention of the London Lead. An uplift commensurate with the overall uplift is recommended: that is an uplift of 1%.*

1.7 Differentiation of pay and allowances at local and regional level

- 1.7.1 There are a number of allowances currently paid to officers in London and the South East. These are similar to arrangements in other public sector, and some private sector, organisations.
- 1.7.2 London payments were originally to compensate for the higher cost of living. They have subsequently been said to assist with recruitment and retention. The South East payments arose because officers were being drawn into the Metropolitan Police Service at the expense of surrounding forces.
- 1.7.3 We know of no formal, systematic evaluation of the benefits of the existing system, relating extra payments to numbers and calibre of recruits, or numbers retained. Until such an evaluation is conducted, we believe it is inappropriate to change the existing system, other than to give an appropriate uplift.

1.8 Observations

- 1.8.1 There are a number of risks in regionalising pay. The biggest for the police currently is that the devolution of policing – and pay – to Scotland and Wales will result in an uncoordinated approach, and loss of officers from bordering services to either Scotland or Wales (or, indeed, vice versa) depending on which service sets the higher salaries. This may also cause pay drift. There is a need to consider mutual aid, collaboration, and interoperability in any regional pay system in policing. Further regionalisation would need to take into account equality concerns. The need for appropriate administration and governance processes to be set up is likely to be costly and offset any intended saving. This is especially true for police pay, which is set out in Regulations.

1.8.2 We would like to understand what consideration the Home Office has given to issues around regionalisation.

1.8.3 **Recommendation 6 (remit):** The current regional allowances should be retained, until such time as an evaluation is undertaken of these, and an evidence base provided, should any change be deemed necessary. In the meantime, *an uplift commensurate with the overall uplift is recommended: that is, an uplift of 1%.*

1.9 The five year remit

1.9.1 The Home Secretary's remit letter suggests a number of priorities for the next five years. However the Staff Associations were also asked to state priorities. Our response therefore comprises three parts: firstly, our overarching concerns; secondly, our response to the Home Secretary's priorities for the next five years, as stated in the remit letter; and thirdly, some issues specific to particular elements of the remuneration system, that we believe must be addressed.

1.10 Staff Association overarching concerns

1.10.1 We believe there is a need to ensure the pay system reflects a number of considerations:

- it should attract and retain officers who are representative of the public served;
- it should be designed so as to ensure officers believe there is organisational justice within the system;
- it should be designed, based on evidence of need, and what works;
- it should facilitate deployability to a range of roles and requiring a range of skills;
- it should appropriately recognise the skills, knowledge, and attributes, and workload required.

1.10.2 With regard to the longer term, five year considerations, we believe our Recommendations 1-3 (data) also cover what is needed to address these. (That is, the Home Office should adopt an evidence based approach to workforce planning, with comprehensive, transparent, and reliable data; modelling of any proposed changes should be undertaken in advance of changes; and recent changes should be monitored for their impact, to check whether the intended benefits have in fact accrued, and to check whether there have been unintended consequences, before further significant change is embarked upon).

1.10.3 The recent changes to the pay system have been wide-ranging. We would not wish to see further turbulence caused by changes that are not evidence based.

1.10.4 We believe that to achieve such a system, existing anomalies need to be addressed. These include the need for a clear rationale for each element of the remuneration package, and a comparison to jobs with similar knowledge, skills, and attribute requirements; consideration of the appropriateness of pay for differing ranks, and whether a single spine point based method for each rank addresses the different organisational and personal drivers of pay; and consideration of how changes to one element impact on the package overall, and its efficacy.

1.10.5 We ask that the Home Office gives a clear statement of the aims of the pay system; what it should achieve as a whole, and how elements contribute; and how changes will be monitored in future. In earlier chapters we made a case for an evidence based system with transparent, comprehensive, and reliable data.

1.10.6 Until this has been achieved, we ask that the economic data we have provided be used at the earliest opportunity to make appropriate uplifts to ensure officers are not left behind when the economy is more buoyant, and when the current cap of a 1% uplift is removed.

1.10.7 We have listed within the body of our submission specific questions that we believe need to be addressed in order to determine next steps with regard to some specific ongoing changes within the pay system.

1.11 **The Home Secretary's remit letter: list of priorities**

1.11.1 With regard to those issues raised in the Home Secretary's remit letter, our recommendations are as follows:

- **Recommendation 7a:** On-call allowance should be reviewed in the light of clear management data, and this should be a priority.
- **Recommendation 7b:** We recommend that the gap between pay scales (Constables to Sergeants, and Inspectors to Chief Inspectors) should not be reviewed in isolation. The total pay scale end-to-end needs to be considered, based on credible data.
- **Recommendation 7c:** We are opposed to the buy-out of Sergeants' overtime. We believe that overtime will always be necessary, and better management of it is the key to ensuring a fair and efficient system. The buy-out of Inspectors' overtime has resulted in unforeseen consequences that should be reviewed and taken into account. The PSAEW opposition to the buy-out is based on the view of these senior officers that overtime is an effective management tool.
- **Recommendation 7d:** We understand that the PAB will review the impact of Limited Duties arrangements once they have been implemented. In order for the review body to review the value of the deployability component of the x-factor, definitive labour market

evidence will be required. This would normally include comparison data, from organisations with similar requirements. In the absence of such data, how does the Home Office intend to value the deployability component?

- **Recommendation 7e:** We would like a better understanding of what a greater degree of coherence between the terms and conditions of officers and staff might mean. We believe that any move to place officers on contracts of employment would be inconsistent with the Office of Constable, and cannot support any recommendation that goes that far.

1.12 **Issues that relate to particular elements of the remuneration system**

1.12.1 We raise a small number of specific issues, that we believe should be prioritised.

- **Recommendations 7f – 7k** Relate to matters that the PFEW and PSEAW believe should be considered alongside those issues raised by the Home Secretary in the remit letter. These are: the impact of the reduction in Constables' starting salaries; pay progression; skills thresholds; Away from Home Overnight Allowance; Motor Vehicle Allowances; and Equality issues.

SECTION 1: BACKGROUND TO POLICING AND CURRENT CONTEXT

This section is in two chapters. The aim is to give the PRRB context regarding policing today.

The first chapter includes background on policing, such as the Peelian principles and Office of Constable. We describe how the terms and conditions under which officers serve impact on the ethos of policing.

It also includes some detail on the roles undertaken by officers, using data gathered from observations of shifts, and job evaluations.

The second chapter describes recent changes in policing. In particular, the changing nature of crime, and the level of skills required to deal with this, are outlined. An academic study, the “Time for Justice” report, is used to define how the role has changed for Inspectors, and to give an account of the demands of the job. Police workforce numbers between 2010 and 2014 are also examined within the context of these changes, highlighting issues in regards to national data collection and reporting.

2 What is the nature of policing in England and Wales?

2.1 Introduction

2.1.1 The purpose of this chapter is to provide context of what policing is like in England and Wales. It will explain the principles on which policing in the UK is based and the unique status of officers. The chapter will outline the framework within which officers serve, the skills required to be an officer and it will paint a picture of the demands of policing, both in terms of the job and the impact it has on officers and their families.

2.2 The Peelian principles and policing by consent

2.2.1 Since modern policing began in 1829 there have been fundamental principles that define the function and purpose of policing. These principles have evolved over the years but the basics and core objectives have stood the passage of time. The principles are known as Robert Peel's Nine Principles of Policing (see Annex 2.1), though they are likely to have been written by the first Commissioners of the Police of the Metropolis. When introduced, the principles created a policing philosophy "unique in history and throughout the world because it derived not from fear but almost exclusively from public co-operation with the police, induced by them designedly by behaviour which secures and maintains for them the approval, respect and affection of the public".² Generally, this philosophy is known as policing by consent.

² *A New Study of Police History* by Charles Reith, London: Oliver and Boyd, 1956, pg. 140.

2.2.2 Policing by consent is the idea that the police can only function because of the support given to it by the public. In December 2012 the Home Secretary confirmed this principle continues to lie at the heart of British policing³. The PFEW and PSAEW believe policing by consent to be a sacrosanct construct and have argued robustly against reforms that threaten the principle.

2.3 The Office of Constable

2.3.1 As well as policing by consent being a unique policing philosophy, the “*Office of Constable*” is also unique.

2.3.2 The term Office of Constable can be found in the sworn oath that every member of a police force must make upon appointment, as per Schedule 4 of the Police Act 1996:

2.3.3 *“I...do solemnly and sincerely declare and affirm that I will well and truly serve the Queen in the Office of Constable, with fairness, integrity, diligence and impartiality, upholding fundamental human rights and according equal respect to all people; and that I will, to the best of my power, cause the peace to be kept and preserved and prevent all offences against people and property; and that while I continue to hold the said office I will, to the best of my skill and knowledge, discharge all the duties thereof faithfully according to law.”*

³ Response to freedom of information request as to what the Home Secretary means by “Policing by Consent” <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/policing-by-consent> Ref 25060 Pub. 10 December 2012

2.3.4 Upon making this declaration, officers are presented with a warrant card that gives them the authority to carry out the functions described in the oath. As such, police officers hold a unique status within society; they are not employees, but office holders sworn to serve the Queen. They are independent legal officials with a significant degree of authority and discretionary power. They are expected to discharge the duties of the Office of Constable at all times, whether or not they are on duty, as failure to do so could result in misconduct or even criminal proceedings. As Lord Denning stated in 1968, as holders of the Office of Constable, police officers are “*answerable to the law and to the law alone.*”⁴

2.3.5 Because of the unique status of the Office of Constable, police officers are empowered to resist unlawful orders as well as any undue political pressure. As Shami Chakrabarti, Director of Liberty, noted in an article in Policing UK 2013:

2.3.6 *“The value of our policing model was never as evident than during the handling of August 2011’s riots. In the face of knee-jerk advice from armchair-Constables, police chiefs were robust in rejecting calls for military intervention, water cannon and plastic bullets – used previously with disastrous impact in Northern Ireland – and instead redeployed and inflated the number of officers on the street to good effect.*

2.3.7 *As tensions simmered in our own towns and cities and politicians sought to explain the events, the political and operational independence of the police meant that expertise and non-partisanship led the response. Blanket punishments were resisted, rights were protected and legitimacy maintained.”*⁵

⁴ Regina -v- Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Ex parte Blackburn [1968] 2 QB 118; [1968] 1 All ER 763; [1968] 2 WLR 893

⁵ Chakrabarti, S. (2013) Preserving rights and building legitimacy. *Policing UK 2013*, pg. 82-83

2.3.8 The PFEW and PSAEW believe that this independence is as essential for police officers as it is for judges and magistrates within a democratic criminal justice system. Just as judges should not be distracted from deciding cases purely on the basis of the relevant facts and laws⁶, police officers should not be distracted from acting independently by other pressures or interests.

2.4 The framework within which officers serve

2.4.1 The nature of police service has shaped the framework of terms and conditions within which police officers serve. The framework is designed both to support the central features of British Policing and to reflect the realities of police service. In particular:

Terms and Conditions

2.4.2 The terms and conditions under which police officers serve are contained in regulations made under the Police Act 1996.

2.4.3 This reflects the constitutional significance of the role of police officers.

Probationary period

2.4.4 Police officers have a much longer probationary period (two years) than in most other professions.

2.4.5 This is because of the significant authority, responsibility and accountability inherent in the Office of Constable. It is intended to ensure that police forces have a proper opportunity to determine whether or not newly appointed Constables are suitable to hold the relevant powers and responsibilities, and are suited to a career as a police officer.

⁶Judiciary of England and Wales website <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-judiciary-in-detail/jud-acc-ind/independence>, attached at Annex D.


Termination of service

- 2.4.6 Once an officer has successfully completed the probationary period, there is careful but sufficient regulation of the way in which service can be terminated by the force.
- 2.4.7 Police officers can be required to leave the service on the grounds of poor performance, poor attendance or for disciplinary reasons. Officers can also be compulsorily retired on the grounds of ill health or age.
- 2.4.8 There is no power to make police officers compulsorily redundant. Regulation A19 of the Police Pensions Regulations 1987, and the equivalent provision in the Police Pensions Regulations 2006, allow for compulsory retirement on the grounds of efficiency of the force. These provisions are available for use in very specific circumstances (and in particular, where an officer is entitled to an immediate full pension).
- 2.4.9 These restrictions on the way in which service can be terminated have a dual function:
- They underpin the independence of the Office of Constable. Police officers can exercise their powers in the knowledge that they are answerable to the law, but without fearing that their service could be terminated for their actions; and
 - They form part of a package which helps secure and retain a body of officers who can deliver policing by consent.

Promotion

2.4.10 The police service is a rank based organisation. Officers currently must progress through each of the ranks if they want to be promoted. (Although the introduction of Direct Entry Superintendents and Chief Constables will change this). This rewards both experience and knowledge. However, the organisation is structured as such that most people joining will be “career Constables” (i.e. they will remain at the lowest rank for their entire career). This means that pay structures need to be sufficient to ensure that experienced officers at all levels are retained.

Figure 2.1: Percentage of officers at each rank (excluding secondees)



7

⁷ Winsor Review of Pay and Conditions: Final Report, Vol 1, pg 123.

Pensions

2.4.11 In each of the three police pension schemes, which either exist or will be created,⁸ there are lower retirement ages for police officers than exist for ordinary employment. This reflects the physical and mental demands of the role and the importance of the pension as part of officers' conditions of service.

Industrial action

2.4.12 Police officers are unable to take any form of industrial action. Any act calculated to induce a police officer to withhold his or her services is a criminal offence.

2.4.13 The ability to take industrial action would be difficult to reconcile with the Office of Constable. However, the recent Winsor proposal to introduce compulsory severance prompted the PFEW to ballot its members on whether the PFEW ought to seek industrial rights. Out of 133,108 officers eligible to vote, some 56,333 took part in the ballot, with 45,651 (34% of all officers) voting in favour and 10,681 voting against. These results demonstrated the frustration of officers, but did not reach the required threshold for the PFEW to take action.

⁸ The Police Pension Scheme 1987, the New Police Pension Scheme 2006, and the Career Average Pension Scheme 2015.

Lawful orders

- 2.4.14 Police officers must obey lawful orders, including orders requiring them to perform duties at any time and in any place.
- 2.4.15 This ensures that police forces can respond to any policing need at any time. It also helps ensure policing by consent as police officers perform, and are seen to perform, a range of duties in the communities in which they serve.

Restrictions on the private lives of officers

- 2.4.16 Unlike ordinary employees, the unique status of the Office of Constable places restrictions on the private lives of police officers and their families. These include:
- abstaining from any activity which is likely to interfere with the impartial discharge of their duties, or which is likely to give rise to the impression amongst members of the public that it may so interfere;
 - not taking any active part in politics and officers are specifically prevented from joining the British National Party, Combat 18 and the National Front;
 - getting permission from their chief officer for their place of residence;
 - not wilfully refusing or neglecting to discharge any lawful debt;
 - not taking on any employment or business interest outside of policing without the express consent of their Chief Constable.
- These business restrictions can also apply to a partner, spouse or relative residing with the officer.

2.4.17 These restrictions are designed to ensure public confidence in the impartiality of police officers. The PFEW and PSAEW wholly support the need for officers to be demonstrably impartial, but clearly these restrictions go far beyond those in other professions.

2.4.18 In addition to the above, police officers are not allowed to wilfully neglect to perform their duty as it would result in an offence of misconduct in a public office. As such, police officers are expected to discharge their duties at all times, whether or not they are on duty.

Psychological contract

2.4.19 Police officers accept the framework described above (whereby they must obey lawful orders, including the need to be available 24/7, and are restricted from taking industrial actions, etc.) in return for terms and conditions that recognise the responsibilities they carry. This reciprocal arrangement gives rise to expectations regarding working conditions that are often referred to as a “psychological contract”.⁹

2.4.20 The framework set out above means:

- officers have a high degree of confidence that so long as they carry out their duties properly and efficiently their position is secure, and this ensures that the independence of the Office of Constable is protected;
- forces attract and retain high calibre officers who accept the inherent risks of policing and the flexibility of postings;
- officers are encouraged to remain in service so that experienced officers are retained, thus creating an effective workforce;

⁹ Argyris, C. (1960). *Understanding Organisational Behaviour*. Homewood: Dorsey; Rousseau D.M. (1995). *Psychological Contracts in Organisations: Understanding Written and Unwritten Agreements*. Sage Publication.

- the costs associated with continually having to select and train large proportions of the workforce are minimised, which is particularly important in times of austerity;¹⁰
- workforce planning for each force is easier; and
- the service is representative of the public it serves, including a spread of ages, rather than mainly younger personnel, and the profile of the service best supports policing by consent.

2.4.21 It is worthy to note that where psychological contracts are breached there is a “direct and negative effect on the organisation”,¹¹ as workers are likely to leave the organisation, seek to have more “voice” such as by demanding representation, or become disaffected.¹²

2.4.22 It is our contention that following turbulent years during the Winsor Review and the public sector pay freeze, officers’ psychological contracts have repeatedly been breached. This view helped to form our submission principles, including that any further change should be evidence based. It has also helped to shape our recommendation regarding this year’s pay uplift.

¹⁰ Boyd, E., Geoghegan, R., and Gibbs, B. Policy Exchange (2011) *Cost of the Cops: Manpower and deployment in policing*. The cost of training in the first two years of service was estimated at £15,000. Winsor quoted the full costs calculation from this study as being £80,000 per officer, in the first two years of service.

¹¹ George, C. (2009) *The Psychological Contract*. P. 27 Open University Press.

¹² G Turnley, W. H. & D.C. Feldman. (1999) “The Impact of Psychological Contract Violations on Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect.” *Human Relations* 52(7): 895–922.

2.5 Skills and knowledge required to be a police officer

2.5.1 The skills and knowledge required to be a police officer are many and varied. When a person joins a force as a police officer in the rank of Constable, they have to undertake the Initial Police Learning and Development Programme (IPLDP). This is a comprehensive, 2 year programme that aims to train student officers to become efficient and Constables of good conduct. (Please note that for other entry routes, such as the fast track to Inspector scheme, the initial learning requirements vary slightly). The programme is a mixture of classroom and work-based learning and officers are placed into their local communities to engage with them. Specifically, the IPLDP comprises of:

- 80 hours' Community Engagement (including a placement).
- Independent Patrol.
- Minimum Qualification (Diploma in Policing).
- Officer Safety Training.
- First Aid Training.

2.5.2 The mandatory qualification that officers must attain is the Level 3 Diploma in Policing; it consists of 10 units and is available under Ofqual's Qualifications Credit Framework (QCF). The 10 units are as follows:

- Gather and submit information that has the potential to support law enforcement objectives.
- Provide an initial response to incidents.
- Arrest, detain or report individuals.
- Conduct priority and volume investigations.
- Interview victims and witnesses in relation to priority and volume investigations.
- Interview suspects in relation to priority and volume investigations
- Search individuals and their personal property.

- Carry out systematic searches of vehicles, premises and open areas.
- Manage conflict.
- Provide initial support to victims, survivors and witnesses and assess their need for further support.

2.5.3 Also, in addition to the above, the initial learning curriculum introduces many aspects of other learning programmes at the initial/first responder level, such as Professionalising the Investigation Process (PIP) Level 1, forensics, mental ill health, and equality and human rights¹³.

2.5.4 Clearly, the IPLDP is a comprehensive programme designed to equip student officers with the broad skills and knowledge they will need to become efficient and well-conducted Police Constables. The use of a mandatory qualification also highlights the necessity of these skills and knowledge in policing.

2.5.5 The components of the IPLDP are also to be reassessed at the 4 and 7 year points for Constables, and it will be essential that they are able to demonstrate all the skills, knowledge, and aptitudes that underpin these. This applies to all Constables. This demonstrates the need for all to be deployable in a wide range of circumstances. Conversely, it shows there might be unintended consequences of introducing pay for specialist skills.

¹³ College of Policing website, *Initial Police Learning*, <http://www.college.police.uk/en/12881.htm> [accessed on 10 December 2014]

2.6 The day-to-day job

2.6.1 Being a police officer is a demanding job. As mentioned previously, officers can be directed to work in any role or location within the force (or even outside the force area) by their Chief Constable. The nature of policing by consent is also such that officers face a risk of serious injury or death in carrying out their duties, whether on or off duty.¹⁴ Even as recently as August 2014 the UK's terrorist level was raised to 'severe' on the basis of concerns over an attack inspired by extremists in Syria and Iraq and, in October 2014, four men were arrested in London over allegations that they were plotting to shoot dead police officers or soldiers in the capital.¹⁵ In addition, many roles require shift work and officers can be recalled to duty from a rest day or annual leave, all of which can impact on their private lives.

2.6.2 The quotes below are from case studies the PFEW conducted in 2011 of officers on the front line. They describe the realities of the job and begin to paint a picture of what officers face day-to-day:

“Over the years I have lost count of the number of times I have had to put myself between violent offenders and members of the public. I do, however, remember every fatal road traffic collision I have attended during the time I was a traffic patrol officer together with the families I have had to break that news to and then give support. Being a police officer is not just a job, I am a police officer 24/7, 365 days a year. To me and my family it is a way of life!”

(Sergeant, Cambridgeshire)

¹⁴ The Police Roll of Honour Trust lists over 60 deaths on duty in the UK since 2008. <http://www.policememorial.org.uk/index.php?page=annual-roll-of-honour>

¹⁵ Dodd, V and Quinn, B (2014) “Four men charged with terror offences after London raids”, *The Guardian*, 17 October [Online]. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/oct/17/four-men-charged-terror-arrests-london> (Accessed 20 October 2014)

“I have been spat on, assaulted and called every name imaginable by people who called for the police to help them! I have carried body parts from the side of roads and half an hour later told the family of that person their son is dead. I have been at the scene of a double child murder and then gone home and sat watching my kids sleep.”
(Officer, North Wales)

2.6.3 In addition to this, staff members from the PFEW recently spent a day observing officers from Hampshire. Table 2.1 below summarises the issues that the officers had to deal with; it highlights the breadth of roles officers do and the incidents they deal with.

Table 2.1: Summary of incidents during PFEW staff observations of officer shifts

Observation 1	Observation 2	Observation 3
Details		
Early shift (7am-3pm) with a two-man Targeted Police Team (TPT) crew in Basingstoke.	Early shift (7am-4pm) with a Roads Patrol Unit in Whitchurch.	Early shift (7am-4pm) with a Response Unit in Eastleigh.
Summary of day		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Road traffic incident – officers breathalysed the driver and investigated the cause of the accident. 2. Broken down vehicle – attendance to check if safe. 3. Missing person – follow up intelligence of location of missing boy. 4. Domestic violence incident – attend scene and search for suspect who had fled. 5. Rape – Take details from victim and arrange appropriate handover. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Speeding motorists – stop and issue penalties. 2. Search for known banned driver. 3. Traffic incidents – implement rolling roadblocks. 4. Traffic collision – no offence committed, but a driver became angry so officers diffused the situation. 5. Suspected robbery & pedestrian on the highway – pursuit vehicles required, though this team was stood down. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Visibility – Driving to crime hotspots to be visible to the public. 2. Incident in a pub – person self-harming following dispute with staff. Diffuse the situation. 3. Southampton Airport – Walk around for visibility (deterrent) and general patrol. 4. General enquiries - Talk to staff at half-way house about suspected grooming victim; follow up intelligence about missing patient from hospital. 5. Arrest an individual who has caused criminal damage – Taser deployed due to resisting arrest and aggression.

2.6.4 While the above focusses on the federated ranks, Superintendents and Chief Superintendents also have demanding and variable roles. They are the senior operational leaders in the service, operating at both the strategic and the tactical levels, and are the bridge by which policies and procedures get translated into practice. Below are three examples that give a cross-section of the types of role performed Superintendents and Chief Superintendents. They list the responsibilities of each member and give an indication of the managerial responsibilities these officers have:

Table 2.2: Roles and responsibilities of Superintendent ranks

<p>Rank: Superintendent</p> <p>Population served: 750,000</p> <p>Role: Deputy Area Commander for Somerset Policing Area</p> <p>Main responsibilities: Uniform policing across the county of Somerset; leadership development; training and change management; partnership working; rural crime lead; media cadre</p> <p>Specialist skills: Trained firearms, public order and CBRN commander</p> <p>Other: Commanded police response to the major flooding 2014 and Glastonbury Festival 2014</p>	<p>Force: Avon and Somerset</p> <p>No. of officers/staff: 600</p>
<p>Rank: Detective Superintendent</p> <p>Population served: 2.7m (across 3 counties)</p> <p>Role: Head of Protecting Vulnerable People</p> <p>Main responsibilities: Operational lead for all investigations into child abuse, domestic abuse (inc. Honour-Based Violence, forced marriage, abuse in care homes) and 'on line' indecent images of children; management of registered sex offenders and victims of rape; and vulnerable adults and missing persons</p> <p>Specialist skills: Strategic firearms commander, negotiator and PIP3 investigator</p> <p>Other: 'On call' as part of Force SIO rota and informal 24/7 'on call' for Dept.</p>	<p>Force: Thames Valley</p> <p>No. of officers/staff: 300</p>

Rank: Chief Superintendent **Force:** West Yorkshire
Population served: 760,000 **No. of officers/staff:** 1900
Role: District Commander, Leeds BCU
Main responsibilities: Policing in Leeds (209 sq. miles), including Response, CID, Safeguarding and Neighbourhoods. Also the lead for Leeds Community Safety Partnership.
Specialist skills: Trained firearms and public order commander
Other: Silver Commander for Leeds United Football Club, divisional shift cover

Rank: Detective Chief Superintendent **Force:** MPS
Role: National Co-ordinator – Domestic Extremism (Specialist Operations)
Main responsibilities: National responsibility for countering the threat of domestic extremism and preventing disorder including:
Extreme Right Wing; Environmental Activists; Animal Rights; English Defence League; Anti-Fascism
Works closely with Counter Terrorism networks and UK police forces (particularly Special Branches) and operates across nine regions. He has set up the intelligence cell for the NATO Summit
Deputy to the national lead on 'open-source' intelligence.
Commands large number of London-based and regionally-based including:
MPS and seconded police officers, police staff, technical and social media experts
Manages risk, safety and welfare of u/c officers (Operation Herne)
'On call' as Authorising Officer for CHIS (Covert Human Intelligence Sources and RIPA (Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act)
Set up and commanded Operation Withen (post riots investigation) with 1,000 staff leading to 5,000 arrests and 4,000 subsequent convictions

2.6.5 The examples above clearly demonstrate how demanding the job is across different ranks. For Superintendents, the variation in roles is widening. This is partly because the Superintendents have seen the largest cut in numbers by rank (in proportion terms, with around 25% reduction in their numbers between June 2010 and December 2014, from 1,666 to 1,273), and those that remain having to take on additional responsibilities. This has been exacerbated by the fact that many Chief Superintendents' roles have been removed, and at least two services (Northamptonshire and Wilshire) have removed the Chief Superintendent rank from their structure, meaning some Superintendents are now undertaking roles previously filled by Superintendents. It is also partly because in order to cope with budget cuts, many police services have moved away from the Basic Command Unit (BCU) of policing. Where it has been retained, BCUs have often been merged, leaving Superintendents with increasing spans of command and responsibilities. Overall, we believe the pay bill has been suppressed by these impacts, with officers being paid at Superintendents' rates for work previously done by Chief Superintendents, and higher ranks.

2.6.6 Police officers are expected to have the skills to tackle many diverse situations and officers, at any rank, are expected to be able to be deployed to any role within that rank. Often, officers have to work independently and need to think quickly in high pressure situations. They also regularly deal with difficult and dangerous situations.

2.7 Summary

- 2.7.1 Police officers accept many challenging conditions, such as the risk of death or injury; restrictions on their private lives; and the need to be available 24/7. In return, there is an expectation that they will be afforded terms and conditions that recognise the responsibilities they carry. As mentioned in section 2.4, this gives rise to the notion of a “psychological contract” between the officer and the force; a breach of which could have a negative impact on forces. In chapter 6 we demonstrate potential breaches of the psychological contract by focusing on the changes to pay and conditions brought about as a result of Tom Winsor’s review and the Government’s public sector pay policy.
- 2.7.2 The skills and knowledge required to be a police officer include those that underpin the 10 units of the Diploma in Policing. These include gathering information for law enforcement; making arrests; interviewing victims and witnesses; interviewing suspects; searches; managing conflict; and providing support to victims and assessing their need for further support. These require a detailed and up-to-date knowledge of the law and associated procedures, as well as interpersonal skills such as tact and sensitivity. Any role within policing requires all these skills, and often more. The fact that these 10 components are to be reassessed at the 4 and 7 year points for Constables, demonstrates the diversity required in each and every role.

- 2.7.3 This variety is demonstrated in the small number of cases studies we have provided, showing the day-to-day role of officers. In a small number of observations over only three days, PFEW staff witnessed officers dealing with traffic incidents, domestic violence, suspected robberies, and making an arrest using Taser because of the suspect's aggression.
- 2.7.4 For managers at Superintendent and above, the variation between roles can be substantial. The span of command can vary widely. The reduced numbers in Superintendent and Chief Superintendent roles; the changing legislation; increasing scrutiny and accountability; devolvement of responsibilities from ACPO ranks; and the suppression of salary by removing some ranks and moving responsibilities downwards; all have caused significant changes to the roles fulfilled at this rank. This has been so great as to cause the PSAEW to consider whether the current pay structure is fit for purpose.

3 How has the nature of policing changed?

3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 Over time the necessary skills and experience required to be an effective police officer have gradually changed and will continue to do so in response to on-going shifts in the external socio-political landscape. For the purpose of this document, these external influences can be broken down roughly, into the following three categories:

- Social Context for Policing and Crime;
- Political Influence and Police Reform, and;
- Economic Influences.

3.1.2 The pressures above are not the only things to have caused changes over time, and are just some of the many influences on the demands facing the police workforce. This chapter will examine how these pressures have evolved since 2010 and will finish with an analysis of the changing numbers of the police workforce and demand statistics.

3.2 Social context of policing and crime

3.2.1 The social context of policing and the nature of crime are constantly evolving. In order for the police to keep up with public expectations and emerging criminal threats, officers' job requirements also change. In recent years, two of the most notable alterations to the social context of policing have been the changing nature of crime and the reduced public spending across partner agencies and other emergency services.

Changing Nature of Crime

- 3.2.2 Although the overall crime numbers reported by the Home Office (HO) have been consistently falling since 2010, some types of crime have actually increased. Sexual assaults, for example, have increased by 20% between the financial years ending in 2013 and 2014¹⁶. Cyber-crime has also been increasing and is likely to carry on doing so as technology continues to grow and adapt¹⁷. This topography of changing crime directly impacts on the skills needed by police officers to be effective, emphasising the need for officers to have a greater understanding of subjects such as modern technology and how it can be used to commit crime. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) sum it up eloquently by stating that in order for officers to be both productive and effective they 'require new skills to meet the ever changing threats and to keep abreast of the scale and pace of change in technology'¹⁸.
- 3.2.3 With local and national drives towards increasing the numbers of body-worn cameras, GPS systems, improved databases and upgrading computer systems, officers will now have to have a greater understanding of data protection, specialist equipment and bespoke software.

¹⁶ Office of National Statistics.(2014). Crime statistics, period ending: March 2014. Retrieved from: <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/crime-stats/crime-statistics/period-ending-march-2014/index.html>

¹⁷ Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. (2014). Core Business: An inspection into crime prevention, police attendance and the use of police time. Retrieved from: <http://www.justiceinspectores.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/core-business.pdf>

¹⁸ Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. (2014). Policing in Austerity: Meeting the Challenge, page 101. Retrieved from: <http://www.justiceinspectores.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/policing-in-austerity-meeting-the-challenge.pdf>

Partner Agencies

3.2.4 Another high profile change within the social context of policing can be seen in the recent trend towards officers being used as a 'catch all' emergency service. According to HMIC, provisional data for the financial year ending 2014 shows that only approximately one third of the incidences recorded on the police service's command and control systems are related to crime or antisocial behaviour¹⁹. Partner agencies appear to be struggling with reductions to their own budgets, resulting in gaps to their services and the use of the police in their absence. HMIC highlights particular concerns regarding police involvement in incidents where the primary responsibility should lie with mental health teams, or with the ambulance service. Officers have provided examples of when they have transported injured and ill people to hospital due to a lack of ambulances²⁰, and are often the first point of contact with someone who is experiencing a mental health crisis²¹.

3.2.5 For example, every year the police cells are used as 'places of safety' for some 11,000 people²² even though the Home Office and the Department of Health both agree that this should only happen under exceptional circumstances²³. This highlights the burgeoning need for officers to have a greater understanding of mental health, as well as a need to work more closely with their partner agencies, requiring additional skills in multi-disciplinary working, negotiation and influence.

¹⁹ Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. (2014). Core Business: An inspection into crime prevention, police attendance and the use of police time. Retrieved from: <http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/core-business.pdf>

²⁰ Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. (2014). Policing in Austerity: Meeting the Challenge. Retrieved from: <http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/policing-in-austerity-meeting-the-challenge.pdf>

²¹ The Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health. (2008). Briefing 36: The police and mental health. Retrieved from: http://www.centreformentalhealth.org.uk/pdfs/briefing36_police_and_mental_health.pdf

²² The Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health. (2008). Briefing 36: The police and mental health. Retrieved from: http://www.centreformentalhealth.org.uk/pdfs/briefing36_police_and_mental_health.pdf

²³ Home Office. (2008). Police Stations As Places Of Safety [Circular, 007 / 2008]. Retrieved from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/police-stations-as-places-of-safety>

3.2.6 As highlighted above, there has been a clear shift in the dynamics within the social context of policing over the last few years, with police officers required to possess more and more skills. In order to support adequate recruitment and retention of officers, this ever increasing requisite needs to be recognised and rewarded by the Government.

3.3 Political influences and police reform

3.3.1 Over the last few years there have been a number of large scale reforms and changes to policing that have directly affected the job requirements for police officers. Some of these reforms have had internal drivers, whilst others have been powered by political will.

3.3.2 For example, HMIC have previously emphasised that modern ways of working promoted by political reform, such as increased partnership working²⁴, often require officers to have additional skill sets, such as proficiency in negotiation and influence²⁵.

3.3.3 However, one of the largest drivers for police change in recent years has been the Winsor Review²⁶. In 2012 the Winsor Review set out 121 recommendations after an assessment of police pay and conditions. Although the majority of the recommendations referred to police officers' pay and pensions, the review has also affected officers' job requirements. One of the recommendations was to increase the educational and experience-based prerequisites for successful application to the police service:

²⁴ Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act, c13.(2011). Retrieved from: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/13/pdfs/ukpga_20110013_en.pdf

²⁵ Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. (2014). Policing in Austerity: Meeting the Challenge, page 35. Retrieved from: <http://www.justiceinspectors.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/policing-in-austerity-meeting-the-challenge.pdf>

²⁶ Winsor, T. (2012). Independent Review of Police Officer and Staff Remuneration and Conditions. Final report, 2. Retrieved from: <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130312170833/http://www.review.police.uk/publications/part-2-report/>

“An additional qualification should be added to the list required for appointment to a police force in Regulation 10 of the Police Regulations 2003. Candidates eligible for appointment to a police force should have either a Level 3 qualification, or a police qualification which is recognised by the sector skills council, Skills for Justice, or service as a Special Constable or service as a PCSO”²⁷

3.3.4 As potential recruits must now be able to afford additional education and/or spend time (possibly unpaid) working as a special Constable or a Police Community Support Officer (PCSO), this review has also indirectly affected the financial requirements for recruits. The Winsor Review was also the driving force behind the recent implementation of annual fitness tests, directly affecting the physical requirements for being an officer.

3.3.5 Interestingly, although the Winsor report raised the bar in relation to the entry requirements for police officers, it also reduced officers’ starting salaries by approximately £4,000. This effectively equates to asking for more, but paying less, and we fear that these changes will have a detrimental effect on recruitment.

3.3.6 The PFEW workforce survey supports these fears as it highlighted that officers have noticed these changes to their profession without financial recompense. One officer noted:

“We are also being expected to take on more roles and responsibilities for no extra pay.”

²⁷ Recommendation 3: Winsor, T. (2012). Independent Review of Police Officer and Staff Remuneration and Conditions. Final report, 2, 631. Retrieved from: <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130312170833/http://www.review.police.uk/publications/part-2-report/>

3.3.7 According to the Time for Justice report (2012)²⁸, there have been several other additional reforms that have recently led to an increase in requirements specifically for the rank of Inspector. These include the increased deployment of Inspectors as Senior Investigating Officers, and the devolution of command responsibilities from Superintendents to both Inspectors and Chief Inspectors as a result of replacing divisions with Basic Command Units (BCU), and then mergers of BCUs. These changes, (and other recent changes, not noted in the Time for Justice report, such as the decline in numbers of Superintendents), have increased the level of operational responsibility resting upon the shoulders of Inspectors and Chief Inspectors, highlighting a potential increase in the skills and abilities needed to work effectively in this rank. More specifically, an increase in operational responsibility may require advanced decision-making, time management, and team leadership skills.

3.3.8 Although there are many ways in which external authorities will continue to drive changes to officers job requirements, funding remains one of the key instruments of power and influence over organisational change within the police.

²⁸ Turnbull, P., and Wass, V. (2012). Time for Justice? Long Working Hours and the Well-Being of Police Inspectors. Retrieved from: <http://www.polfed.org/documents/Time-for-Justice-report-low-res.pdf>

3.4 Economic influences

3.4.1 The Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) delivered in 2010 stipulated that police funding would be reduced by 14% before the end of the 2015 financial year. Although the spending review specified that these savings should be made from “efficiencies in IT, procurement and back office function,”²⁹ in reality, these savings have appeared to have translated into a 19.47% reduction in police support staff and an 11.01% reduction in police officers overall³⁰. This drop in the police workforce has had a significant effect on officers, often increasing their workloads, responsibilities and number of working hours. It is worth noting that the reduction in numbers has been disproportionate for some ranks: for example the Superintending ranks have reduced by around 25%.

3.4.2 Increased workloads due to staff reductions have been reported by police officers across the service during the PFEW Pay Review Survey. A good example of this is eloquently illustrated by the below quote:

“I have suffered increased pension contributions, loss of CRTP (staged), loss of £3k SPP per year on top of my OCU losing 25% staff & virtually all police staff support. I have to do far more administrative work to compensate on top of having to cover the work of the posts lost (3 DI's to 2 DI's on my team) plus a reduction of 8 teams to 6 which means more work, less resources, and more frequent weekend working.”

²⁹ Her Majesty's Treasury. (2010). Spending review 2011. Page 54. Retrieved from: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/203826/Spending_review_2010.pdf

³⁰ Home Office. (2014). Police Workforce, England and Wales, 31 March 2014 [data tables]. Retrieved from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/tables-for-police-workforce-england-and-wales-31-march-2014>

3.4.3 These changes highlight a potential increase in the skills and abilities needed to work effectively as an officer. For example, more advanced skills in time management and decision-making which may prove pivotal when dealing with heavy workloads and competing demands. The recent reduction in police staff has also increased officers' administrative duties. This addition to their role not only detracts time from policing, but also requires officers to master supplementary skills in administrative proficiencies such as data entry, word processing and information management.

3.4.4 Due to a decreased workforce, officers are also often driven to working longer hours in order to manage the sheer volume of work and as a couple of respondents to the PFEW workforce survey pointed out:

“Our rest days can be cancelled at short notice, leave periods can be blocked, dependant on events and you are expected / ordered to work long hours.”

“Officer numbers are decreasing all the time which puts more responsibility and pressure onto serving officers.”

3.4.5 Similarly, over a quarter of officers who responded to the PFEW Pay Survey were found to be dissatisfied with their working hours and / or felt that their hours were unfair. However, as highlighted in the Time for Justice report³¹, the officers who are most likely to be dissatisfied with their working hours are Inspectors. This may be caused by the overtime 'buyout' in 1994, with some Inspectors feeling that they are often given longer working hours as they are seen as a 'free resource' when compared with lower ranks which are not salaried.

³¹ Turnbull, P., and Wass, V. (2012). Time for Justice? Long Working Hours and the Well-Being of Police Inspectors. Retrieved from: <http://www.polfed.org/documents/Time-for-Justice-report-low-res.pdf>

3.4.6 HMIC have also acknowledged that since 2010, many forces have reduced Chief Officer and supervisory posts in order to reduce management costs³². Consequently, management and higher-ranking officers have specifically noticed an increase in their supervisory workloads and levels of responsibilities³³. To fulfil these roles effectively, officers may have needed to further advance their abilities in areas such as people management, communication and decision-making.

3.5 Police workforce numbers over time

3.5.1 In order to maintain the safety of the public and the police officers themselves, it is essential to manage and plan workforces so that there are always enough officers to meet the policing demand. This principle was broadly recognised in the recent HMIC report, *“Policing In Austerity: Meeting the Challenge”*, HMIC recognised that it is essential to ensure that there are sufficient warranted officers in order to meet operational planning and resilience needs³⁴.

³² Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. (2014). Policing in Austerity: Meeting the Challenge. Retrieved from: <http://www.justiceinspectors.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/policing-in-austerity-meeting-the-challenge.pdf>

³³ Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. (2014). Core Business: An inspection into crime prevention, police attendance and the use of police time. Retrieved from: <http://www.justiceinspectors.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/core-business.pdf>

³⁴ Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. (2014). Policing in Austerity: Meeting the Challenge. Retrieved from: <http://www.justiceinspectors.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/policing-in-austerity-meeting-the-challenge.pdf>

3.5.2 Graph 3.1 and Table 3.1 both illustrate that since 2010, the total police workforce has decreased by 14.37%. During this time period, the number of police officers has reduced by 11.01%, whilst the number of police staff has reduced by 19.47%³⁵. It is important to view the reduction in police staff and police officers in combination; a reduction in one group can have a noticeable knock-on effect upon the other. Reduction in police officer numbers can result in police staff undertaking tasks that fall outside of their job role³⁶, whilst reduction in police staff can pull police officers away from frontline duties. The impact of the heavier reduction in police staff can therefore have a direct effect upon the demands placed on officers.

3.5.3 Table 3.2 shows the police workforce reduction as a proportion and illustrates that the greatest reduction was during the 2011/12 financial year, when the total police workforce shrank by 5.63%. Unsurprisingly, this increase is echoed by the trend in police officer double time working across the same time period. Since overtime is more costly than basic hours, workforce reductions may have had an unintended impact on the services overall costs³⁷

³⁵ Home Office. (2014). Police Workforce, England and Wales, 31 March 2014 [data tables]. Retrieved from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/tables-for-police-workforce-england-and-wales-31-march-2014>


³⁶ Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. (2014). Core Business: An inspection into crime prevention, police attendance and the use of police time. Retrieved from: <http://www.justiceinspectors.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/core-business.pdf>

³⁷ Office of Manpower Economics, PNB Census of Earnings, Hours and Length of Service. Data available from PFEW on request.

Table 3.1: Total police workforce (2010 – 2014)³⁸

Staff Type	March					% Reduction
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	
Total Workforce	244497.07	233255.20	220121.28	213631.50	209361.88	14.37%
Police Staff	79596.09	74010.13	67472.32	65508.62	64096.91	19.47%
Police Officers	143734.44	139109.61	134100.02	129583.79	127909.30	11.01%

Graph 3.1: Total police workforce (2010 – 2014)³⁹



³⁸ Home Office. (2014). Police Workforce, England and Wales, 31 March 2014 [data tables]. Retrieved from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/tables-for-police-workforce-england-and-wales-31-march-2014>

³⁹ Home Office. (2014). Police Workforce, England and Wales, 31 March 2014 [data tables]. Retrieved from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/tables-for-police-workforce-england-and-wales-31-march-2014>

Table 3.2: Annual police workforce reductions on previous year as a proportion (2010 – 2014 financial years)⁴⁰

Staff Type	% Reduction on previous year			
	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13	2013-14
Total Workforce	4.60%	5.63%	2.95%	2.00%
Police Staff	7.02%	8.83%	2.91%	2.15%
Police Officers	3.22%	3.60%	3.37%	1.29%

3.5.4 Although reductions to the police workforce has slowed since 2012, there continues to be an annual decrease in the number of police officers and police staff, and the turnover rate for the police workforce as a whole (i.e. the number of individuals leaving the police service) has increased from 5% in 2010 to 8% in 2014⁴¹.


3.5.5 What is not clear from national police workforce statistics in their present form, is the reason for the reduction in the police workforce since 2010. In part, this decrease is likely to be the consequence of the deliberate workforce planning strategies of individual forces. However it may also be due to an increase in voluntary turnover as more staff choose to leave the police service. It is worth noting that although the turnover for officers only has stayed fairly stable since 2010 (see Graph 5.1 in Chapter 5), we are currently unable to tell whether these service exits are voluntary or mandatory and thus there still could be an increase in officers leaving voluntarily. Furthermore, while it might be expected that voluntary turnover would decline during the recession, there is no evidence that this has been the case.

⁴⁰ Home Office. (2014). Police Workforce, England and Wales, 31 March 2014 [data tables]. Retrieved from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/tables-for-police-workforce-england-and-wales-31-march-2014>

⁴¹ Home Office. (2014). Police Workforce, England and Wales, 31 March 2014 [data tables]. Retrieved from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/tables-for-police-workforce-england-and-wales-31-march-2014>

3.5.6 Data collated at a national level also do not currently differentiate between the extent to which police turnover is planned and unplanned. This creates a serious gap in the HO's ability to understand recruitment, management, and retention needs of the police work force and to adjust their policies accordingly.

Graph 3.2: Annual police workforce reduction as a percentage since 2010⁴²



3.5.7 At the same time as the number of police officers has reduced, the size of the population in England and Wales has increased⁴³. Between 2010 and 2014, the number of police officers per 100,000 population decreased by 14.39%. These data clearly illustrate that the police service is now serving a larger population than it was in 2010, yet doing so with fewer officers.

⁴²Home Office. (2014). Police Workforce, England and Wales, 31 March 2014 [data tables]. Retrieved from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/tables-for-police-workforce-england-and-wales-31-march-2014>;

⁴³Office of National Statistics. (2013). Population Estimates for England and Wales - Mid-2012. Retrieved from: <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/pop-estimate/population-estimates-for-england-and-wales/index.html>


Table 3.3: Police officers per capita (2010 -2014; Home Office Forces)⁴⁴

Police Officers	March					%
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Reduction
Per 100,000 Population	264	254	243	231	226	14.39%


3.5.8 The United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime annually publishes workforce data for police personnel at a national level. The most recent international data is shown in Graph 3.3 and indicates that England and Wales had fewer frontline police personnel per capita in 2012-2013 than Australia and many other countries in Western Europe. In addition, Graph 3.4 highlights that the reduction in the number of Police Officers in England and Wales between the 2009-2010 and 2012-2013 financial years was greater than the reduction in frontline police personnel in other comparator nations including the United States, France and Germany. Furthermore, other countries such as Australia and Canada have actually increased their size of their police workforce, over the same period.

⁴⁴ Home Office. (2014). Police Workforce, England and Wales, 31 March 2014 [data tables]. Retrieved from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/tables-for-police-workforce-england-and-wales-31-march-2014>

Graph 3.3: Frontline police personnel per capita⁴⁵ (2012; rate per 100,000 population)^{46, 47}



Graph 3.4: Reduction in frontline police personnel (2009 to 2012)⁴⁸



⁴⁵ NB. UN label Home Office Workforce Statistics for Financial Year 2012-2013 as 2012

⁴⁶ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Criminal Justice. Criminal Justice System Resources [data tables]. Retrieved from: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/index.html>

⁴⁷ NB. The UK currently does not provide these statistics to the UN, however figures for England and Wales were calculated using Home Office Workforce Statistics

3.6 Demand for policing over time

3.6.1 The number of crimes committed (per 1,000 population) and the total number of 999 calls have decreased in England and Wales since 2010⁴⁹. Although this could partially be explained by the introduction of the Police 101 service in 2012⁵⁰, UN statistics indicate that this is possibly reflective of a broader downward trend in crime, particularly in Europe. However, certain crimes in England and Wales have increased during this period. For example, sexual offences have been increasing per 1,000 population since 2012, and have increased by 20% between the financial years ending in 2013 and 2014⁵¹. The investigation and prosecution of complex crimes such as these are particularly time and labour intensive, a factor not captured by overall crime figures or captured in a way that could feed into a national demand and capacity analysis. To help determine demands, this deficit in data capture should be addressed along with the publication of data regarding number of calls to the 101 service.

3.6.2 As previously mentioned in paragraph 3.2.4, HMIC have also recognised that there has been an increase in the time that police officers are required to spend responding to demand which could more appropriately be dealt with by other services. Responsibilities such as these, along with other more traditional police duties (such as providing crowd control and crime prevention work), are also not currently captured in a meaningful way.

⁴⁸ NB. The UN uses nationally reported statistics to compile its analysis, therefore there is likely to be some slight variation the timing of data collection between countries, for example UN label Home Office Workforce Statistics for Financial Year 2009/10 as 2009, 2010/11 as 2010, 2011/12 as 2011 and 2012-2013 as 2012.

⁴⁹ Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary.(2014). Value for money profile data, 2014 – annual data return [data tables]. Retrieved from: <http://www.justiceinspectors.gov.uk/hmic/data/value-for-money-data/>;
HMIC.(2010). Underlying data [data tables]. Retrieved from:
<http://www.justiceinspectors.gov.uk/hmic/data/value-for-money-data/>

⁵⁰ Home Office.(2013). Helping the police fight crime more effectively [webpage]. Retrieved from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/helping-the-police-fight-crime-more-effectively/supporting-pages/implementing-101-the-police-non-emergency-number>

⁵¹ Office of National Statistics.(2014). Crime statistics, period ending: March 2014. Retrieved from: <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/crime-stats/crime-statistics/period-ending-march-2014/index.html>

3.7 Summary

- 3.7.1 Throughout the past four years of austerity and reform, the police service has risen to the challenge with officers taking on more responsibilities; larger workloads; and extending their existing skill sets to meet the needs of both the service and the public. However, without a corresponding increase in appropriate support, training and remuneration, officers may find it difficult to continue to fulfil these increasing requirements in the future.
- 3.7.2 Declines in police workforces and a growing population in England and Wales have reduced the number of police officers per capita by 14.39% since 2010. Comparing the decline in police personnel for England and Wales with other countries shows that our police service has suffered from more workforce decline than many other comparator countries.
- 3.7.3 The decline in the police workforce and growth in labour intensive crimes and additional 'hidden' duties have resulted in an increase in officers' workloads, and thus their individual levels of responsibility.
- 3.7.4 As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the necessary skills and experience required to be an effective police officer have also gradually increased over time, and will continue to do so in response to external influences. Changes to the entry requirements, fitness testing and the numerous external influences have also expanded the skill set required to work effectively in a modern police role.

3.7.5 There is a considerable deficit in terms of the police workforce data that is currently collected and reported. This makes it very difficult to assess demand and capacity issues, restricting the Home Office's ability to model, plan and manage the police workforce. Due to the extent of our concerns regarding the current data deficits, Chapter 4 is dedicated to discussing these in depth.

3.7.6 Although there are some serious challenges in regards to the nationally held data, the evidence outlined in the text above highlights the increased level of skill and responsibility required in working effectively as a modern police officer. To date, none of these changes have been reflected in pay and conditions. If these changes continue to go unrecognised, it may become increasingly difficult to maintain officers' psychological contracts with the service. In turn, this may make it more challenging to ensure that there are sufficient, capable and motivated officers serving within the police service.

3.8 Questions arising

- How are changing requirements being captured, and reflected in the rewards, or in reward planning?
- How has the reduction in officer numbers affected the ability of the police to serve the public, and how has it affected the workload and skills required by individual officers?
- How do we know what police are doing in their roles, and whether they are being recompensed properly for their efforts? Currently, there seems to be no national mechanism for systematic monitoring of these.

SECTION 2: OFFICIAL WORKFORCE DATA

This section contains an analysis of the workforce data provided by official sources. The aim is to demonstrate to the PRRB that the evidence base for changes to pay and conditions is not well elucidated.

In this section we discuss the comprehensiveness, transparency, and accuracy of existing data. We also compare it to data used in other public sector organisations.

Going forward, we recommend changes so that:

- an evidence based approach to workforce planning is adopted, with appropriate and transparent data;
- should significant changes be suggested to pay and conditions, then appropriate modelling of likely impacts should be undertaken; and
- recent changes should be monitored for their impact, to check whether intended and unintended consequences have accrued.

4 Workforce data: are the current workforce data robust enough to evaluate pay against the outcomes of ‘sufficient, capable and motivated’ officers?

4.1 Introduction

4.1.1 The majority of the workforce data we examine within this document was collated from two main sources: Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC)⁵², and the Home Office (HO)⁵³. To the best of our knowledge these data have been interpreted appropriately and accurately.

4.1.2 However, we have noticed a number of challenges with these data sets in terms of accuracy, comprehensiveness and transparency. This is a key concern as these challenges may impact upon the validity of any conclusions that are drawn from the data.

4.1.3 We recognise that in many cases the data collected at force level are more comprehensive. For example, some forces run attitudinal surveys. However, given the current national pay system and the need for officers’ pay and conditions to be legislated in Regulations and Determinations, our concern is that the lack of comprehensive data at a national level means that national policies cannot be properly evaluated. Nor can the impact at force level be compared, when the data are different at that level.

⁵² Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary.(2014). Value for money profile data, 2014 – annual data return [data tables]. Retrieved from: <http://www.justiceinspectors.gov.uk/hmic/data/value-for-money-data/>; HMIC.(2010). Underlying data [data tables]. Retrieved from: <http://www.justiceinspectors.gov.uk/hmic/data/value-for-money-data/>
⁵³ Home Office. (2014). Police Workforce, England and Wales, 31 March 2014 [data tables]. Retrieved from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/tables-for-police-workforce-england-and-wales-31-march-2014>

4.1.4 As part of our PRRB submission, we have been asked to comment on whether the existing pay system ensures sufficient, capable and motivated personnel. In order to achieve this, however, we must also evaluate whether the national workforce data currently published by HMIC and the HO are; *comprehensive, accurate, and transparent* enough to allow such meaningful evaluation.

4.2 Data comprehensiveness

4.2.1 To ensure appropriate, effective, and evidence-based workforce planning, both data collection and analysis should always be driven by need. Although this can be accomplished by working through stages similar to that in Table 4.1 , there are some data that are almost always appropriate to collect and analyse, such as: overall numbers (joiners, leavers, and so on); the age, gender, and ethnic profile of the service as a whole; length of service; and predictions of the likelihood of leaving and plans for redressing any gaps.

Table 4.1: Typical stages of workforce planning

- Identification of planning needs;
- Identification of appropriate measures (or indicators) that will be able to accurately gauge performance against the organisations planning needs;
- Data collection and analysis;
- Development of change strategy and action plan, and;
- Evaluation of outcomes using performance measures/ indicators.

- 4.2.2 Although the Home Office collects data on police officers, their measures (or data series) do not appear to be based on adequate workforce planning requirements.
- 4.2.3 Good examples of a comprehensive data collection are the Ministry of Defence's national and official statistics. The MoD collects and releases a series of monthly, quarterly and annual personnel reports for both military and civilian departments. They also collect and produce information on health statistics, equipment, activities, as well as finance and economics.
- 4.2.4 When specifically comparing the personnel data reported by the MoD for the Armed Forces and the HO for the police, there is a marked difference. Table 4.2 gives a top level comparison guide between the services personnel reporting.

Table 4.2⁵⁴: Top level comparison between the MoD⁵⁵ and HO⁵⁶ workforce reports

	MoD Armed forces workforce reports and data	HO Police workforce reports and data
Frequency	<p>Annual</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Top level report for Armed services • Tri-service personnel bulletin • Reserves and cadets strengths • Maternity report • Redundancy program statistics <p>Quarterly</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Top level report for Armed services • Royal Navy and Royal Marines quarterly pocket brief <p>Monthly</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Top level report for Armed services • Royal Navy and Royal Marines monthly personnel statistics 	<p>Biannual (March and September releases)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Police workforce England and Wales
Information Categories Included in Report(s)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strength and Liabilities: numbers and proportions • Branch, specialisation and arm information: workforce numbers and percentages • Rank information (paid): workforce numbers and percentages • Intake (Joiners) from 'Civil Life' or 'Another Service' • Outflow (leavers) information: rates and exit reasons • Voluntary outflow information: rates and exit reasons • Promotion information • Training information • Gender information: workforce numbers and percentages • Ethnicity information: workforce numbers and percentages • Top level budget information • Regular length of service (LoS) information • Gains to strength: by branch 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strength: numbers and proportions • Workforce area, Force: numbers and percentages • Rank information (paid) : workforce numbers and percentages • Joiners: rates and proportions • Leavers: rates and proportions • Gender information: workforce numbers and percentages • Ethnicity information: workforce numbers and percentages

⁵⁴ **Please note:** this table is a top level report assessment only. If you would like to see a copy of either of these reports, please use the links in the footnotes 55 and 56

⁵⁵ Information taken from reports contained within the webpage detailing MoD statistics by topic on the Government website: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/mod-national-and-official-statistics-by-topic>

⁵⁶ Information taken from the reports within the webpage detailing the Home Office Police workforce England and Wales statistics on the government website: <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/police-workforce-england-and-wales>

- 4.2.5 As previously mentioned, Table 4.2 shows notable differences in the frequency and scope of the regular workforce reports from each service. More specifically, the MoD include additional data on; planned workforce numbers; exit reasons for both voluntary and mandatory outflow (leavers); maternity and paternity leave; promotions; as well as training and skill mixes. The MoD attempts to provide information on those aspects of pay and conditions that are key motivators, enablers, and retention factors. The national level of data collection for the police does not appear to include these elements in a comprehensive way.
- 4.2.6 Given the deficits highlighted by the above comparison, we have serious concerns over the frequency and scope of the data currently available. Although we understand that it is not within the PRRB's remit to plan and/or monitor the police workforce, the workforce data mentioned throughout this chapter is essential for exploring whether the existing pay and conditions ensure the recruitment and retention of sufficient, capable and motivated officers.
- 4.2.7 Deficits in the comprehensiveness of the data will be considered below specifically in reference to the themes of; *Sufficient, Capable and Motivated*. Please note: a full evaluation matrix between what is currently available and what we believe to be essential data for accurate and effective police workforce planning can be found in Annex 4.1.

Sufficiency

- 4.2.8 As stated in Chapter 2 police officers accept many challenging conditions, but with an expectation that they will be afforded terms and conditions that recognise the responsibilities they carry. This reciprocal arrangement gives rise to expectations regarding working conditions that are often referred to as a “psychological contract”⁵⁷ .
- 4.2.9 Although sufficient recruitment, retention and motivation of capable officers cannot be ensured solely by pay, it is nonetheless a critical factor which appears in many employee motivation theories⁵⁸ and forms part of an officer’s psychological contract with the service.
- 4.2.10 There are two issues regarding the sufficiency of officers that we consider pertinent here. The first is whether the overall numbers of officers are sufficient to meet the demands of policing. Whilst appreciating that it is not within the Pay Review Body’s remit to increase the numbers, the relevance here is that decreasing numbers means increasing workload: and that should be rewarded. Not only is the service as a whole “doing more with less”, but each individual officer is having to do so.

⁵⁷ Argyris, C. (1960) *Understanding Organisational Behaviour*. Homewood :Dorsey; Rousseau D.M. (1995). *Psychological Contracts in Organisations: Understanding Written and Unwritten Agreements*. Sage Publication.

⁵⁸ Rainall, S. (2004). A review of employee motivation theories and their implications for employee retention within organizations. *The Journal of American Academy of Business*, 9, 21-26. Retrieved from: ftp://118.139.161.3/pub/moodledata/113/Ramlall_2004.pdf

4.2.11 The second issue is whether pay is sufficient to attract officers of an appropriate calibre into service, and then retain them. Within this, it is also important to consider whether the pay is sufficient to attract and retain officers who reflect the public they serve. This means, for example, attracting officers from differing socio-economic backgrounds, genders, and ethnicity, and retaining officers that reflect a range of ages. We found twenty-six studies⁵⁹ that addressed the consequences of either black and minority ethnic (BME) or gender representativeness in the police, (or both). A number of these suggest that perceptions of police legitimacy and trustworthiness increase when a police service is more representative in terms of ethnicity and gender. Some research also suggests a representative service also has a positive effect on performance.

Overall sufficiency

4.2.12 There is a general feeling within the police service that there are a sufficient number of applicants and no current recruiting difficulties. If this is the case, it is likely that this is partially due to the effects of locally planned workforce reductions and the influence of the recession. The recent austerity and shrinking job market may have caused a reduction in competitive remuneration. Therefore, it would be worth noting that officers who haven't left during recession may well leave upon economic upturn. Recent research has found a correlation between unemployment rates, consumer confidence and voluntary turnover rates; suggesting that as economic fears recede, voluntary turn over rises⁶⁰.

⁵⁹ References for these are supplied at Annex 4.2

⁶⁰ Schwartz, J. and Erickson, R. (2009). Prepare Now Or Lose Your Best Employees Soon [webpage]. Retrieved from: <http://www.forbes.com/2009/08/12/talent-employees-retention-leadership-ceonetwork-deloitte.html>

- 4.2.13 This being said, data required to actually *evidence* staff sufficiency and recruitment efficiency on a national level is simply not available through the HO. Unlike the MoD, the HO do not provide information on actual workforce vs. planned workforce numbers. This means that currently the data reveals how many people are employed, rather than how many posts are filled.
- 4.2.14 A key area in terms of defining whether the number of officers is sufficient is the national levels of demand and capacity. As mentioned in Chapter 3 however, there is currently very little public data that can be used to evaluate police demand. 999 call data and crime figures alone are not an adequate representation of the demands placed on the police. It would be helpful if data regarding the 'hidden' responsibilities of police, such as crowd control and inter-agency support, were captured in a meaningful way as it would enable a fuller understanding of national demand and capacity.
- 4.2.15 Insights from other professions, such as nursing, indicate that it is possible to produce recommended minimum staffing levels and that implementation of these recommendations can have an impact on a range of positive outcomes at both an individual and organisational level⁶¹. Although there are obvious intrinsic differences between nursing and policing, the viability such a project within a policing context should be explored.
- 4.2.16 We believe that there needs to be a shift away from the position taken in the last few years, when the number of officers has been determined by affordability, to a position where the number of officers is based on the demands of policing. We have, and will continue, to argue for greater numbers of officers. However, we understand that the overall numbers of officers is outside the remit of the PRRB.

⁶¹Royal College of Nursing. (2012). *Mandatory Nurse staffing. Policy Briefing, 03/12*. Retrieved from: http://www.rcn.org.uk/_data/assets/pdf_file/0009/439578/03.12_Mandatory_nurse_staffing_levels_v2_FINAL.pdf

Recruitment and retention

- 4.2.17 If an organisation fails to offer what potential applicants view as proper recompense for the level of responsibility and skill required for the role, it may deter them from applying. This is especially pertinent given the recent reduction in police workforce and the Winsor recommendation to increase entry requirements⁶². This recommendation was implemented alongside a reduction to the starting salary; highlighting the recent and damaging ‘more for less’ attitude towards policing. As previously mentioned, the reductions in the police workforce also seem to support this sort of attitude, as there are inevitable knock-on effects on individual workloads and responsibilities.
- 4.2.18 To better understand and monitor the attractiveness of policing as a job, we need to know the number, and calibre, of applicants that apply for each position, as well as those who are actually recruited. Ideally, we would also know whether the applicants and recruits were internally or externally sourced; and if they were internally sourced, why they moved roles. For example, was it a promotion or did they transfer to another area?
- 4.2.19 Similarly, to understand retention we need to know the level of planned and unplanned turnover; we also need to know whether leavers exited the service, or just their role, as well as their underlying reasons for leaving.

⁶² Recommendation 3 & 5 from: Winsor, T. (2012) *Independent Review of Police Officer and Staff Remuneration and Conditions, Final report*, 2, 631.

- 4.2.20 There is currently no accessible information regarding number of applicants for each vacancy, nor the profile of applicants (age, gender, qualifications, ethnicity, etc.) at a national level or in any central repositories that would allow comparison of the experiences of different forces. This means that it is difficult to gauge whether there are sufficient and capable officers, and whether legislation regarding workforce diversity is being properly enacted.
- 4.2.21 Although the HO does collect data on exit reasons, this information is not currently part of their standardised reporting. This evidence is absolutely key in evaluating the impact of policies designed to manage service retention and talent flow.
- 4.2.22 Furthermore, there has been a recent focus on the need for force “resilience”, and this argument is being used to underpin the rationale for officers on restricted duties to be potentially exited from service. Unfortunately, data that could inform us of the size and scope of this issue are not currently available on the Home Office website. More specifically, it would be helpful to have details on: whether police services are unable to meet commitments currently, what commitments these are, and what role those on restricted duties play in this; the type of restricted duties officers are performing; the reasons for officers being on restricted/recuperative duties (e.g. injury, illness, disability); whether or not this was a result of working as a police officer; and the reasons for restrictions (e.g. management, medical).
- 4.2.23 Recent discussions with the Home Office have revealed that some of these key pieces of data, such as number and quality of applicants for each vacancy, are no longer being collected though the Annual Data Requirements (ADR)⁶³. However, if the data do not allow for policies to be evaluated, then how can these policies be justified, and the cost-impacts calculated?

⁶³ P. Spreadbury (personal communication, 17 November 2014)

4.2.24 We understand that the HO ADRs are not solely driven by workforce planning and that there are competing data priorities; however, we would argue that the lack of adequate, appropriate and accurate workforce data such as this will affect the HO's understanding of policy effectiveness, and our ability to effectively represent our members' interests.

4.2.25 As such, we believe that the PFEW is a key stakeholder in the ADR collected by the HO and consequently should be invited to attend and contribute to their annual review of the ADR. This would offer us the opportunity to engage with the HO and present feedback on data priorities to help shape a more effective and evidence based workforce plan.

Capable

4.2.26 Beyond ensuring that there are sufficient police officers, it is also critical that officers are both motivated and capable, in order to carry out their role effectively. Changes to the existing pay and remuneration packages are also likely to have an impact on the performance⁶⁴ of existing employees. There is also a possibility that changes to these systems could have a negative impact on staff turnover intentions⁶⁵, and consequently organisational performance⁶⁶.

⁶⁴T. Newburn. (1999). *Understanding and preventing police corruption: lessons from the literature*. Policing and Reducing Crime Unit, Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, Police Research Series, 110, 20.

⁶⁵ Miceli, M.P., and Mulvey, P.W. (2000). Consequences of Satisfaction with Pay System: Two Field Studies. *Industrial Relations*, 39, 62-87. doi:10.1111/0019-8676.00153

⁶⁶ Heavey, A. L., Holwerda, J. A., & Hausknecht, J. P. (2013). Causes and consequences of collective turnover: A meta-analytic review. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 98, 3, 412.

- 4.2.27 National statistics, however, are currently not able to capture these issues. Fortunately, the PFEW's workforce survey conducted in Spring 2014 sheds considerable light on officers' attitudes towards their work, their current pay and conditions, and the police service in general. Chapter 6 details the key findings from this survey in order to address the main themes of Sufficient, Capable and Motivated.
- 4.2.28 It would be good practice for the HO to hold data on the numbers and profile of individuals with specific skills. Even though there is an increasing pressure to undertake mutual aid activities, and collaboration, the HO does not currently report any data pertaining to the calibre of recruits or existing officers. This makes it impossible for us to determine whether capable candidates are being attracted to the service; officers are offered the opportunity to gain appropriate skills; and whether those who are skilled are being retained. Collecting and reporting this data would facilitate effective capacity planning and maintenance.
- 4.2.29 There is also little quantitative, and no qualitative, information captured at a national level regarding how long officers remain in service; whether those leaving are likely to be higher calibre; and what the reasons are for leaving. This makes it extremely difficult to understand the rationale for some of the policies suggested by the HO.
- 4.2.30 Unlike the MoD, the HO does not publish data on wastage during probation. This means that it is difficult to measure the impact of changes to key areas such as recruiting standards. Information such as this is essential in order to understand whether the current pay and conditions facilitate the recruitment and retention of officers who are able to deal with the challenging nature of police training, and the demands of the job.

- 4.2.31 Although it is likely that the College of Policing will collect such data in the future, there is no transparent plan as to how this will be used in analysis or planning, and it might be expected that ongoing policy evaluation should take such data into account.
- 4.2.32 The pipeline showing the flow of officers through the ranks is also not clear, meaning that officers often enter service with expectations that they will be promoted that cannot be met. The PFEW workforce survey showed that 12.1% of Constables and 15.5% of Sergeants passed their promotion boards, but there was no position open for them to move into.⁶⁷ In addition, there is currently no data offered centrally to assess how many individuals are in receipt of Acting Up allowance for acting in a higher rank. Given austerity pressures not to promote, this would be a useful measure both to understand the promotion pipeline, and to understand whether those in rank are fully prepared for the job, in the interests of the public.
- 4.2.33 The recent implementation of the Fast Track and Direct Entry schemes has been designed to increase access to higher ranks for capable individuals. However, their introduction to date has been piecemeal and seemingly without any analysis being undertaken to investigate how the restriction of ACPO access opportunities for existing officers will impact on the retention of existing talent.

⁶⁷ Boag-Munroe, F., Knapper, S., and Elliot-Davies, M. (2015) Police Officers' Promotion Prospects and Intention to Leave the police service: The mediating effects of perceived organisational support and personal morale. Paper presented at the British Psychological Society's Division of Occupational Psychology Conference, Glasgow 7-9th January 2015.

Motivated

- 4.2.34 As with performance, changes to the existing pay and remuneration packages are likely to have an impact on the morale⁶⁸ and turnover intentions⁶⁹ of existing employees.
- 4.2.35 Unlike other public sector agencies, there is currently no national level collection of attitudinal data regarding the motivation of officers. An example of good practice in this regard is the Armed Forces, who routinely collect measures of motivation and attitudes towards pay and allowances, and who use this to help shape their policy. The Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Surveys (AFCAS) have been running for several years. Perception data from these surveys can be matched to the package of pay and allowances attained by each individual, through the Joint Personnel Administration system.
- 4.2.36 This makes it possible for the Armed Forces to understand which pay and allowances have the effects that they are intended to. For example, it allows analysis of whether particular rewards incentivise individuals to develop skills, stay in service, and undertake particular duties, and so on.

⁶⁸ Smith, J. C. (2013). Pay growth, fairness and job satisfaction : Implications for nominal and real wage rigidity. Working Paper. Coventry, UK: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Retrieved from: <http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/56589>


⁶⁹ Miceli, M.P., and Mulvey, P.W. (2000). Consequences of Satisfaction with Pay System: Two Field Studies. *Industrial Relations*, 39, 62-87. doi:10.1111/0019-8676.00153

4.3 Data accuracy and uniformity

- 4.3.1 Whilst using the data provided by the HO and HMIC to help understand national trends in police staffing, we have observed some problems with the data auditing process prior to publication. In some cases these problems have led to significant errors in nationally published data. Although the relevant bodies are generally helpful and responsive to our queries, we are concerned over the time and effort it has taken to address and rectify some errors once identified.
- 4.3.2 A good example of this are the sickness figures for Cleveland Police. Using the workforce and sickness data collected by the HO, we examined the number of officers on sick leave⁷⁰ as a proportion of each Force's total workforce. This allowed us to compare sickness figures between Forces, irrespective of the differences in their workforce size. However, on acquiring the data it appeared that the figures for Cleveland were disproportionate compared with the rest of the Forces.
- 4.3.3 Graphs 4.1 and 4.2 highlight these inconsistencies by illustrating that in 2013, the reported proportion of staff on long term sick leave (LTS) was 22.88%. This is over 20% higher than both the average amongst other forces and the next highest force figure.
- 4.3.4 They also show that the 2010 figures for short and medium term sickness (SMTS) are equally as concerning. The reported proportion of staff on SMTS leave for Cleveland was 35.83%, which is over 30% higher than both the average amongst other forces and the next highest force figure.


⁷⁰ NB data is taken as a headcount on the 31st (of March each year.)

Graph 4.1: Staff on long term sick leave as a proportion (2010 – 2014; includes police officers, staff including s.38+9 and PCSOs)⁷¹



*Average across all PFEW forces excluding Cleveland

Graph 4.2: Staff on short or medium term sick leave as a proportion of the police workforce (2010 – 2014; includes police officers, police staff including s.38+9 and PCSOs)⁷²



*Average across all PFEW forces excluding Cleveland

⁷¹ Calculated using data from the documents listed in **Annex 4.3:**

⁷² Calculated using data from the documents listed in **Annex 4.3:**

- 4.3.5 When queried in June 2014, the HO acknowledged the sickness figures for Cleveland as incorrect⁷³, yet 6 months later these errors have still not been fully explained or amended within the publically available data tables on the HMIC website.
- 4.3.6 We recognise that austerity measures have hit the support functions for officers as well as officers themselves. However, we believe that the public deserve to have a police service that is designed, supported, and held to account based on accurate and up-to-date data.
- 4.3.7 In addition to errors within the published data sets, we have also observed several other difficulties regarding comparing and understanding the data produced by HMIC and the HO. Currently these organisations do not practice a uniform approach when reporting police workforce data or crime statistics. There are many differences in how they report this information and these divergences are not always effectively sign posted. This can make comparison between data sources lengthy and problematic. Guidance notes on exclusion and inclusion criteria used for each data series are usually held in a separate document, whilst key information is not always clear and, in some instances, is lacking.
- 4.3.8 For example, Table 4.3 shows that when comparing the historical figures from the 2014 and the 2013 data sets for crime per 1,000 populations, the numbers do not match for each concordant year. This unexplained fluctuation indicates that there is some variation in how the HMIC numbers were calculated in 2013 and 2014, but the nature and extent of these variations is not clearly signposted.

⁷³ E. Woods (personal communication, 26 June 2014)

4.3.9 In addition, crime statistics data are reported by the HO as a frequency (the actual number of incidents) and includes (some) incidents of fraud; whereas HMIC reports crimes as a rate (per 1,000 population) and does not include fraud⁷⁴.

4.3.10 This lack of consistency and clarity makes it challenging to interrogate, understand, and use the data appropriately. With these difficulties in mind, we would like to see a greater integration and compatibility between the collection and presentation of data by HMIC and the HO; this will help develop a more reliable evidence base.

Table 4.3⁷⁵: Crimes per 1,000 population over time by data set

Crimes per 1000 population	According to the 2014 Crime and ASB data set	According to the 2013 Crime and ASB data set
12 months to June 2013	60.74	61.22
12 months to June 2012	65.15	65.40
12 months to June 2011	69.31	69.49

⁷⁴ Data taken from Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary 'Crime and Anti-Social Behaviour' [data sets]. Retrieved from: <http://www.justiceinspectores.gov.uk/hmic/data/crime-and-policing-comparator-data/>

⁷⁵ Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary.(2014).Crime and ASB – June 2011/12/13/14 [data table]. Retrieved from: <http://www.justiceinspectores.gov.uk/hmic/data/crime-and-policing-comparator-data/> ; Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary.(2014). Crime and ASB – June 2010/11/12/13 [data table]. Retrieved from: <http://www.justiceinspectores.gov.uk/hmic/data/crime-and-policing-comparator-data/>

- 4.3.11 Additionally, there are some data series and key statistics related to workforce strength collected by the HO and published by HMIC, that are not fit for purpose in their present form. In particular, we note limitations with the reporting of sickness absence data. For instance, sickness absence is only reported by HMIC, and is done so as a headcount of police officers on long-term sick leave and short-term sick leave on the 31st March each year. Snapshot data of this kind is not truly representative of sickness absence over the entire year. For example, it does not capture the number of days lost to sickness nor the number of officers who are absent through sickness within a given year.
- 4.3.12 More broadly we feel that the use of a “snapshot” model to capture data at one particular point in time presents challenges for accurate assessments of whether the current police workforce is sufficient to meet demand. For example, population fluctuations in some areas of the country, in particular in regions with high levels of seasonal tourism can significantly distort police officers per capita calculations, and underestimate the demand for policing as a consequence. In addition, the use of broad statistics such as number of leavers, without drilling further into reasons for leaving, again prevents firmer conclusions being drawn.
- 4.3.13 We do, however, recognise that all data are reliant on accurate reporting, and that this often sits at a force level, rather than with national organisations. As noted above, this is something that has recently been highlighted by HMIC within the context of crime-recording: however the same principles should also apply to police workforce reporting, to effectively analyse police workforce strength as well as demand for policing.

4.4 Transparency

- 4.4.1 A final concern with regard to the data that are collected is with regard to the transparency of data. As previously mentioned, recent discussions with the HO has revealed that much of the data they collect are not currently disseminated through regular reports⁷⁶.
- 4.4.2 Sickness data, for example, are collected by the HO and reported by HMIC in their 'Value for Money' data sets. As previously mentioned, the current document bases the sickness figures on an unrepresentative "snapshot" methodology⁷⁷. However recent discussions with the HO revealed that other, more appropriate measures, such as 'Total Contracted Hours Lost to Sickness' are collected but not currently used in HMIC reports.
- 4.4.3 A more critical example of the challenges of data transparency is the PNB Pay Census, which has run since 2010. This was the only nationally collated measure of actual pay and allowances paid to officers. From 2010 to 2014 the costs of this census were shared between the HO and Staff Associations, even though the data are required by law to monitor equality issues. There have been a number of occasions when the analysis undertaken by the Staff Associations has been used by both sides to reach agreements over the best way forward on a change of policy. These have included modelling the savings made by the two year pay freeze; the costing of resuming incremental progression, and modelling of options; savings of changing the rate of overtime payments; impacts of pension savings; and equal pay issues.

⁷⁶ P. Spreadbury (personal communication, 17 November 2014)

⁷⁷ Please see section 4.3

- 4.4.4 Unfortunately now that the HO will be funding data collection, there has been no consultation over what data are to be collected. Furthermore, the HO has stated that there is no intention to share the data, other than summaries.
- 4.4.5 This lack of transparency leaves the Staff Associations in a difficult position, in that there are likely to be approaches by members over concerns about losses of pay that the Staff Associations cannot adequately answer for members. This is likely to increase distrust; leave the Staff Associations unable to understand policy changes and impacts; and make it more difficult for the Associations to be supportive of HO initiatives. It will also mean the burden of analysis and interpretation of data will fall even more to the HO. Overall, these unintended consequences are not likely to be in the public interest.

4.4.6 Obviously these concerns apply to the ongoing management of officers: comprehensive, transparent, and reliable data is needed for that. Additionally, these concerns apply to the future planning of changes to the way officers are managed. How can policies be determined unless robust data are available, and are used to help assess the likely impacts, both expected and unintended? Other large public sector bodies, such as the MoD, conduct detailed analysis of planned changes, using extant data and qualitative data to assess likely workforce impacts. An example is the MoD's New Employment Model. By contrast, the Home Office does not appear to have a scheme in place to model the likely impacts of future changes. This means that change is enacted that may cause negative as well as positive impacts, and makes the prediction of even the most essential information, such as numbers of officers, difficult. An example is with regard to the introduction of the new pension scheme: the Staff Associations would expect predictions regarding likely increased officer turnover, the length of service of officers affected, and a plan for replacing experience and training. We are not aware of any such modelling.

4.4.7 The concerns also apply to the assessment of recent changes. For example, the changes made following the Winsor Review were wide-reaching. The Staff Associations have lobbied for these to be assessed: however, in many cases there seem to be no plans to do so. (This is expanded on in Chapter 10).

4.5 Summary

4.5.1 As described throughout this chapter, there are significant challenges in evaluating the role of pay in workforce behaviour due to concerns with the current availability, accuracy and transparency of the HO and HMIC data. These concerns are supported by the lack of scope and frequency in the data provided by the HO when compared with other public services.

4.5.2 In order to effectively represent our members' interests in matters of pay and conditions, we need access to key information that is currently unavailable to us⁷⁸. These deficits also make it difficult to understand or have full confidence in the national workforce plan for policing.

The HO do not currently treat PFEW and PSAEW as key stakeholders and in some cases are suggesting that we will not have the access we previously had to strategic data. Although we understand the Annual Data Returns (ADRs) are used for more than workforce planning and that these requirements must be prioritised, we feel that there should be a system to enable us to give regular feedback to the HO. This will help to shape more efficient reporting and provide access to the necessary information needed for us to supply the PRRB with appropriate and evidence-based recommendations.

4.6 Questions arising

- How can the HO adequately plan the police workforce without holding key information on recruitment, retention and skill mix?
- How can the HO evaluate the effects of pay and conditions changes without key information on recruitment, retention and skill mix?
- How can we evaluate the current pay and conditions and/or make recommendations for future changes without adequate access to accurate data?

⁷⁸ Please see Annex 4.1 for a full list of data requirements and their accompanying rationales

4.7 Recommendations

- 4.7.1 **Recommendation 1 (data):** We believe it is crucial that the HO adopt *an evidence based approach to workforce planning*, with the role that pay and conditions play in that clearly demonstrated.
- 4.7.2 For example, we would like to see appropriate data regarding recruiting, selection, training and development, progression, and exit. This should include national collation of data on the numbers and calibre of applicants as well as actual recruits, to better understand the attractiveness of policing; promotions, to understand the scope for career progression and the impact of recruitment freezes on this; numbers passing promotion criteria who are not subsequently promoted; transfers between forces; length of service of leavers by gender and ethnicity; the costs of replacing expertise when trained officers leave; and so on, as all these affect the degree to which the pay system can be designed so as to support sufficient, capable, and motivated officers with an appropriate demographic mix.
- 4.7.3 Data should be comprehensive, accurate, and transparent: in particular data should be shared with ACPO, the APCC, and Staff Associations.

- 4.7.4 **Recommendation 2 (data):** Our second recommendation is that, *should significant changes be suggested to the pay and conditions system, appropriate modelling of the likely impacts should be undertaken* in advance of changes.
- 4.7.5 In the interests of transparency this modelling should also be shared. The modelling should include consideration of impacts on recruitment and retention, (including costs of any loss of experience, and replacement / training costs); and consideration of impact on groups with protected characteristics.
- 4.7.1 **Recommendation 3 (data):** Our third key recommendation, is *that recent changes be monitored for their impact, to check whether the intended benefits have in fact accrued, and to check whether there have been unintended consequences*, before further significant change is embarked upon.
- 4.7.2 Again, policy evaluations such as these should be shared.

SECTION 3: KEY EVIDENCE 2014

The PFEW and PSAEW submission contains three key sources of information:

- Objective evidence of recruitment / retention.
- Perceptual evidence: a workforce survey.
- External evidence: wider economic changes and their impact on pay.

Through this evidence we will demonstrate that:

- The HO evidence base regarding recruitment and retention is poor, particularly in regard to forward projections and modelling these.
- The changes that have occurred in the last few years, following the Winsor Review and austerity measures, have caused officers to have low morale and have caused a breach of the psychological contract. Both of these have been demonstrated in previous academic studies to relate to increased intention to leave: a finding that is replicated in our workforce study.
These significant changes and the churn caused also lead us to recommend that there be no further substantial changes to the pay system until such time as they are well-evidenced.
- The external economic climate, including inflation, coupled with austerity measures such as the pay freeze, has caused a substantial decline in the real value of officers' pay.

5 Objective evidence regarding the numbers of officers recruited and retained

5.1 Introduction

5.1.1 There are several key areas which need to be considered in order to build a clear picture of recruitment, retention and talent flow within the police service.

5.1.2 As discussed in depth within Chapter 4, the majority of the data required for meaningful analysis of the police workforce recruitment and retention patterns are not currently reported by the HO or HMIC. Nonetheless, Table 5.1 depicts the *regularly reported* evidence on the key recruitment and retention questions mentioned in Chapter 4. As previously mentioned, although the HO does collect additional data, the HO does not currently disseminate these through standard publications.

Table 5.1 List of regularly reported evidence regarding recruitment and retention⁷⁹

Region	APPLICANTS 2014					JOINERS 2014				LEAVERS 2014						
	External Applicants	Internal Applicants		Total Applicants	Total Vacancies	External Joiners	Internal Joiners		Total Joiners	External Exit		Internal Exit		Total Leavers		
		Promotion	Secondments /Transfers				Promotion	Secondments /Transfers		Voluntary	Mandatory	Promotion	Secondments			
Total	Data not provided/collected by the HO					Data not provided/collected by the HO				5588.98	Data not provided/collected by the HO					6903.92
Avon and Somerset										91						150
Bedfordshire										18						91
Cambridgeshire										55						58
Cheshire										18						91
Cleveland										1						83
Cumbria										110						77
Derbyshire										65						100
Devon and Cornwall										177						105
Dorset										14						81
Durham										6						79
Essex										90						185
Gloucestershire										69						68
Greater Manchester										98						294
Hampshire										60						200
Hertfordshire										58						85
Humberside										28						92
Kent										162						207
Lancashire										44						149
Leicestershire										116						154
Lincolnshire	31	74														

⁷⁹ Home Office. (2014). Police Workforce, England and Wales, 31 March 2014 [data tables]. Retrieved from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/tables-for-police-workforce-england-and-wales-31-march-2014>


Region	APPLICANTS 2014					JOINERS 2014				LEAVERS 2014					
	External Applicants	Internal Applicants		Total Applicants	Total Vacancies	External Joiners	Internal Joiners		Total Joiners	External Exit		Internal Exit		Total Leavers	
		Promotion	Secondments /Transfers				Promotion	Secondments /Transfers		Voluntary	Mandatory	Promotion	Secondments		
London, City of	Data not provided/collected by the HO					Data not provided/collected by the HO				29	Data not provided/collected by the HO				63
Merseyside										255					204
Metropolitan Police										2343					1772
Norfolk										119					76
Northamptonshire										32					61
Northumbria										99					204
North Yorkshire										103					76
Nottinghamshire										175					107
South Yorkshire										107					130
Staffordshire										28					114
Suffolk										89					55
Surrey										89					113
Sussex										107					146
Thames Valley										302					263
Warwickshire										39					37
West Mercia										14					119
West Midlands										0					328
West Yorkshire										47					229
Wiltshire										28					56
Dyfed-Powys										59					53
Gwent	26	69													
North Wales	65	86													
South Wales	124	122													

5.1.3 Historical joiners' and leavers' data are represented in Graph 5.1, and although the number of officers leaving the service has stayed fairly stable since 2010, the numbers who joined the police service dropped considerably between 2011 and 2013. This most likely indicates a reduction in locally planned recruitment (in response to the 2010 Spending Review⁸⁰): but in some cases we believe there has been a reduction in capable applicants, with some recruitment targets not having been met. (For example, the numbers accepted on a recent Direct Entry scheme are much lower than expected). However, this distinction cannot properly be made from the available data as there is no application data (such as the number or calibre of applicants per vacancy), or planned workforce data/models. Nor does the HO differentiate between those who have joined from an external or internal applicant pool within their joiners' data.

5.1.4 In addition, the available data from the HO on outflow do not differentiate between planned and unplanned turnover, nor do they distinguish between officers who have exited the service voluntarily or for another reason such as retirement.

⁸⁰ Her Majesty's Treasury. (2010). Spending review 201. Retrieved from: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/203826/Spending_review_2010.pdf

Graph 5.1: Total number of Police officer joiners and leavers 2010-14 for England and Wales⁸¹



⁸¹ Home Office.(2014). Police workforce, England and Wales, 31 March 2014 [data tables]. Retrieved from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/tables-for-police-workforce-england-and-wales-31-march-2014> ; Home Office.(2013). Police workforce, England and Wales, 31 March 2013 [data tables]. Retrieved from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-workforce-england-and-wales-31-march-2013> ;Home Office.(2012). police service Strength England and Wales, 31 March 2012 [data tables]. Retrieved from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-service-strength-england-and-wales-31-march-2012>; Home Office.(2011). police service Strength England and Wales, 31 March 2011 [data tables]. Retrieved from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-service-strength-england-and-wales-31-march-2011>; Home Office.(2010). police service Strength England and Wales, 31 March 2010 [data tables]. Retrieved from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-service-strength-england-and-wales-31-march-2010>

- 5.1.5 However, some interesting inferences can be made from the Direct Entry (Superintendent) data. The Direct Entry (Superintendent) scheme derived from Recommendation 19 in the 2012 Winsor Review⁸². There was significant interest in the programme, and out of the initial 888 applicants⁸³, 46 candidates were entered into the scheme. Only 13 of those 46 applicants passed the national assessment centre, and according to the Policing Minister, Mike Penning, this was a lower number than had been hoped for⁸⁴. In fact, fewer than 10 applicants were subsequently entered into service, with some withdrawing.
- 5.1.6 The large discrepancies in the number of applicants, candidates and final appointees, may indicate that those who are currently applying to the scheme are not of a high enough calibre. Thus, we must ask the question: why is the Direct Entry (Superintendents) Scheme not attracting the right applicants? There also need to be questions asked about the efficiency of a scheme where nearly 900 applications need to be processed, only for fewer than 10 suitable candidates to be found.
- 5.1.7 Although there are clearly some gaps in the available data that make it difficult to evaluate the current resourcing model, the level of overtime worked by officers may indicate that it may be flawed. For example, within the financial year 2012-13, officers worked over 100 hours of overtime on average⁸⁵ roughly one extra (eight hour) shift a month.

⁸² Recommendation 19; Winsor, T. (2012). Independent Review of Police Officer and Staff Remuneration and Conditions, Final report, 1, 20 Retrieved from: <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130312170833/http://www.review.police.uk/publications/part-2-report/>

⁸³ West Yorkshire Police Federation. (2014). [Direct entry: Nearly 50 applicants for superintendent role](http://www.wyypf.polfed.org/2014/07/03/direct-entry-nearly-50-applicants-for-superintendent-role/) [web page]. Retrieved from: <http://www.wyypf.polfed.org/2014/07/03/direct-entry-nearly-50-applicants-for-superintendent-role/>

⁸⁴ College of Policing.(2014). *Direct entry to superintendent assessment centre results announced* [press release]Retrieved from: <http://college.pressofficeadmin.com/component/content/article/45-press-releases/772>

⁸⁵ Office of Manpower Economics, PNB Census of Earnings, Hours and Length of Service.

5.2 Summary

5.2.1 As highlighted throughout both the current and preceding chapters, the police workforce data available from the HO and HMIC are currently poor in both quality and quantity. Although there are data in regards to joiner and leaver numbers, it would be unwise to use these to draw conclusions given their considerable limitations. Consequently, these deficits have restricted our ability to understand and model any potential patterns in police recruitment and retention.

5.2.2 However, data that are available indicate that recruitment on the Direct Entry (Superintendent) scheme and overtime appears to indicate that there may be some challenges in recruiting the right candidates and having sufficient officers to cope with the current workload.

5.2.3 The HO and HMIC should work together to address these deficits and promote a more evidence based approach to workforce planning.

5.3 Questions Arising

- The questions arising from Chapter 4 also apply here, but more specifically:
 - How can the HO monitor recruitment and retention when the data do not distinguish between internal and external appointments/moves?
 - How can the HO monitor recruitment and retention if the numbers of filled vs unfilled posts are unknown?.
 - How can the HO monitor whether officers and recruits are capable if information regarding their skill mix and qualifications are unknown?

6 External context: Government pay policy and impact on police perception evidence: workforce surveys

6.1 Introduction

- 6.1.1 At present, data are not collected by the Home Office on police officers' motivation, morale or attitudes towards the police. Although individual forces do conduct their own engagement surveys, a proactive understanding of police officers' opinions, experiences and intentions at a national level (for example regarding their intention to leave or views on current training or promotion provisions) is lacking. This is in contrast to other public services, such as the NHS and the Armed Forces, where reliable and representative data on workforce attitudes have been collected for many years.
- 6.1.2 To address the lack of national data on police officers' opinions, experiences and intentions, PFEW and PSAEW independently conducted two surveys of all their members in Spring 2014.
- 6.1.3 PFEW's survey provided an insight into its members' views on many aspects of their pay and conditions. The first part of this chapter presents an overview of these findings. The full research report is available on request from PFEW.
- 6.1.4 The key considerations in designing the PFEW workforce survey were to test various hypotheses about the relationships between changes to pay and conditions, morale, the status of officers' psychological contracts, and intention to leave the service. To that end, we designed the study using measures that have been tested elsewhere for their validity and reliability. We borrowed items from the Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey, to facilitate comparisons. These issues are discussed in the chapter that follows.

- 6.1.5 Findings from the PFEW workforce survey have also been peer-reviewed and have been presented at The British Psychological Society's Division of Occupational Psychology Conference in Glasgow in January 2015⁸⁶.
- 6.1.6 PSAEW's survey addressed the personal resilience of Superintendents and Chief Superintendents. Findings from this survey are presented in the second part of this chapter. The full report can be obtained on request from PSAEW.
- 6.1.7 This survey addressed a range of issues relating to the health and wellbeing of the Superintending rank. Of particular relevance for the current focus on questions of sufficiency, capability and motivation are Police Superintendents' experiences and opinions in relation to their attitudes towards their role, their perceptions of training, development and feedback and their current working demands and availability of resources.

⁸⁶ Boag-Munroe, F., Knapper, S. and Elliott-Davies, M. (2015) Police Officers' Promotion Prospects and Intention to Leave the police service: The mediating effects of perceived organisational support and personal morale, Paper presented at the British Psychological Society's Division of Occupational Psychology Conference, Glasgow, 7 – 9th January 2015.

6.2 PFEW WORKFORCE SURVEY 2014

6.3 Survey Methodology

- 6.3.1 The PFEW workforce survey was designed with a view to obtaining federated rank members' views on their current pay and conditions, and their attitudes to their work and the police service in general.
- 6.3.2 The survey was accessible to members via the PFEW website and was publicised both centrally and locally through Joint Branch Boards (JBBs). The total number of responses after data cleansing was 32,606, this represents a response rate of 25.6% across England and Wales.
- 6.3.3 In addition to demographic information the survey also gathered information on individual officers' pay and pensions. This allowed for the reporting of breakdowns on pay elements lost by officers under the Winsor Review and Government public sector pensions' policy.
- 6.3.4 As well as questions on overall morale, fairness and attitudes towards their work and the police service, respondents were asked specific questions regarding how these various changes to pay and pensions, and other service wide changes impact on their own morale.
- 6.3.5 The survey also established information on officers' views of the service as an employer, including their own future prospects for promotion, satisfaction with their training opportunities, working hours, workload and likelihood of staying in the police service. This gives some indication of future retention issues.

6.3.6 The items used to capture data on key psychological constructs measured in this survey were derived from pre-existing and pre-validated scales (for example officers' psychological contracts⁸⁷). In addition, a number of items were adopted from the Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey (AFCAS) (for example relating to workload and morale), to allow external comparisons to be drawn.

6.4 Police workforce profile

6.4.1 Although demographic information on police officers is collected by the Home Office, PFEW's survey captured a range of further demographic details not presently published at a national level. This provides further insight into the profile of the current police workforce⁸⁸. For example:

6.4.2 65% of Constables are over 35 and 56% have been in their current rank for over 10 years.

6.4.3 27% of officers have a degree or a higher degree, whilst a further 9% have other professional qualifications such as accountancy, teaching or nursing.

6.4.4 36% of female officers are under 35. The proportion of male officers under 35 is 26%.

6.4.5 Factors such as these are likely to play a role in determining whether officers feel that their pay and benefits are fair and motivating. Therefore, if more thorough data were to be collected in this way, this could have an important bearing on future remuneration policy.

⁸⁷ Coyle-Shapiro, J., & Kessler, I. (2000). Consequences of The Psychological Contract for the Employment Relationship: A Large Scale Survey. *Journal of Management Studies*, 37(7), 903-930.

⁸⁸ A comparison of the composition of the survey sample with the actual workforce population based on most recent Home Office/HMIC and PNB Census data suggests that the survey was fairly representative of the workforce as a whole. (Full details of the representativeness analysis are presented in Annex X?)

Key findings

6.5 Officers' morale and motivation

Feeling undervalued by the police service and the public

6.5.1 Two thirds of officers say that they are proud to be in the police. This is despite the fact that fewer than one in seven officers feel that they are valued in the police and just under 22% of officers believe that they are respected by society at large. In addition, only 18% of officers believe that the police service considers their best interests when it makes decisions that affect them, and less than 4% feel that the service cares about their opinions.

6.5.2 Many officers' comments also highlighted a sense of being an "easy target" for savings and having been disproportionately affected by recent public sector cuts. For example, officers told us that:

"I enjoy my job. I wouldn't do anything else. However, not as an individual but as a whole, I feel the police are undervalued and unpopular and are therefore easy to mess about financially".

(Constable, 20 – 25 Years' Service)

"We are busy dealing with issues in the community and putting their needs before ours, hoping that someone will take care of our needs. They say we should see our profession as a vocation, taking pride and passion in what we do above everything else, and indeed we should, but it shouldn't be stated in order to cover financial failings".

(Constable, 10 – 15 Years' Service)

“I left behind a military career to join the Police and I love my job. The financial aspect of it though is getting worse. I know numerous colleagues who have left to join the private sector due to far more attractive pay and conditions. The colleagues that have left were really good Bobbies. I understand that the country is in a financial mess, but we have been financially affected too much.”

(Sergeant, 15 – 20 Years’ Service)

“Doing more, but receiving less”

6.5.3 Fairness in the remuneration level overall as well as in recent pay increases received appears to be a significant issue for a large proportion of officers. Over two thirds of officers say that they do not receive fair pay for the responsibilities they have in their job or compared to employees doing similar work in other organisations. 92% of officers do not believe that they have received pay increases which maintain their standard of living. For instance:

“I am a manager of both risk and people. Based on the decisions I make and the number of people I manage my pay would be much greater in the private sector”

(Sergeant, 10 – 15 Years’ Service)

“The expectation now is to be all things to all people, I am a first aider, a mental health nurse, a social worker, a teacher and lastly a crime investigator. I feel that all of the aforementioned groups are rewarded much more handsomely for the work they do”

(Constable, 5-10 Years’ Service)

“I don’t expect a pay rise above inflation but to be increasingly worse off year on year is neither motivating nor fair.”

(Sergeant 20 – 25, Years’ Service)

6.5.4 At the same time as experiencing a real-terms decrease in pay, officers also report an increase in their workload, with a majority of officers telling us that they are overworked. 72% of officers have experienced an increase in their workload over the last twelve months with 57% now feeling that their workload is too high. In their comments, officers typically do not see these as separate issues, and instead have emphasised a sense of “doing more, but receiving less”. For example:

“I have suffered increased pension contributions, loss of CRTP (staged), loss of 3k SPP per year on top of my OCU losing 25% staff and virtually all police staff support. I have to do far more administrative work to compensate on top of having to cover the work of the posts lost (3 DI's to 2 DI's on my team) plus a reduction of 8 teams to 6 which means more work, less resources, and more frequent weekend working.”

(Chief Inspector, 25 – 30 Years' Service)

Impact of recent reforms on take-home pay

6.5.5 Remuneration is currently a pressing concern for officers. Only 12% of officers say they rarely think about salary and promotion at the moment and less than 10% say that they are not concerned about exactly what they are paid, as long as they can do what they enjoy.

6.5.6 This is perhaps understandable given that 72% of officers also say that they have been affected by three or more of the recent reforms to pay and pensions. Officers tell us that these reforms have had a significant impact upon their take home pay over the last few years:

“As a result of losing SPP, a reduction in on-call allowance and changes to overtime rates I estimate that I have lost 15% of my income prior to 2010. With salary freezes, a freeze on attaining pay point 10 for Constable, inflation rises and not to mention just missing out on CTRP, I estimate that I am 20% a month worse off in real terms.”

(Constable, 10 – 15 Years’ Service)

“Both my husband and I were in receipt of CRTP, the removal of it has seen our monthly household income reduce by almost £400 per month, on top of this we are having to pay increased amounts into the pension scheme, we are both significantly worse off than we were before”

(Sergeant, 15 - 20 Years’ Service)

Impact of recent reforms on morale

- 6.5.7 Personal morale is low for a majority of officers; around three in five officers say that their morale is currently low. Officers are most likely to attribute a decline in their morale to changes to remuneration. This includes reforms introduced as a consequence of the Winsor Review such as changes in overtime and rest day payments (91%) and the loss of CRTP and SPP (76%).
- 6.5.8 A large proportion of officers tell us that pension reforms have also had a damaging effect on their morale. For example 87% say that the increase in the normal pension age has reduced their morale and 75% say their morale is lower as a consequence of the introduction of the Career Average Revalued Earnings (CARE) pension scheme. The impact of pension changes on morale in particular was repeatedly emphasised within officers’ comments. For example:

“The change in relation to terms and conditions in particular pensions has had a dramatic impact upon morale”.

(Inspector, 20 – 25 Years’ Service)

“We have had SPP taken from us, CRTP is being taken from us. We have had a two year pay freeze, a 1% rise last year and a planned 1% rise this year. In addition to this our pension contributions have increased two years on the run and are due to increase again in April 2014. We are being forced into a new pension scheme no-one would choose to join, that sees us working longer to get less out and for less time. We have been hit in the pocket on all levels and morale as a result is seriously affected.”

(Sergeant, 15 – 20 Years’ Service).

6.5.9 The number of losses experienced by officers as a consequence of the Winsor reforms was found to have a significant impact upon their morale⁸⁹. Our analysis indicated that there was a significant decrease in morale for each additional loss experienced, up to four losses⁹⁰. However there was no significant difference in the morale of officers who had experienced four losses, compared to officers who had experienced five losses⁹¹. What cannot be determined from this analysis however is whether this represents a “floor effect” in officers’ morale or whether further losses would be associated with even lower morale.

⁸⁹ (f = 22.62, p < .001), controlling for demographic variables

⁹⁰ LSD pairwise contrasts, all p values < 0.05

⁹¹ (p = 0.88)

6.5.10 The proportion of officers who attribute a reduction in their morale to changes to remuneration is in stark contrast to the proportion who says that their morale has reduced because of other recent changes not linked to remuneration, such as higher selection standards (25%) and introduction of fitness testing (21%). This highlights the fact that officers are not adverse to change per se, and the majority have seen some of the recent changes in a positive or neutral light. However changes to remuneration have had a strong negative impact upon officers' morale.

6.6 Capability and training: opportunities for training and development

6.6.1 73% of officers say that they want to be provided with more opportunities to increase their skills and knowledge, and 51% do not believe that they receive support when they want to learn new skills.

"I am certainly considering leaving due to the restrictions on training and my own personal development within the force, which I feel has been impacted upon by staff cut backs and limited opportunity for promotion/specialist skills."

(Constable, 5 – 10 Years' Service)

6.6.2 Arguably even more concerning than a lack of support for officers' longer-term development, over one third of officers say that their force does not provide sufficient training in relation to their current responsibilities: 37% say that they do not receive adequate training for their role and 34% say that the training they receive is not up-to-date.

“The main factor currently is the lack of training and the lack of ability to change role, develop professionally and gain promotion. This runs parallel to increased responsibility and increased workload. I no longer feel that I am providing the service I used to provide to complainants of crime or completing work to the standard that I expect of myself simply because of lack of resources and time to do so effectively”.

(Constable, 5 – 10 Years’ Service)

6.7 Indicators of future police workforce sufficiency

Recruitment and retention challenges

- 6.7.1 15% of officers told us that they are either actively seeking alternative employment or intend to leave the police service within two years. In total, two thirds of officers say that they intend to remain within the service until pension age. Moreover, only one in eight officers would recommend joining the police service to others. Officers’ comments reinforce these findings, for example:

“The general feeling amongst officers regardless of service is that they would leave if given the opportunity. A very large amount of officers including myself are starting to work/train in other areas with a view to leaving the service”.

(Sergeant, 10 – 15 Years’ Service)

“As an Inspector with 26 years’ service, I am lucky that some of these issues do not apply to me, so my own morale is unaffected. However I once would have recommended policing as a career to others, which I will no longer do.”

(Inspector, 25 – 30 years’ service)

“I graduated university with a Masters [degree] 6 years ago. Since then most of my classmates earn 50-100% more than I do in the police. I was aware the pay would be lower when I joined, but not as low as it is. My pay has been frozen, my allowances and pension cut and inflation has cut away at what I do earn. I fail to see why anyone graduating now would consider joining the police, especially now that the starting salary has been lowered yet further.”

(Constable 3 – 5 Years’ Service)

- 6.7.2 There is a significant relationship between officers’ morale and their intention to leave the police service. Our statistical analysis indicated that for every one unit decrease in morale (measured on a five point scale from very high to very low), the odds of officers intending to leave the police service within the next two years increased by 130%⁹².

Removal of the “Golden Handcuffs”

- 6.7.3 As noted in section 6.5.8 above, more than three quarters of officers say that their morale has declined because of recent changes to their pension. Moreover, the majority of officers (62%) say that they are dissatisfied with their pension. In addition to the negative impact pension reforms have had on morale, officers’ responses within the pay survey indicate that they feel that changes to pensions have removed the “golden handcuffs” that previously bound officers to the police service. For instance:

“The changes to the pension scheme have in essence unlocked the ‘golden handcuffs’ I would have retired at 52 years of age on a full pension. I now have to work until 60 years of age for a reduced pension. I am actively looking for alternative employment out of the police.”

(Sergeant, 15 - 20 years’ service)


⁹² (Exp(B) = 2.30; p < 0.001), controlling for demographic variables.

6.7.4 This view is supported by our statistical analysis. Officers who are dissatisfied with their pension are more than twice as likely to intend to leave within two years than are officers who are satisfied with their pension⁹³.

6.8 Police Officers' Psychological Contract with the police service

6.8.1 A psychological contract refers to the reciprocal exchange relationship that exists between two parties regarding the mutual obligations towards each other⁹⁴. As can be seen in Figure 6.1, police officers' psychological contracts with the police service are likely to be made up of many different aspects, including the perceived equity of their pay and benefits.

Figure 6.1: Content of psychological contract⁹⁵



⁹³ (Exp(B) = 2.13, $p < 0.001$), controlling for demographic variables.

⁹⁴ Guest, D.E. & Conway, N. (2002) Pressure at work and the psychological contract. London: CIPD; Rousseau D.M. (1995) Psychological Contracts in Organisations: Understanding Written and unwritten Agreements. Sage Publication.

⁹⁵ Herriot, P., Manning, W. E. G., & Kidd, J. M. (1997). The content of the psychological contract. British Journal of Management, 8(2), 151-162.

6.8.2 The aspects of the psychological contract highlighted in Figure 6.1 above correspond to what researchers have termed the “transactional” psychological contract, reflecting the sense of whether or not an organisation has fulfilled their promised obligations in relation to pay and benefits.⁹⁶ These obligations are currently particularly salient to officers in the aftermath of the Winsor Review and the public sector pay freeze as well as the changes to officers’ pensions. For instance, the following comment is reflective of officers’ views about the elements of their remuneration that have been taken away from them in recent years:

“The biggest impact for me is that I will now not receive the package (earnings, pay progression and pension) I signed up for. In simple terms this is a breach of trust and in any other field would be tantamount to a breach of contract.”

(Constable with 3-5 years’ service)

6.8.3 Although the losses to pay and benefits officers have recently experienced represent only one element of their psychological contract with the police service, it is especially important to take note of changes that they are likely to represent a significant “step-change” in the psychological contract officers hold with the Service. Research suggests that there are certain threshold points in an individual’s perceptions of the extent to which their psychological contract has been breached. After these threshold points, further breach of the psychological contract can have a more negative impact upon work-related attitudes such as trust and intention to leave⁹⁷. The losses experienced by officers as a consequence of recent reforms are likely to be one such threshold point, any subsequent breaches are therefore likely to be felt even more strongly by officers in future.

⁹⁶ Robinson, S. L., Kraatz, M. S., & Rousseau, D. M. (1994). Changing obligations and the psychological contract: A longitudinal study. *Academy of Management Journal*, 37(1), 137-152.

⁹⁷ Rigotti, T. (2009). Enough Is Enough? Threshold Models for The Relationship Between Psychological Contract Breach And Job-Related Attitudes. *European Journal of Work And Organizational Psychology*, 18(4), 442-463.


6.9 Psychological Contract breach and intention to leave

- 6.9.1 In addition to determining whether officers' morale was a significant predictor of their intention to leave the police service, we also looked to establish whether officers' perceptions of their psychological contact with the police service also predicted their intention to leave. Measured on a five point scale (with one equalling a wholly positive perception of their psychological contract and five equalling a wholly negative perceptions of their psychological contract), for each unit increase, the odds of officers planning to leave the Police increased by 89%⁹⁸.
- 6.9.2 We also assessed whether psychological contract breach might also have an indirect effect on officers' intention to leave by influencing their attitude towards the police service more generally. The model of psychological contract breach presented in Figure 6.2 has been developed by Zhao and colleagues from the combined findings of a range of prior research studies⁹⁹. This model shows that a person will typically respond to a breach in their psychological contract with an affective (or emotional) response; and it will directly influence attitudes such as organisational commitment and intention to leave. These affective responses to psychological contract breach play an important role in shaping attitudes towards the organisation, which in turn are key factors in their actual behaviour.

⁹⁸ (Exp(B) = 1.89; $p < 0.001$), controlling for demographic variables

⁹⁹ Zhao, H. A. O., Wayne, S. J., Glibkowski, B. C., & Bravo, J. (2007). The impact of psychological contract breach on work-related outcomes: a meta-analysis. *Personnel Psychology*, 60(3), 647-680.

Figure 6.2: The impact of psychological contract breach on work-related outcomes (adapted from Zhao et al. 2007)




6.9.3 This model can help us to understand the potential consequences when police officers hold negative perceptions of their psychological contract with the police service. In particular it can be taken to indicate that when officers hold negative perceptions of their psychological contract, they are more likely to report low morale and both this, and their perception of the psychological contract itself, will prompt them to ultimately choose to leave the police service.

6.9.4 We applied the model to officers' intention to leave the Service in Figure 6.3, and tested the first three steps in this sequence using the data collected within the workforce survey. Our findings match Zhao et al.'s model, showing that officers' perceptions of their psychological contract directly predicted officers' intention to leave the Service. However officers' perceptions of their psychological contract also indirectly predicted intention to leave by negatively affecting their personal morale¹⁰⁰.

¹⁰⁰ All paths significant at $p < .001$, controlling for demographic variables

Figure 6.3: Observed relationship between police officers' psychological contracts, morale and intention to leave the police service



NB, shaded out circles not explicitly tested within the analysis

6.9.5 This finding is important because it indicates that officers who have experienced changes to their psychological contract in the recent past (for example because of the Winsor Review) are more likely to experience low morale, more likely to plan to leave and thus ultimately may be more likely to actually leave the police service. A greater awareness of factors such as officers' perceptions of their psychological contract or their morale could be early indicators of potential workforce turnover.

6.9.6 As we note in the following section, experienced officers are most likely to have been affected by recent changes, more likely to experience low morale and more likely to intend to leave the police service. There is therefore a danger that the Service will lose experienced officers that are difficult to replace.

6.9.7 Such analysis also demonstrates the value of survey data in evaluating policy, and the potential for the Home Office to conduct better workforce modelling and forward planning.

6.10 Differences between demographic groups

Length of service

6.10.1 Mid-career officers are most likely to have been affected by the losses brought about by recent changes to remuneration. More than eight in ten officers with between 5 and 15 years' service have been affected by three or more losses brought about by either the Winsor reforms or recent changes to pensions. Many officers' comments emphasis the impact that this has had on them, for example:

"I have 11 years' service now and therefore, was expecting to be on the top pay scale and applying for my CRTP. I have been frozen on Pay scale 9 and because I joined in the month of January, will not be on the top scale until I have 12 years' service. Financially, I am thousands of pounds a year down on what I was expecting to be on at this stage of my career, contrary to what I signed up for."

(Constable, 10 – 15 Years' Service)

6.10.2 In particular, the forthcoming changes to the pension scheme have unsettled officers. Three quarters of officers with between 5 and 15 years' service say that they are dissatisfied with their pension and 91% of officers in this group say that their morale has declined because of the introduction of the CARE scheme.

6.10.3 These changes have the potential to impact on the overall demographic profile of the service, as the removal of the "golden handcuffs" of a final salary scheme, and its replacement with a career average scheme (CARE) in April 2015 is likely to mean that officers are less likely to feel tied into service. We have seen no evidence that the Home Office has modelled the likely effect of this.

6.10.4 The effect of the losses officers have experienced appears to be reflected in their morale, and just under two thirds of officers in the 5 to 15 years' service group say that their personal morale is low. With the exception of officers approaching pension age, these officers are also most likely to be intending to leave within the next two years. For example in the 10 to 15 years' service group, one in four officers says that they plan to leave the service. Sample comments include:

“Having 14 years’ service the swap to CARE pension scheme has made me think about whether to stay in the police. I would consider leaving the Police for another job, since the retirement age is now no longer appealing. Having expected to leave at 55 and now staying until 60, paying more into my pension and not receiving the same back, has left me looking at some of the financial benefits of working in private industry.”

(Inspector, 10 – 15 Years’ Service)

6.10.5 Statistical analysis indicated that officers with 10 to 15 years' service are in fact 97% more likely to plan to leave the service within two years than officers with under 5 years' service¹⁰¹. In addition, officers with between 5 and 10 years' service are 81% more likely to intend to leave the police service than their colleagues with under 5 years' service¹⁰².

Rank

6.10.6 Constables are more likely to express lower satisfaction and lower morale than any other rank. Two out of three Constables are dissatisfied with their pay, 21% intend to leave the service within two years and 63% report low personal morale, almost double the proportion of Chief Inspectors who say that their morale is low. Officers' comments highlight that a range of factors contribute to these attitudes, for instance:

¹⁰¹ (Exp(B) = 1.97, p < 0.001), controlling for other demographic variables

¹⁰² (Exp(B) = 1.81, p < 0.001), controlling for other demographic variables

“Being a Constable for 10 years now I have seen morale gradually drop and hit the low it is at the moment. More and more officers don't feel protected either physically, mentally or financially, there are ever decreasing numbers in terms of officers on the front line which in turn makes us feel less and less safe and forever chasing our own tails to get the job done”

(Constable, 10 – 15 Years' Service)

6.10.7 Our statistical analysis showed that Constables have an increased odds of intending to leave the police service within the next two years. In particular, the odds of Constables intending to leave the police service are 25% greater than their colleagues in the Inspecting ranks¹⁰³.

6.10.8 A smaller proportion of Sergeants than Constables express low morale and an intention to leave the service. Nonetheless, just over half of all Sergeants still told us that their morale is currently low. Moreover, 59% do not feel that they are paid fairly for their responsibilities and one in six Sergeants plan to leave the police service within two years. Sergeants' comments on the whole indicate a similar set of concerns to those expressed by other ranks, for example:

“The Abolition of SPP and CRTP reductions including the pension increases and pension reform and reduction in overtime rates have made a significant impact on morale. As a Custody Sergeant it is noticeable that frontline officers have now lost their commitment to this profession and are not willing to put that little bit extra in that has always been integral.”

(Sergeant, 20 – 25 Years' Service)

¹⁰³ (Exp(B) = 1.25, p < 0.05), controlling for other demographic variables

6.10.9 Inspecting ranks are least likely to report low morale and least likely to plan to leave the service. However issues regarding working hours were raised by many officers, with Inspecting ranks expressing greater dissatisfaction with their working hours than other ranks. Over half of Chief Inspectors and one in three Inspectors said that they are dissatisfied with their working hours, and more than 80% have seen an increase in their workload over the last year. For example, Inspectors tell us that:

“I am working long hours with reducing pay (phasing out of CRTP payments, no SSP). My staff are paid overtime, I am not. I do not get time in lieu, but have to negotiate with my command team to claw some hours back but this will never amount to the extra hours I work. This reduces my morale considerably, impacts on my home life significantly and is no doubt affecting my health negatively”. (Inspector, 20 – 25 Years’ Service)

“As a newly promoted Inspector I was amazed at what you lose on promotion in comparison to the small pay rise. In comparison to other Public Sector roles, e.g. teaching, and the private sector, pay is poor for the amount of stress, responsibility and hours worked.”
(Inspector, 5 – 10 Years’ Service)

6.11 Benchmarking

6.11.1 Findings from the PFEW’s workforce survey were compared to results from the NHS Staff Survey 2013 and the Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey (AFCAS) 2014. Many questions in the PFEW survey were adapted from the AFCAS survey, and contained essentially the same wording, albeit there was a need to replace the name of each Service with the police service. The NHS items differed in wording. This analysis allowed a certain degree of benchmarking to be conducted with other public service organisations.

6.11.2 **Fair Treatment:** 44% of police officers in the PFEW workforce survey disagreed with the statement “I am treated fairly”. This compares to 15% of Armed Forces personnel in the AFCAS 2014 survey who said that they were not treated fairly. Although the NHS staff survey did not ask respondents to report on global perceptions of fairness, this question was asked within the context of career development. In response to this question, the proportion of NHS staff who said that they did not receive fair treatment within the context of career progression was 8%.

6.11.3 **Satisfaction with remuneration:** Police officers in the PFEW’s workforce survey were more dissatisfied with their basic pay than respondents in other public organisations in 2013/14. 51% of police officers reported that they were currently dissatisfied with their basic pay, in contrast to 35% of NHS staff and 37% of Armed Forces personnel.

6.11.4 **Workload:** 57% of officers in the PFEW workforce survey said that their workload had been too high over the last 12 months and 72% said that their workload had increased during this period. When Armed Forces personnel were asked about their workload in the AFCAS 2014 survey, 46% of respondents said that their workload had been too high. 44% of employees within the NHS said that they were currently unable to meet the conflicting demands on their time at work.

6.11.5 **Morale:** 59% of police officers rated their morale as low in the PFEW workforce survey. Responses from police officers in 2014 indicate that morale is considerably lower than in other public organisations. AFCAS 2014 found that 28% of Armed Forces personnel said their morale was low. Although the NHS staff survey did not ask staff to report their morale, only 15% of respondents in this survey said that they did not look forward to going to work and 8% said that they were not enthusiastic about their job.

- 6.11.6 **Satisfaction with training:** 37% of officers in the PFEW's workforce survey said that they did not have adequate training for their role. This is in contrast to the 16% of Armed Forces personnel who were not satisfied with the amount of training they receive and 11% of NHS staff who disagreed that their training had allowed them to do their job more effectively.
- 6.11.7 **Recruitment and retention:** The PFEW workforce survey found that 11% of officers were planning to leave the police service as soon as possible. This is in contrast to 9% of Armed Forces personnel who had either put in their notice to leave or intended to leave as soon as possible.
- 6.11.8 Findings from the PFEW workforce survey also indicated that only 12% of officers would recommend joining the police service to others. This is considerably lower than other public service organisations. For example 41% of Armed Forces personnel and 58% of NHS staff would recommend joining the service to others.

6.12 PSAEW PERSONAL RESILIENCE SURVEY 2014

6.13 Survey Methodology

6.13.1 PSAEW's Personal Resilience Survey was designed to capture information on the health and wellbeing of the Superintending ranks, including their working conditions, performance management and development, and how they feel about their jobs. The survey report is available in full from PSAEW, on request.

6.13.2 The survey was conducted using an online questionnaire, sent electronically to all PSAEW members and available for a period of three weeks. 1,033 responses were received, representing response rate of 81.4%.

6.13.3 This survey is the sixth conducted by PSAEW on this topic, allowing findings from 2014 to be compared to the findings from previous years.

Key Findings

6.14 Motivation and Job Engagement

6.14.1 92% of respondents said that they get a "buzz" from working in the Superintending ranks, and that it is exciting and rewarding work. Moreover, 96% see being in the police service as a vocation, whilst 79% said that being a Superintendent is an important part of who they are. This indicates that the majority of Superintendents and Chief Superintendents are engaged within their role and experience a high level of intrinsic motivation within their work.

6.14.2 On the other hand, 55% of respondents said that they work hard because they don't want to be seen as weak. This proportion has increased by 7% since 2009. External pressure to work as hard as possible therefore appears increasingly to be a motivating factor for many members of the Superintending ranks. Such pressure however is a cause for concern, particularly given that 45% of respondents say that they enjoy their work less now than they did a year ago; and the proportion of respondents who say that they get a buzz from their work or see their role as an important part of who they are have both declined since 2011.

6.14.3 In this regard, respondents also highlight concerns for the recruitment of new officers to the police service. For instance:

“National changes to policing are undermining the values of the service resulting in officers joining as ‘just another job and see how it goes for a few years’ rather than a vocation”.

6.15 Training and development: indicators of future workforce capability

6.15.1 Concerns regarding issues relating to performance management and development are also highlighted within the survey. 50% of respondents said that they did not receive helpful feedback on their performance and only 59% felt that they received all the training they required to do their job. For example one respondent reported that:

“I have been offered no career development and my PDR was submitted without me even seeing it or having a chance to comment on it. Notably there was no development in it”

6.15.2 A notable proportion of Police Superintendents - 41% - felt that senior management's approach to managing their performance was harsh and unhelpful. In addition, 78% of respondents said that people in their organisation felt that they mustn't be seen as fallible, seek support or admit they can't cope.

6.15.3 These findings suggest that many members of the Superintending ranks currently do not experience an organisational climate that is supportive of their development. This observation is particularly concerning given that nearly 20% of respondents had been in post for a year or less.

6.16 Indicators of current and future workforce sufficiency

6.16.1 The PSAEW Personal Resilience Survey 2014 asked respondents their intentions with regards to remaining in the police service until retirement within the context of recent pension reforms. 96% of officers who would complete all their service of the current pension scheme said that they planned to complete their full pensionable service before retiring.

6.16.2 By contrast, 76% of respondents who said that they would become a member of the 2015 scheme said that they intended to remain a police officer until at least the age of 55. This demonstrates a notable difference between the intention to remain amongst officers who will and will not be transferred to the CARE scheme in 2015.

6.16.3 77% of respondents are regularly in breach of the working time directive, working 50 or more hours a week. In addition, one in five respondents report working more than 60 hours per week on a regular basis. The full extent of this may not currently be recognised by forces as 57% of respondents said that they did not record their working hours accurately.

6.16.4 The long hours worked by Superintendents appears in part to be the result of organisational culture; for example just under two thirds of respondents (65%) say that there is a perception that working long hours is a way to show you are performing well, whilst a similar proportion (66%) say that their ACPO team does not reinforce the importance of work-life balance through their behaviour.

6.16.5 However at the same time, 98% of respondents say that their role as Superintendent or Chief Superintendent places them under high levels of demand and 89% say that these demands have increased in the last year. Increased work demands were the most common area of concern amongst the Superintending ranks: 58% cited this as either their greatest or second greatest concern.

6.16.6 Moreover, 64% disagreed that their span of command is reasonable to undertake without excessive working hours. Beyond a cultural issue, these statistics point to challenges in terms of sufficiency. For the majority of Superintendents and Chief Superintendents, the demands placed upon them are too great to be achieved without working excessive hours on a regular basis. For example one respondent commented that:

“I did not take all my leave. This is mainly down to the intensity of my work and my own commitment to it, rather than being prevented from taking it”.

6.16.7 An added challenge faced by Police Superintendents relates to the resources available to them; 58% of respondents say that they have insufficient staff or resources to do their job. This is either the greatest or second greatest concern for more than one in three officers at this rank. This finding points to a further sufficiency issue, highlighting that low staffing levels within the Superintending ranks and amongst the ranks they supervise both increase the work pressures of Police Superintendents.

6.17 Summary

PFEW Workforce Survey

- 6.17.1 Issues of fair treatment repeatedly arise in officers' responses within this survey. Officers tell us they don't want special treatment, they just want to feel valued and fairly treated.
- 6.17.2 Extensive changes have been made to officers' pay and conditions over the last few years. These changes have affected the take-home pay of a large number of officers and have often had a negative impact on morale and motivation. The recent changes to remuneration were cited as causing morale to decline. For example, 91% of officers said this was at least in part due to overtime and rest day payments changes; 76% cited loss of CRTP and SPP; 87% cited the increase in pension age, and 75% the introduction of the CARE pension scheme.
- 6.17.3 Our analysis also indicated that there was a significant relationship between officers' perceived breach of psychological contract, their morale and their intention to leave the Service. For example, for every one unit decrease in morale the odds of officers intending to leave increased by 130% and for each unit increase in psychological contract breach, the odds of officers planning to leave the Police increased by 89%.

6.17.4 Comparisons with other organisations such as the NHS and the Armed Forces suggest a number of areas - including morale, perceived fair treatment and the proportion of officers' who would recommend joining the police to others - which are of particular cause for concern for the police service. In all cases the numbers of police officers giving negative responses are substantially higher than in other public sector bodies. (59% of police officers state they have low personal morale, compared with 28% of Armed Forces respondents; 44% of police officers disagree that they are treated fairly, compared to 15% of Armed Forces personnel; and 12% of police officers would recommend joining to others, compared to 41% of Armed Forces).

6.17.5 This survey offers a snapshot of morale in the service at this time. However, by including items specifically about recent changes, it also allows a measure of the relationship between these and morale, the psychological contract, and intention to leave. As such it is a valuable tool for evaluating the policies that have brought about change to pay and conditions. The Home Office might consider adopting a similar survey, funded by the employer rather than members. In addition, by relating policies to likely turnover, the survey offers a way to forecast manpower levels for the future, and consider recruiting needs and development needs for those officers who will be needed to replace leavers.

PSAEW Personal Resilience Survey

6.17.6 On the whole, members of the Superintending ranks report engagement in, and positive attitudes towards, their role within the police service. However respondents indicate that the demands and scope of their role puts them under significant pressure in terms of the hours they are required to work. This raises questions regarding workforce sufficiency, which may be underestimated by senior managers due to Superintendents either under-recording the hours worked, or not recording them at all.

6.17.7 The greatest or second greatest concern for more than one in three Superintendents and Chief Superintendents is a lack of staff and resources to do their job effectively. This reflects a further important workforce sufficiency issue that currently has a notable impact upon the Superintending ranks.

6.17.8 The findings from this survey also highlight challenges regarding the development and performance management of Police Superintendents. A lack of effective support for development could point to future capability issues; particularly given that almost one in five respondents had been in post for less than a year.

6.18 Questions arising

- Given the importance of survey data in helping to manage the workforce, and understand the impact of policies, does the Home Office have any plans to conduct national surveys?

7 External context: Government pay policy and impact on police pay

7.1 Introduction

7.1.1 The Coalition Government's 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review, which introduced a substantial 20% real terms cut in central Government funding to the police service in England and Wales in the four years from March 2011 to March 2015, impacted on workforce numbers. This Government has also had a major impact on police officers' pay through the Winsor reforms. It is set to cut police funding by a further 4.9% in real terms for the financial year 2015-16.¹⁰⁴ These cuts in funding are substantial, given that the police budget for England and Wales represents only 1.3% of total public expenditure.¹⁰⁵ Police cuts have also coincided with the Government's public sector pay policy of a two year freeze on pay settlements, and further two years of a 1% pay cap.

7.1.2 Below, we set out both the real value of police pay settlements and the cumulative effects of pay restraint, pay reform and inflation on officers' average pay over recent years.

¹⁰⁴ HMIC, Policing in Austerity: Meeting the challenge, July 2014, p32 and p128. Available from HMIC website, <http://www.justiceinspectors.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/policing-in-austerity-meeting-the-challenge.pdf> ; see also Home Secretary's statement on 2015-16 funding <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/spending-round-security-the-foundation-of-prosperity-says-home-secretary>

¹⁰⁵ Total central government spend on police was £8.8bn in 2012-2013 (also reported by CIPFA in that year), whereas total current public expenditure (Resource DEL plus AME) was £664.5bn for that year, see HM Treasury, Spending Review 2010 (Cm 7942). Available from HM Treasury website, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/203826/Spending_review_2010.pdf

7.2 Government pay policy

- 7.2.1 Since 2013 Quarter 1, the UK economy has continued to grow in every quarter resulting in annual growth of 2.7% in 2013 and 2.3% in the first three quarters of 2014.¹⁰⁶ Total growth for 2014 is estimated by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) to be 3% and 2.4% in 2015¹⁰⁷. However, economic improvement has not been felt by employees, especially public sector employees, where real earnings have remained suppressed due largely to the Government's continuing public sector pay policy.
- 7.2.2 The Government's two year pay freeze announced in 2010 covered all public sector staff by 2011, including the police. This pay freeze was replaced in 2013 by a pay cap, under which basic pay increases must not exceed 1% on average. This pay policy has coincided with a period of relatively high inflation - between 3% and 5%. This contrasts with an earlier period of pay restraint: in 1993-94 the Conservative Government stipulated a limit of 1.5% on public sector pay increases, but that was at a time when the Retail Prices Index (RPI) for that financial year averaged about 1.7%.¹⁰⁸
- 7.2.3 Income Data Services (IDS) also remarked that unlike many incomes policies of the past, there has been no attempt to offset control of pay with stronger control of inflation. In the same article IDS also noted that initially the Treasury was considering a pay cap of 2%, which would at least have been in line with the Bank of England's Consumer Prices Index (CPI) inflation target.

¹⁰⁶ ONS, Gross Domestic Product Preliminary Estimate, Q3 (July-September) 2014, 24 October 2014, table 1, p2. Available from ONS website, http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_381573.pdf

¹⁰⁷ Office for Budget Responsibility, Economic and fiscal outlook, December 2014 (Cm 8966), p58. Available from OBR website, http://cdn.budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/December_2014_EFO-web513.pdf

¹⁰⁸ IDS, Government incomes policies: past and present, 12 February 2013. Available from IDS website, <https://ids.thomsonreuters.com/pay-reward/features-analysis/government-incomes-policies-past-and-present>

7.2.4 If re-elected, the current Government pledges to continue reducing the country's debt with further spending cuts over the next Strategic Review period. The Chancellor has already stated that public sector pay will continue to be capped at 1% in FY 2015-16.¹⁰⁹ As a result, HMIC reports some police services are already basing future financial plans on the need to make savings over the next four years that are similar to the last four years (£2.53m).¹¹⁰

7.3 Impact on police pay: pay settlements


7.3.1 Graph 7.1 shows that pay settlements in the whole economy and the private sector over the period of the past two years of police settlements have clustered around a median of 2.5%.¹¹¹ These settlements, unlike those in the public sector, have almost kept pace with RPI inflation, and indeed, the settlements in the upper quartile across the whole economy have either equalled or surpassed RPI inflation. In some sectors, such as energy, water, and transport, settlements have specifically been linked to RPI inflation.

¹⁰⁹ See HMTreasury, Spending Round 2013, June 2013 p8. Retrieved from HM Treasury website, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/209036/spending-round-2013-complete.pdf ; in subsequent Autumn Statement the Chancellor stated that "the next government will need to continue to reform and take tough decisions on public sector pay and workforce beyond 2015-16." (HM Treasury, Autumn Statement 2013, December 2013 (Cm 8747) https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263942/35062_Autumn_Statement_2013.pdf

¹¹⁰ See HMIC, Policing in Austerity: Meeting the challenge, 2014 p123-130. Retrieved from HMIC website, <http://www.justiceinspectors.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/policing-in-austerity-meeting-the-challenge.pdf>

¹¹¹ IDS, Pay awards in 2014 cluster around 2.5%, 11 September 2014. Retrieved from IDS website, <https://ids.thomsonreuters.com/pay-reward/features-analysis/pay-awards-in-2014-cluster-around-25?index=68&content=67527>

Graph 7.1: Whole economy and private sector median pay settlements and RPI inflation, May 2012 to September 2014 (IDS)¹¹²



¹¹² Source: IDS Pay Data. Available from IDS website, <https://ids.thomsonreuters.com/pay-reward>


7.3.2 Graph 7.2 below sets out police officer pay settlements since 2010 compared to the rate of inflation in September, the month of settlement. Over this period cumulative pay settlements for the police have totalled 4.5%, whereas cumulative RPI inflation has been 18.3%. The value of police pay settlements since 2010 has been eroded by RPI inflation in every year, resulting in a real terms fall in the value of police pay settlements of 13.8%. Since it includes housing costs, RPI continues to be used as the most appropriate measure of the cost of living, and is still used by the Government to uprate many official measures and indices. Also there have been problems with the Consumer Prices Index including housing costs (CPIH), the Government's alternative measure of inflation, which includes rental costs in place of full housing costs, resulting in it losing its national statistics status.¹¹³ However, using CPI inflation, which increased 14.4% over this period, shows a substantial fall in the real value of police settlements of 9.9%.

7.3.3 It is also worth noting that some basic items of expenditure have seen higher prices rises than the headline all-item RPI measure. Although overall RPI inflation for September is currently 2.3%, fuel and light inflation is running at 4.1%, fares and other travel costs at 3.4% and clothing and footwear at 7.0%.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ See IDS, Inflation: another index bites the dust?, 28 August 2014. Available from IDS website, <https://ids.thomsonreuters.com/pay-reward/features-analysis/inflation-another-index-bites-dust>

¹¹⁴ For detailed RPI items for September see table 41, Office for National Statistics (ONS), Consumer Price Inflation Reference Tables, October 2014. Available from ONS website, <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcn%3A77-323605>

Graph 7.2: Police officer pay settlements compared to RPI and CPI inflation, 2010-14



7.3.4 Furthermore, there is evidence that RPI inflation is set to rise to about 3% after 2015. The Conservative Party is committed to continuing public sector pay restraint into 2015 and 2016 if it wins the next election, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer has said a future Conservative Government would continue to restrain public sector pay beyond 2016. The main opposition party is also committed to delivering further public spending savings. If the 1% pay cap does continue for a further two years (2015 and 2016) alongside Office for Budgetary Responsibility (OBR) projected RPI inflation rates of approximately 2.3% for September 2015 and approximately 2.9% for September 2016, the real terms value of a 1% police settlement over 2015 and 2016 would fall a further 3.25%. This would equate to an overall fall in the value of police settlements of approximately 17% since 2010.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ Calculated as follows: FY2010-14, -13.75% + FY2014-16, -3.25% = -17%.

7.3.5 In this context, it needs to be remembered that about 50% of all federated rank officers are already at the top of their scale, and rely on the annual uplift as their only pay increase.

7.4 Impact on police pay: average earnings

7.4.1 In addition to low pay settlements for the police since 2010, there has been a two year incremental progression freeze, which was imposed on the police but not on any other public sector group with the exception of civil servants in a number of Government departments where progression was found to be non-contractual.¹¹⁶

7.4.2 Furthermore, there have been actual pay cuts introduced as a result of the Winsor recommendations on police pay reform. Constables and Sergeants have had a reduction in some overtime payments. All federated ranks have lost Special Priority Payments (SPPs) (annual amounts normally between £500 and £3,000 - exceptionally up to £5,000). There have been freezes on new applications for Competence Related Threshold Payments (CRTPs), (annual amount of £1,212), which have been completely phased out from 1 April 2013. The Superintending ranks have seen the suspension of performance related bonuses and double increments prior to their abolition from 1 April 2014.

7.4.3 We have used average nominal pay data from the Police Negotiating Board (PNB) Census of Earnings and Hours for 2010 to 2013 as the basis for calculating the fall in average real pay for each federated and Superintending rank officer. In this calculation 2009-10 was selected as the base year. We have compared both basic pay and total pay for full-time officers, as reported in the PNB Pay Census for each year.

¹¹⁶ See IDS, Pay in Central Government 2012-2013, 25 April 2013. Available from IDS website, <https://ids.thomsonreuters.com/pay-reward/features-analysis/pay-in-central-government-201213>

- 7.4.4 RPI inflation rates are presented as averages for each financial year, and are based on the 12 month rate published every month by the Office for National Statistics (ONS)¹¹⁷ Over the three years following 2009-2010, RPI inflation has been 5.0% for the FY 2010-11, 4.8% for the FY 2011-12 and 3.1% for the FY 2012-13. Although not presented here, a similar trend of falling real earnings occurs even when the CPI inflation figures of 3.5%, 4.3% and 2.7% are used.
- 7.4.5 It should be noted that this analysis for the period up until March 2013 is likely to understate the current impact on police pay, since it covers only some of the changes to pay arising from the Winsor Review. It excludes the impact on earnings of the full effect of the abolition of SPPs from 1 April 2012 (pro-rated payments continued to be made until December 2012); the phasing out of CRTPs over three years from 1 April 2013 (only the suspension of new applications occurred in 2012-13); the final year (2013-14) of the two year progression freeze; the final year (2013-14) of the two year suspension of Superintending ranks' performance related bonuses and double increments payments; and the reduced pay scale for new Constable entrants from 1 April 2013. It also excludes the impact on police pay of the two year public sector 1% pay cap in September 2013 and 2014.

¹¹⁷ FY average calculated from monthly figures in table 43, Office for National Statistics (ONS), Consumer Price Inflation Reference Tables, October 2014. Available from ONS website, <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcn%3A77-323605>

7.4.6 We have attempted to capture this further impact on officers' pay in section 7.4.15 below. We have projected forward the pay elements making up total pay, and removed those that no longer apply in 2013-14, allowing - where necessary - for the 1% pay uprate for that year. These figures were then summed to produce an overall estimate of total pay for 2013-14. We then applied to this figure the average inflation rate for the FY 2013-14, to arrive at an estimate of the value of officers' real pay in that year. It should also be noted that it has not been possible to estimate further earnings loss, due to the final year of the progression freeze, nor to take into account the effect on earnings of the additional on-call payment which came into effect on 1st April 2013. Since this is based on projected figures rather than actual PNB data for 2013-14, which has still to be collected, we have reported figures separately for the periods 2010-13 and 2010-14 so as to avoid any confusion.

7.4.7 Although many of Winsor's changes to pay are only now having full effect, we can illustrate the effect of some of the changes effective from 1 April 2012. For example the two year incremental progression freeze or suspension started on 1st April that year. Also SPP payments were abolished at the same time, (although since this was paid in the calendar year to December 2012 some payments were made in December for the period January-March). Rest day working paid at double time was reduced to time and a half from 1st April 2012.

7.4.8 Usually there is a yearly increase on average basic pay for each cohort as officers progress to the next incremental point. But in 2012-2013 average basic pay (nominal) actually fell -0.51% for Inspectors, -0.40% for Chief Inspectors, -0.98% for Superintendents and -0.40% for Chief Superintendents. For Sergeants there was little change (+0.01%) and for Constables there was a slight increase of +0.81% as progression continued for those officers on the first three points of the Constables' pay scale. Because many other elements of pay are related to such increases in basic pay (such as overtime and the new pay element for unsocial hours) nominal total pay also shows decline – Sergeants' -0.24%, Inspectors' -0.53%, Chief Inspector's -1.02%, Superintendents' -0.92% and Chief Superintendents' -0.19%. Again Constables' total pay increased slightly by +0.80%.

7.4.9 The pay of all federated ranks officers was affected by SPPs, and Constables' and Sergeants' by the overtime changes. In the previous FY 2011-12 the average SPP payment to a member of the federated ranks was £873 per recipient (averaging £347 per officer in force), but in 2012-13 this had fallen to £303 (averaging £131 per officer in force, pro-rata-ed). Likewise, total overtime payments for Constables fell from £3,152 per recipient (£2,941 per officer) in 2011-12 to £2,739 per recipient (£2,556 per officer) in 2012-13. There was a similar reduction for Sergeants from £3,910 per recipient (£3,577 per officer) in 2011-12 to £3,456 (£3,140) in 2013-14.

7.4.10 New pay scales were introduced for Superintendents and Chief Superintendents from the week of 1 April 2014. The Superintendents' scale reduced from five to four points, with an increase of around £1,000 to the top of the scale point. The Chief Superintendents' scale remained at three points, but each point was uplifted by around £3,000. However, funding for these changes came from discontinuing performance pay for Superintending ranks, and removing the Post-Related Allowance (PRA) of £5,001 per annum (non-pensionable) which had been paid to Chief Superintendents in up to 30% of roles. This meant an uplift for some, but for many experienced officers, in the most demanding posts, a reduction of approximately £2,000 per year.

7.4.11 Whilst recent pay changes have impacted on officers' pay over the whole period 2010-13, RPI inflation has also reduced the real terms value of all officers' pay. We have taken from the PNB Census the figure for average basic pay and average total pay (nominal) in each FY year from 2009-10 to 2012-13 for full-time officers in each rank. We have then calculated the nominal percentage increase from one year to the next and set this against RPI inflation for each year so as to arrive at the real terms value of officers' pay in each year, and cumulatively across the period. Over this period the recent changes in pay and inflation have together reduced the real terms value of full-time Constables' average basic pay by approximately 6% (from £31,601 in 2009-10 to £29,665 in 2012-13), and total pay¹¹⁸ by about 8% (from £38,125 to £35,002). The fall in real earnings has been somewhat less for Constables than other ranks, no doubt in part due to the first three points of the Constables' pay scale being exempt from the progression freeze.

¹¹⁸ Total pay as recorded by PNB includes all additional payments and allowances including replacement allowance. Total pay includes location payments, London Weighting, all overtime, public holidays, CRTP, SPP, replacement allowance, all other allowances, and since 2013 unsocial hours, overnight allowance and hardship allowance payments. For superintending ranks total pay has also included bonus payments such as performance and post-related payments. Since the 2010 base data excluded 'other additional allowances' (dog handler payments etc.), the total pay figure for 2011-13, which included such payments was adjusted accordingly.

7.4.12 The real pay of Sergeants and Inspectors fell by a similar amount – basic by approximately 8% and 9% respectively, and total pay by approximately 11% for both ranks. Chief Inspectors’ pay fell by about 9% (basic) and 12% (total), whilst for Superintendents and Chief Superintendents basic pay and total pay both fell by about 9%. For all federated ranks basic pay fell about 7% and total pay about 9% (see Graphs 7.3 – 7.6 below)¹¹⁹.


7.4.13 A real terms fall of 8.5% in the average (mean) annual gross pay of all full-time UK public sector employees based on data from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) suggests that Inspectors and Chief Inspectors have seen slightly higher falls than the public sector generally.¹²⁰

7.4.14 As mentioned above, PNB pay data only goes up to the FY 2012-13, so it is possible that further erosion of police pay has occurred in the past 18 months when the below inflation 1% pay cap has been in operation for the police (September 2013 and September 2014). The full effect of the abolition of SPPs has yet to be felt (pro-rata-ed payments were made up until December 2012). The phasing out of CRTPs has started. There has been a continuation of the 2-year freeze on incremental progression. The full effect of the suspension of Superintending rank bonuses will have been felt.


¹¹⁹ ASHE data on Annual Gross Pay in the UK as a whole shows similar falls to those for total pay for two groups of police officers identified: sergeants and below (although the large number of jobs reported suggests inclusion of police staff) and senior police officers (inspectors and above). ASHE data suggests the pay of sergeants and below fell 10.5% in real terms, whilst senior officers pay fell about 11%. Annual gross pay includes basic, incentive, bonus, overtime and shift pay (see table 14.7a). Available from ONS website, <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/all-releases.html?definition=tcm%3A77-21502>

¹²⁰ Annual gross pay is close to total pay in that it includes incentive and bonus payments, overtime and shift pay (see above).


Graph 7.3: Average basic pay in real terms for federated ranks, 2009-10 to 2012-13 and 2013-14 (projected) (at 2009-2010 prices)




Graph 7.4: Average total pay in real terms for federated ranks, 2009-10 to 2012-13 and 2013-14 (projected) (at 2009-10 prices)



Graph 7.5: Average basic pay in real terms for Superintending Ranks, 2009-10 to 2012-13 and 2013-14 (projected) (at 2009-10 prices)



Graph 7.6: Average total pay in real terms for Superintending Ranks, 2009-10 to 2012-13 and 2013-14 (projected) (at 2009-10 prices)



7.4.15 Although PNB pay data has not yet been collected for FY 2013-2014, it is possible to project forward one year from 2012-2013 and estimate the likely further erosion of officers' real pay. For this exercise we have added 1% to all basic pay rates in 2012-2013 and those other elements of pay affected by the 1% award for September 2013 (i.e. London Weighting, overtime, public holiday pay, and unsocial hours). On the other hand, we have excluded SPP payments, Superintendent performance related bonuses and reduced CRTPs by 25% as per the Police Arbitration Tribunal (PAT) decision of December 2012¹²¹ subsequently embodied in Police Regulations. From this we can produce a reasonable estimate of basic and total pay for each rank.

7.4.16 The dotted line in graphs 7.3 – 7.6 represents our estimate of further decline in officers' real pay up to March 2014 (before the resumption of incremental progression on 1 April 2014). Our estimate suggests that the real terms value of full-time Constables' average basic pay is likely to have fallen a further 2% since 2012-2013 (i.e. 8% overall since 2009-2010). Likewise, Constables' total pay is likely to have fallen further by about 3% (i.e. nearly 11% since 2009-2010). Basic and total pay for other ranks show a similar additional fall in value since 2012-2013. For example, total real pay for federated ranks as a whole is estimated to have fallen 11.5% over the whole period, 2010-14, and Superintendents' pay by 11.7%. Although not strictly comparable with PNB data, provisional ASHE data for 2013/14 would seem to confirm this continued real terms fall in the pay of police officers (i.e. Sergeants and below, and Inspectors and above)¹²².

¹²¹ Decision of the Police Arbitration Tribunal (PAT): Winsor Report Part 2, December 2012 (ACAS 108/2012-13), recommendation 83 p33.

¹²² Although ASHE figures for annual gross pay are not strictly comparable to PNB earnings data, the most recent provisional ASHE median pay figures for 2014 confirm a continuing fall in the value of police pay for both sergeants and below (-13.6% since 2010) and inspectors and above (-13.1% since 2010). These figures are slightly higher fall than our estimate for 2013/14 and may also reflect the effect of the second year of the progression freeze, which we were not able to model for in our estimate. Available from ONS website, <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/all-releases.html?definition=tcm%3A77-21502>

7.5 Pension changes: impact on total and lifetime remuneration

- 7.5.1 There have been a number of changes to police pensions, with more imminent.
- 7.5.2 The change from a final salary pension scheme to a career average scheme (Career Average Revalued Earnings: CARE) is perhaps the most significant. This change means that officers' pensions will be worth considerably less in the future, and so their lifetime remuneration package is significantly reduced. The PFEW survey demonstrates that this is of substantial concern. Whilst the major impact will not be on take home salary in the immediate future, officers are concerned about the overall loss.
- 7.5.3 Another change to pensions that directly impacts on take-home pay is the change to the contribution rates. As part of the Government's reform of public service pensions, the contribution rates for existing police pension scheme members increased annually from April 2012 to April 2014. Tiered contribution rates, based on a member's salary, have also been introduced. Members of the Police Pension Scheme (PPS) 1987 have therefore seen their pension contributions increase from 11% in March 2012 to either 14.25% or 15.05% (depending on salary). Members of the New Police Pension Scheme (NPPS) 2006 have seen their pension contribution increase from 9.5% in March 2012 to between 11% and 12.75%. At the time of writing the Home Office is consulting with the PABEW on contribution rates from 1 April 2015 for members of the PPS 1987, NPPS 2006 and the new CARE Police Pension Scheme (PPS) 2015. It is proposed that from 1 April 2015 the member contribution rates for the new CARE PPS 2015 scheme will be between 12.44% and 13.78. So all members are having to pay more of their salaries into their pensions, and in some cases the increase has been as much as 4.05%.

7.6 Summary

- 7.6.1 There has been a real terms cut in central Government funding to the police service in England and Wales in the four years from March 2011 to March 2015. Since 2013 the UK economy has grown in every quarter, with annual growth of 2.7% in 2013, and 2.3% in the first three quarters of 2014. The pay policy of a pay freeze and cap has coincided with a period of relatively high inflation (3-5%). There has been no attempt to offset control of pay with stronger control of inflation. In addition, police officers have suffered pension contribution increases. Pay settlements in the whole economy, and private sector, in the last two years have clustered around a median of 2.5%. Many of the settlements have been linked to RPI inflation – especially in the sectors of water, energy, and transport. So, the public sector, and policing in particular, is out of kilter with these sectors.
- 7.6.2 Over the period since 2010 to now, cumulative police pay settlements have been 4.55%, whereas RPI inflation has been 18.3%. This has meant a real terms fall in the value of police pay settlements of about 13.8%. Even comparing pay rises with CPI inflation, which increased 14.4% over this period, shows a substantial fall in the value of police pay. At the same time, basic items of expenditure have increased: although RPI was 2.3% in September, fuel and light inflation was 4.1% ; fares and travel 3.4%; and clothing / footwear 7.0% .
- 7.6.3 If the pay cap continues for another two years, this will result in an overall fall in the real terms value of police settlements of about 17% since 2010 (-13.8% plus a further - 3.25% in 2015 and 2016).
- 7.6.4 The progression freeze was imposed on the police but no other public sector group. Actual pay cuts have included overtime pay (cut by £413 per recipient), CRTPs (cut by £303 per recipient from 1st April 2013), SPPs (loss of £873 per recipient by 1st April 2013).

7.6.5 Over the period 2010 – 2014 we estimate that federated ranks have had a real terms reduction in pay of 11.5%, and Superintendents' pay by 11.7%.

7.6.6 Two key changes to pensions have also had a significant impact on the total remuneration package, particularly over the whole lifetime, including post retirement. These are the change to a CARE scheme from a final salary scheme, and changes to contribution rates.

7.7 Questions arising

7.7.1 This above section well illustrates the need for more timely pay data in the future, which can be made available to all the sides. To date the collection of data for the PNB Census has always commenced about eight months after the end of the pay period. This results in the delivery of the completed data tables about a year after the end of the relevant financial year. There have often been further delays and revisions after this date resulting in final data tables appearing up to one and a half years after the end of the relevant financial year. Ideally 2013-14 pay data should already be available and we should not have to rely on an estimate.

7.8 Recommendations

7.8.1 **Recommendation 4 (remit):** In this financial year we ask for an uplift of 1% for all. This is based on: our recognition of the Government's intent, and the need for public sector austerity; and our concern that there should be no further divisive pay changes, such as increases for some but not others, without there being an evidence base modelling likely impact. We also recommend that the economic data we have provided be considered in future pay uplifts, as demonstrating the need to make appropriate adjustments when the UK economy is buoyant. Over the coming years, we recommend that officers are given pay uplifts that enable them to maintain their standard of living, rather than falling behind as has been the case in the last few years.

8 The London Lead

8.1 Introduction

- 8.1.1 The London Lead has existed for approximately one hundred years. There was variation in the pay for ranks above Sergeant between forces until the Desborough Report in 1919. This report recommended standardisation of pay across regions, except for London Inspectors.
- 8.1.2 Desborough concluded that even though overall the principle of standardisation of pay was to be desired, there was a rationale for additional payments to London Inspectors. This was that Inspectors and Chief Inspectors in London carry a level and a range of responsibilities not found anywhere else in the UK. This was subsequently confirmed by the Oaksey Review (1948), the Royal Commission (1962), the Edmund-Davies Report (1978) and the Sheehy Report (1993). All these reports endorsed the view that the job weight of London Inspectors and Chief Inspectors differs by such a degree that an additional payment is justified. The London Lead differs from the London Allowance and other regional payments, as it is justified in terms of the nature of the job rather than the regional cost of living.
- 8.1.3 In his Independent Review of Police Office Pay and Conditions, Tom Winsor Reviewed the London Lead. He considered submissions from a number of bodies, following which he stated that “the evidence [was] not conclusive, since, in the absence of a job evaluation exercise, it is not possible to the accuracy of the argument that Inspectors in the London forces have significantly greater responsibilities, spans of control, and workloads than their counterparts in other forces”.¹²³

¹²³ Winsor, T. (2012). Independent Review of Police Officer and Staff Remuneration and Conditions. Final report, 2. (Paragraph 7.1.278) Retrieved from: <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130312170833/http://www.review.police.uk/publications/part-2-report/>

8.1.4 Winsor therefore recommended that

“The London Lead for the Inspecting ranks in the London forces should be maintained in the short-term. The police pay review body should consider the London Lead in its first review...”

(Recommendation 57)

“when it will have the opportunity of receiving fuller and perhaps more persuasive evidence on the issue”.¹²⁴

8.2 The case for the London Lead, and PFEW position

The Inspecting ranks

8.2.1 The Inspecting ranks are of fundamental importance to successful service delivery. They have a key managerial role and provide a vital link between senior managers and operational police officers, ensuring performance delivery.

The Demands of policing London

8.2.2 London itself creates a number of unique policing challenges. London is among the most densely populated cities in Europe, with a population of 8.2 million¹²⁵ – 15% of England and Wales’ population. In addition to the residents, 790,000¹²⁶ commute into London for work, either daily or weekly, while 16.8 million overseas tourists¹²⁷ and 262 million UK visitors¹²⁸ come to London annually. It is the most ethnically diverse city in the UK.

¹²⁴ Winsor, T. (2012). Independent Review of Police Officer and Staff Remuneration and Conditions. Final report, 2. (Paragraph 7.1.278) Retrieved from:

<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130312170833/http://www.review.police.uk/publications/part-2-report/>

¹²⁵ Office for National Statistics. (2011). *2011 Census* [Data file]. Available from NOMIS website,

<https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/>

¹²⁶ Ibid

¹²⁷ Office for National Statistics. (2014). *Travel Trends, 2013* [Data file]. Available from the ONS website,

<http://www.ons.gov.uk>

¹²⁸ Visit England. (2014). *The GB Day Visitor: Statistics 2013* [Annual Report]. Available from Visit England’s website, <http://www.visitengland.org/>

- 8.2.3 39% of state secondary school children do not speak English as their first language (this rises to 69% in Tower Hamlets)¹²⁹. And it is also home to the major non-Christian religious groups – 57% of England’s Jewish population live in London as do 51% of Hindus, 38% of Muslims, 30% of Sikhs and 34% of Buddhists¹³⁰.
- 8.2.4 Additionally, there are extremes of socio-economic status across the city. Although average London household incomes are the highest in the UK, London also houses the highest proportion of children living in workless households and in income poverty of any region in the UK. In 2013 over a fifth of London children (383,000, aged 0-18) lived in households where at least one adult was claiming a key social security benefit¹³¹. Similarly, it is the region with the highest proportion of rough sleepers in the UK¹³². While there are parts of London with high employment rates, there are also parts where the employment is lower than in most UK regions. Unemployment is concentrated in the East End, especially Hackney, Newham and Tower Hamlets. Such extremes of social and economic experience make for a highly complex, demanding and sometimes volatile policing environment, as the August 2011 riots demonstrated.
- 8.2.5 There are also strategic and tactical demands of policing the capital city. London is the centre of Government and diplomatic activity; a global centre of finance; the location of the main royal residences; the major centre for royal events; a major tourist destination; a major national and international transport hub; the focus of a wide range of political demonstrations and protests; the highest profile UK target for potential terrorist attacks; and a key location for organised crime.

¹²⁹ Department for Education. (2013). *Schools, pupils and their characteristics: January 2013* [Data file]. Available from the Government’s website, <https://www.gov.uk/>

¹³⁰ Office for National Statistics. (2011). *2011 Census* [Data file]. Available from NOMIS website, <https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/>

¹³¹ Department for Work and Pensions. (2013). *Children in out-of-work benefit households statistics: 31 May 2013* [Data file]. Available from the Government’s website, <https://www.gov.uk/>

¹³² Department for Communities and Local Government. (2014). *Rough sleeping in England: autumn 2013* [Data file]. Available from the Government’s website, <https://www.gov.uk/>

8.2.6 This working environment requires a distinctive set of decision-making abilities on the part of the Inspectors and Chief Inspectors who police the city. The following paragraphs give an illustration of the kind of work being undertaken by the London Inspecting ranks in some of those roles.

Counter-terrorist policing

8.2.7 The London area is allocated about 50% of the total UK counter-terrorism budget. This underlines the greater threat which the Inspecting ranks in London have to deal. The Government's counter-terrorist Prevent Strategy¹³³ locates 16 of the 25 'priority areas' in London. By far the greater proportion of specialist counter-terrorist police officers are London, and the Metropolitan force leads and coordinates the UK counter-terrorist policing.

Protection-policing

8.2.8 Approximately 1000 officers are permanently devoted to 'protection-policing'. The Diplomatic Protection Group covers 190 embassies and diplomatic missions with 6000 diplomats (and their 16,500 dependants). Nearly all of this work involves Inspectors running armed teams on 24/7 schedules.

Public order policing

8.2.9 The preservation of social order is regarded as the fundamental function of an effective police force. The August 2011 riots and looting demonstrated how fragile this can be. These riots required virtually all of the Metropolitan Police Service and City of London Inspecting ranks to work round the clock for almost two days, with extended tours of duty thereafter.

¹³³ Home Office. (2011). *Prevent Strategy*. Retrieved December 11, 2014, from https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf

8.2.10 London routinely hosts a wide variety of public events. Examples include the Notting Hill Carnival; football matches involving 15 major football league clubs; numerous political protests, trade union demonstrations and other protest events. All such events require proactive public order policing, involving strategic and tactical planning. The Inspecting ranks conduct the key operational roles in this.

Serious crime policing

8.2.11 Approximately 19% of all crime was committed within the London area in the year to June 2014¹³⁴. There were 207,000 arrests during 2012-2013¹³⁵, each of which has to be recorded, processed and regularly reviewed according to a rigid set of bureaucratic routines in order to ensure 'due process'. The Inspecting ranks are responsible for ensuring the integrity of this process.

8.2.12 London is also a focus for extensive serious and organised crime. The Metropolitan and City forces have a number of highly specialised teams dedicated to particular forms of crime. The City specialises in financial and economic crime, such as fraud. The Metropolitan has specialised units covering armed robberies (the Flying Squad); kidnapping; drug dealing; people and sex trafficking; and child abuse – which includes a sub-unit dealing with paedophile crimes. It is important to understand the complexity and variety of such specialised units and their workloads. For example, there are 18 Child Abuse Investigation Teams each dealing with about 100 referrals per month, all requiring extensive investigation and sensitivity. It is not unusual for Detective Chief Inspectors to oversee the investigation of between 1000 and 2000 crimes while supervising some 450 officers while Detective Inspectors supervise between 20 and 70 officers.

¹³⁴ Office for National Statistics. (2014). *Crime in England and Wales, year ending June 2014* [Data file]. Available from the ONS website, <http://www.ons.gov.uk>

¹³⁵ Home Office. (2014). *Police powers and procedures England and Wales 2012 to 2013* [Data file]. Available from the Government's website, <https://www.gov.uk/>

8.2.13 Comparisons with CID operations in other forces are problematic without an independently conducted research project.

Daily response policing

8.2.14 A typical response team Inspector supervises 45-50 officers (rising to 60 on night-shift). These supervisory ratios are believed to be considerably higher than elsewhere. Although the Metropolitan has a similar proportion of Inspectors to other forces, a far higher percentage are abstracted for specialist duties (as detailed above).

8.2.15 Although comparisons are not easy, there are indicative data which suggest that London Inspecting ranks routinely carry a significantly greater workload than elsewhere. Over one weekend (25th-28th March, 2011), the Metropolitan Police received 4443 calls requiring an 'immediate response'. This is an average of 139 calls for each operational command unit. During the same time-frame, South Yorkshire dealt with 642 such calls averaging 107 calls per command area while, in Northumbria, the average was 21 calls per response Inspector.

8.3 The PFEW position

8.3.1 The PFEW believes that the pay system should demonstrate organisational justice. Officers in significant management roles should be rewarded appropriately for their skills, knowledge, attributes, hours worked, sacrifices made, responsibilities, span of command, and the risks and demands of the job. We agree with Winsor's position that these should be properly evaluated, through a systematic job analysis. In order to fully evaluate whether there are differences between forces or regions, including London, this would need to be conducted in a number of locations and statistically reliable comparisons made. PFEW is not aware of any such study, although there has been a study conducted on behalf of the Inspectors' Branch Boards of the Metropolitan and City of London Police Federations¹³⁶ that assesses the work-related well-being, job-satisfaction, and burn-out of the Inspecting ranks in the capital compared to other major cities and the rest of England and Wales. This study concludes that Inspecting ranks in the capital work more hours; have more rest days cancelled; experience a greater impact on work-related well-being; and have lower job satisfaction. These are indicators of significant differences between the roles of Inspectors in the capital and elsewhere. It is not clear from the study what the exact links are between these largely wellbeing related outcomes and job content, and we believe that relationship is worthy of further exploration: however, as an indicative study we believe this work is notable.

8.3.2 We believe that definitive work to assess the difference in job content between London and elsewhere is the responsibility of the Government Department in charge of policing: the Home Office. We do not believe it should be left for officers themselves to fund the collection of such data, via the PFEW.

¹³⁶ Cookson, G., and Williams, P, King's College London: *Investigating the London Lead*, Final Report August 2014.

8.3.3 Until such time as data are collected as part of a formal job evaluation, we do not believe that there is a case for removing the London Lead, and there is some evidence through the Cookson and Williams study that the Inspecting role in London differs from that elsewhere. To remove the London Lead would save the Home Office an insubstantial amount of money, (approx. £3,400,000 assuming 1,700 Metropolitan Inspectors) but would cause considerable hardship to those officers who are currently in receipt of the payment. In addition, the removal of this payment might have unintended consequences, such as turnover of Inspectors. As the job market improves in London, officers in the Inspecting ranks are leaving for other jobs. The PFEW Metropolitan Inspectors' Branch Board is able to give examples of Inspectors who have left to join security businesses, particularly in Canary Wharf, for significantly higher salaries. Such turnover is costly to the service in terms of experience loss, and the need to train replacements.

8.3.4 PFEW are not aware of any studies undertaken to gather either qualitative information from Inspectors as to their likely reaction to such a change, nor quantification of the likely cost-benefits. We would expect to see this information before removal of this payment is considered.

8.4 Summary

8.4.1 The London Lead has been reviewed in the past, and on each occasion has been continued because the role appears to be different in London compared to other regions.

8.4.2 The Metropolitan Inspectors' Branch Board argues that

- The London Area is the most complex and demanding policing environment in the UK; and many of the problems are rarely encountered elsewhere.
- Policing in London demands a far wider range of specialised units and technical skills than are found elsewhere in the UK. Some units are unique to London and, in consequence, the Metropolitan and City forces have evolved to become a national and international resource of policing expertise.
- The levels of responsibility, spans-of-control, complexity of problems and the workloads of the London Inspecting ranks are far in excess of those experienced by colleagues elsewhere in the UK.

8.4.3 We believe the pay system should demonstrate organisational justice. Officers in significant management roles should be rewarded appropriately for what they do.

8.4.4 We acknowledge that Winsor stated that the demands of the role should be properly evaluated. We believe that to comply with Winsor's proposal, a study needs to be conducted systematically comparing London policing to other forces and regions. PFEW is not aware of any such study. We believe that such a study is the responsibility of the Home Office: it should not be left to officers themselves to fund such work, through contributions to PFEW.

8.4.5 Until such time as data are provided that provide a formal evaluation, we do not believe there is a case for removing the London Lead. To do so would further contribute to perceptions of unfairness in the pay system, and would cause considerable hardship to those officers affected.

8.5 Questions Arising

- Have the Home Office conducted an evaluation comparing the role of the London Inspectors to others?
- What data does the HO have on this?
- What kind of evaluation, if any, is planned?

8.6 Recommendations

8.6.1 **Recommendation 5 (remit)** is that *the London Lead should be retained. It should be uplifted by 1%, in line with other elements of the remuneration package.*

9 Regionalisation of pay: Observations

9.1 Introduction

9.1.1 In this year, we have been asked to provide “*observations on the level and scope of existing arrangements for differentiation of officer pay and allowances at the regional and local level*”.¹³⁷

9.2 Existing arrangements and their derivation

9.2.1 The current framework for police officers’ pay includes five location-based payments:

- London Allowance and London Transitional Supplement,
- London Weighting,
- South East England Allowance,
- South East England Transitional Supplement.

9.2.2 London Allowance is payable to members of the Metropolitan police service and City of London Police at a rate determined by the Commissioner or force with regard to location and retention needs. The maximum rate is £4,338 a year, for those appointed on or after September 1994, and not receiving a replacement (housing) allowance. It is £1,011 per annum in other cases. It is non-pensionable.

9.2.3 London Transitional Supplement is paid to members of the City of London or Metropolitan Police who joined before September 1994 and who receive a replacement allowance equivalent to housing allowance. It is a maximum of £1,000 a year.

¹³⁷ PRRB Remit Letter, from the Home Secretary, the Rt Hon Theresa May MP, to David Lebrecht, Chair of the PRRB, dated 3rd November 2014.

- 9.2.4 London Weighting is part of pensionable pay for Metropolitan and City of London Officers. It is currently £2,325 per annum, and is pensionable.
- 9.2.5 South East England Allowance and South East England Transitional Supplement were introduced in 2001.¹³⁸ The South East Allowance for officers appointed on or after 1 September 1994 and not receiving a bonus allowance was originally set at £2,000 annually in forces bordering the Metropolitan police service i.e. Essex, Hertfordshire, Kent, Surrey and Thames Valley, and at £1,000 in Bedfordshire, Hampshire and Sussex.
- 9.2.6 The South East Transitional Supplement is an allowance paid to officers joining prior to 1 September 1994, and receiving half rate housing allowance or flat rate transitional rent allowance in Hertfordshire, Kent, and Surrey. The allowance increased payment of half rate housing allowance or flat rate transitional allowance in these services to a maximum of £2,000.
- 9.2.7 From April 2013 Chief Constables have had discretion over whether to pay officers regional allowances. This applies to all regional allowances other than London weighting.
- 9.2.8 The most recent Pay Census data covers the period April 2012 to March 2013. It is not yet possible to tell whether Chief Constables have exercised their discretion to pay these allowances: this will become clearer in the next Pay Census data, when new starters from April 2013 will show in the data set.

¹³⁸ Home Office Circular 11/2001 implemented on 1 April 2001 introduced the SE Allowance, and HO Circular 39/2001 introduced the SE Transitional Supplement. Both implemented 1 April 2001. See also Reg. 34 Annex U, para 6 in The Police Regulations 2003 (amended 2012).

- 9.2.9 The London Weighting and Allowances were originally intended to compensate for the higher cost of living in the capital. Over time, these have also been said to be necessary for recruitment and retention purposes.
- 9.2.10 The South East Allowances were brought in in 2001 partly in response to the fact that services around London were losing officers to the Metropolitan police, as they were attracted by the higher salaries there.
- 9.2.11 Winsor appeared to be in favour of a zoning approach, but with uplifts to base pay rather than as allowances. This has been implemented within some Government departments (Ministry of Justice, Department for Work and Pensions). Based on the example from Winsor, Gloucester and Northants would receive the same allowance as Sussex and Kent).
- 9.2.12 It is also worth noting that the Metropolitan Police and City of London police offer concessionary travel for officers. However, this is being phased out. There is concern that this may have an impact on recruitment and retention, especially when the high costs of housing in the area are considered.

9.3 What is known about the benefits of the existing system?

- 9.3.1 Generally speaking, there are numerous systems for regionalising pay. These include payment of allowances, and incorporating extra payments into the existing basic pay. Regional pay systems can range from centrally controlled systems (e.g. zones or regional allowances) to fully devolved systems, with control over pay arrangements vested in local employers.

- 9.3.2 The police services in England and Wales, therefore, essentially have a system of four zones, these being London, two South East zones, and the rest of England and Wales.
- 9.3.3 This is similar to other roles in the public sector, where the most common approach is to use a national pay structure with additional payments to compensate for cost of living in London and the South East.
- 9.3.4 To the best of our knowledge, there has been no systematic, formal evaluation of the benefits of the existing police system, relating the extra payments to numbers and calibre of recruits, and numbers retained, nor to incumbents' perceptions of fairness of pay. It is therefore difficult to justify any changes to the existing arrangements.
- 9.3.5 Further, we are not aware of any analysis to check whether the introduction of the two zones of South East Allowance was successful in preventing haemorrhaging of offers to the Metropolitan Police.

9.4 What do other organisations do?

- 9.4.1 In schools, there are separate pay scales for London and the 'fringe' around the capital, and there have been changes to these in recent years to reflect recruitment and retention difficulties in London and the South East.

9.4.2 In the prison service, 'locality' payments were introduced in 2001 to replace the previous system of London weighting and London allowances, as there were recruitment and retention difficulties on the fringes surrounding London. The number of zones was progressively increased from three to four in 2003, and then to six in 2006. However, the Prison Service Pay Review Body (PSPRB) expressed concerns about the operation of the locality payments. We understand that in 2012 the National Offender Management System (NOMS) proposed replacing the existing Locality Pay Allowance with a basic national pay range with London enhancements: inner and outer London scales being respectively £3,800 and £2,500 a year higher than the national scale. Both NOMS and the unions requested that those proposals be given an opportunity to 'bed in' before considering whether any additional local pay flexibilities are needed. The Prison Service Pay Review Body supported that view¹³⁹ and recommended implementing the NOMS proposals before further consideration.

¹³⁹ Author Peter Knight, Prison Service Pay review Body Report on Local Pay in England and Wales 2012, pub. The Stationary Office,. (2012)

- 9.4.3 At the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), under a structure introduced in 2001, in addition to the inner and outer London and national pay scales, there is a separate ‘specified location pay zone’, meaning that there are four zones in total. There are also separate pay scales for specialist roles.
- 9.4.4 In 2007 a new structure was introduced at the Ministry of Justice based on five zones: ‘inner London’; ‘outer London and SE hotspots’; ‘hotspots’, ‘national plus’ and ‘national’. Under an agreement reached in 2010 the national band was effectively removed and the number of bands was reduced to four.
- 9.4.5 The NHS reached an agreement in 1998 to bring in local pay under the “Agenda for Change”¹⁴⁰. However, in recent years we understand that consequences arising from the localised system have meant that a shift away from localisation and pay has become more centralised.
- 9.4.6 Other systems that balance central and local control of pay include flexible grading (used for police staff) and indexing systems (linked to local market conditions). However, key considerations in any change to existing arrangements would be whether these offer less flexibility than the existing schemes, and whether the administrative burden is likely to be increased.
- 9.4.7 Work conducted by Incomes Data Services¹⁴¹ suggests that the differentials between regions outside London in known localised systems tend to be insubstantial.

¹⁴⁰ Reported in Incomes Data Services, *An Examination of Location-based Pay, Contribution / Performance-related Pay and Comparability of Police officers’ Pay*. (2011).

¹⁴¹ (ibid)

9.5 Other factors in pay systems

- 9.5.1 It is inappropriate to consider the issue of regional pay in isolation from other potential features of the pay system. For example, other organisations sometimes take into account performance, skills, market pay, or competency related pay. Many of these have been considered for the police service, and dismissed as inappropriate.
- 9.5.2 For example, it is worth noting that the police currently operates a system where pay is based on rank rather than on skills. This is in order to ensure deployability between roles and forces (when there are mutual aid or collaboration requirements, for example). It is an important consideration that officers are posted into roles rather than choosing for themselves, and this can be expected to contribute to the perception that rank based pay is a fairer mechanism than some others might be.
- 9.5.3 That said, following the Winsor Review, the service has accepted a system that will be partly competency based. Constables, for example, will be subject to assessments to access spine points 4 and 7 of the pay scale.
- 9.5.4 In essence, then, evolving police pay system is a hybrid one already, incorporating length of service (experience), competency, and regional pay. However, some of these elements are new or subject to very recent change (competency elements, and discretionary regional allowances). It will be important to properly evaluate the impact of these changes before introducing any additional change.

9.6 Risks of further pay regionalisation

An Uncoordinated approach

- 9.6.1 We believe, however, that the devolution of policing that has already occurred in Scotland, and Northern Ireland, and the anticipated devolution of policing in Wales (following the Silk Commission, and the vote on 3rd December 2014 to implement the six Silk recommendations on policing, including the devolution of pay¹⁴²), means there is a likelihood of further regionalisation. We are concerned that this could happen in an uncontrolled way, with Scottish and Welsh police services setting their rate independently of the English services. Regional pay zones can create “cliffs” which can pull people away from neighbouring regions: the services that border Scotland and Wales could lose officers to them. This is a phenomenon that is well-recognised in regional pay systems: Clarks, for example, conducts regular reviews to try and avoid stores “cannibalising” staff against one another. It has already happened in policing, with the Metropolitan Police attracting officers from surrounding forces, resulting in the South East Allowances.
- 9.6.2 There is, therefore, a danger that the services that border Scotland (Northumbria, Cumbria) and Wales (Cheshire, Shropshire, Hertfordshire, and Gloucestershire) will, if unchecked, suffer from a loss of officers to Scotland and Wales.

¹⁴² The Silk Commission’s Part 2 Report (March 2014), Chapter 10.

9.6.3 Furthermore, the overall impact on the pay bill is likely to be a rise. Local pay determination can increase the possibility of salary “arms races” where regions look to pay more and more to be attractive to applicants and “creep” as regions pay more to compete with neighbouring areas with higher rates of pay. Paying different individuals different amounts for the same role can be particularly challenging when there is cross-jurisdictional working. This leads to difficulties in terms of what rate to pay, and could lead to different team members being paid different rates. It can also lead to interoperability issues.

Operational Effectiveness

9.6.4 There is a further danger to the operational effectiveness of policing, posed by regionalisation of pay: that is that officers will be unwilling to take part in mutual aid for forces where the rate of pay is lower than their own. Collaboration between forces may also be affected, as officers being paid different rates to work on the same cases, doing the same tasks, may feel aggrieved.

Equality issues

9.6.5 It must be recognised that any regional pay system would need to be “equality proofed” with care taken to ensure that those with protected characteristics are not adversely affected.

9.6.6 In particular, there is greater pay inequality within the private than public sectors, modelling public sector pay on private sector assumptions could undo the work done to ensure equal pay within the public sector.

- 9.6.7 Devolving pay decisions to a local level is likely to decrease transparency and increase mistakes and omissions which increase the likelihood of equal pay challenges, particularly if data is not available at a local level to justify decisions.

Administration and Governance

- 9.6.8 Any form of devolved decision making (i.e. any system other than a UK wide framework) would need appropriate administration and governance to support it. This is likely to include consultation and dispute resolution mechanisms. The costs in terms of time and resources have the potential to be greater than any savings made from reductions to the salary bill. It will be worth monitoring the cost of running a PNB in Scotland alongside the PRRB.
- 9.6.9 It should be remembered that the pay of officers has a legal basis, and is set out in Regulations and Determinations. This is partly to protect officers because they are not employees. It means that officers are able to have recourse to legal action should pay not be administered in accordance with the Regulations. This adds an additional layer of complexity to the likely costs and resources needed to administer any further regionalisation of pay.
- 9.6.10 Furthermore, depending on the system of regionalisation, there may also be a need to take into account local labour market conditions, and benchmark salaries against these, or local cost of living. Again, this is likely to create extra administrative burden, and a need for specialist Human Resources skills, that might offset any potential savings.

9.7 Summary

- 9.7.1 There are a number of allowances currently paid to officers in London and the South East.
- 9.7.2 London payments were originally to compensate for the higher cost of living. They have subsequently been said to assist with recruitment and retention. The South East payments arose because officers were being drawn into the Metropolitan force at the expense of surrounding forces.
- 9.7.3 We know of no formal, systematic evaluation of the benefits of the existing system, relating extra payments to numbers and calibre of recruits, or numbers retained. Until such an evaluation is conducted, we believe it is inappropriate to change the existing system, other than to give an appropriate uplift.
- 9.7.4 There are a number of risks in regionalising pay. The biggest for the police currently is that the devolution of policing – and pay – to Scotland and Wales will result in loss of officers from bordering services to either Scotland or Wales (or, indeed, vice versa) depending on which service sets the higher salaries.
- 9.7.5 There is a need to consider mutual aid, collaboration, and interoperability in any regional pay system in policing.
- 9.7.6 Further regionalisation would need to take into account equality concerns.
- 9.7.7 The need for appropriate administration and governance processes to be set up is likely to be costly and offset any intended saving. This is especially true for police pay, which is set out in Regulations.

9.8 Questions arising

9.8.1 There is a clear need to evaluate the existing regional allowances. This evaluation might consider:

- What is the intention of the allowances?
- To what extent are they successful (e.g. what role do they play in attraction and retention)?
- What do other organisations aiming to recruit and retain similar calibre of personnel do?
- What is the basis for the value of the allowances?¹⁴³

9.8.2 More broadly, similar analysis should be undertaken for the whole of England and Wales. In particular:

- Are there regions where recruitment and retention are particularly challenging?
- If so, what is the role of pay in this?

9.8.3 Finally, the biggest risk in regionalisation of pay currently is that the devolution of pay in policing to Scotland, and potentially Wales, will create an uncoordinated approach. This could adversely affect deployability, and could impact on the recruiting and retention to forces along national borders. It could cause pay drift, in the same way that the introduction of allowances for the Metropolitan Police Service ultimately meant that surrounding zones needed to be given allowances to ensure recruitment and retention. For that reason we ask:

- What consideration has the Home Office given to this issue?

¹⁴³ Some of these questions have been suggested by the National Crime Agency Pay review Body's recommendation regarding whether allowances payable for specialist and technical skills should be introduced.

- What work has been done, on behalf of bordering forces, to evaluate likely impacts, and any requirements for pay uplifts there?

9.9 Recommendations

- 9.9.1 **Recommendation 6 (remit)** is that *the current regional allowances should be retained, until such time as an evaluation is undertaken of these. In the meantime, an uplift commensurate with the overall uplift is recommended: that is, an uplift of 1%.*

SECTION 4: THE FIVE YEAR REMIT

In this section, first, we discuss issues that we originally requested be included in the remit letter. We believe that in the next five years there is a need to ensure the pay system reflects a number of considerations. It should:

- attract and retain officers who are representative of the public served;
- be designed to ensure officers believe there is organisational justice;
- be designed based on evidence of need, and what works;
- facilitate deployability to a range of roles and requiring a range of skills;
- appropriately recognise the skills, knowledge, attributes, and workload required.

As a first step, we would like to see a clear statement from the Home Office of the aims for the pay system: what it should achieve, and how monitoring against these aims will be conducted in the future. In the next five years, the Home Office should adopt an evidence based approach to workforce planning, and remuneration, with comprehensive, transparent, and reliable data; modelling of proposed changes in advance; and monitoring of recent changes for their impact.

At the earliest opportunity within these five years, we ask that officers' loss of income caused by the pay freeze and inflation be redressed.

Second, we also discuss those aspects of pay and conditions that have been raised by the Home Office for consideration in the next five years. These are:

- On-call allowance
- The gap between Constables' and Sergeants' pay scales, and between Inspectors' and Chief Inspectors' scales
- Buy-out of Sergeants' overtime
- Management of officers on limited duties, and the value of the deployment component of the x-factor
- The feasibility of attaining greater coherence between the terms and conditions of police officers and police staff

Third, we raise a number of other issues that we believe are outstanding, and worthy of monitoring over the coming five years. These are:

- The Constables' pay scale (for officers joining after 1 April 2013)
- Pay progression
- Skills thresholds
- Away from Home Overnight allowance
- Motor Vehicle Allowance
- Equality issues

10 The Remit Letter – five year considerations

10.1 Introduction

10.1.1 The Home Secretary's remit letter asked for the Review Body's comments on priorities for a five year programme including some issues deferred by the Winsor Review for the PRRB's consideration.

10.1.2 This chapter is in three parts.

10.1.3 It begins by outlining our overarching priorities for the pay system overall, and what aspects of the remuneration system we would like to be reviewed as a priority over the coming 5 years. Second, we then provide comments on the priorities for a five year programme highlighted in the remit letter. Third, we list further additional specific areas of concern that we would wish to see included in the five year work programme.

10.1.4 The Winsor Review (2012) amounted to a wide-ranging overhaul of police officer terms and conditions. The past few years have been characterised by significant change for officers, the full impact of which remains to be seen. Many changes to officers' pay and conditions have already been made but some issues, such as threshold assessments and limited duty, are still to be implemented. The recent changes, while comprehensive, have not necessarily resulted in consistency or clarity regarding the intent behind some elements of the remuneration package. We believe that further major change – unless backed up by robust and transparent evidence - would be unpalatable at the present time and would not be in the interests of the service.

10.2 PFEW and PSAEW overarching concerns for the coming five years

10.2.1 We believe that any further change that is not fully evidence based will have a further impact on officers' perceptions of organisational justice. (See Chapter 6).

10.2.2 We believe there is a need to ensure the pay system reflects a number of considerations:

- it should attract and retain officers who are representative of the public served;
- it should be designed so as to ensure officers believe there is organisational justice within the system;
- it should be designed based on evidence of need, and what works;
- it should facilitate deployability to a range of roles and requiring a range of skills;
- it should appropriately recognise the skills, knowledge, and attributes, and workload required.

10.2.3 As a first step, we would like to see a clear statement from the Home Office of the aims for the pay system: what it should achieve as a whole, and how elements within it contribute to that, and how monitoring against these aims will be conducted in the future. We believe that a strategic overview is needed, and it may be that overall direction may be aided by the work of the ACPO Workforce Planning Business Area, as well as other initiatives.

10.2.4 We believe that there are a number of anomalies within the current system, and that these need to be addressed in a systematic manner. Some of these have been raised as concerns in discussions of the topics that the PRRB has already been asked to consider. For example:

- It is not clear what the rationale is that underpins the basic pay. It certainly has not kept up with inflation, and it is not clear how it compares to jobs with similar skills, knowledge, and attributes requirements.
- A related point is that the current system whereby pay is largely rank based, with spine points, assumes that the same drivers underpin pay for all ranks: this may not be the case. Those in different ranks have very dissimilar career expectations, and the roles may vary to differing extents. Similarly, the service needs to encourage different career patterns (e.g. to encourage many Constables to have whole careers at a single rank, but to incentivise a very small proportion of officers to aim for ACPO ranks), and this may not be best achieved by the current system.
- It is not clear what is being rewarded by some elements of remuneration. For example, the components of the x-factor are not clearly elucidated, and the rationale for some elements of the remuneration package means they are not necessarily distinct.

- In the recent past it would appear that some elements of the remuneration system have been changed without due consideration being given to the impact on the overall remuneration package. Consideration does not seem to have been given to whether adequate ameliorative action is needed to continue to recruit and retain the appropriate calibre of officers, to maintain a perception of organisational justice and fairness in the system, and to motivate officers. An example is the introduction of the CARE scheme.

10.2.5 Perhaps the best way to explain some of these concerns is to outline some current and emerging career pattern and pay drivers for two ranks: Constables and Superintending ranks. These have been chosen as being the ranks at the lower and upper end of the promotion and pay spectrum of officers represented in this submission. However, the argument also applies to other ranks, and we believe is consistent with our recommendations on issues such consideration of the gaps between rank pay scales.

Constables

- 10.2.6 Constables form the vast majority of the police service: around 77%. This means that most officers serve their entire careers as Constables. Because the service requires so many, and because it is efficient for them to be experienced and to be representative of the public served, it is appropriate for the pay system to encourage retention of officers willing to remain at this rank for their whole career. That is why the PFEW was keen to ensure as many officers as possible have access to the top of the Constable pay scale, rather than limiting it to specialist skills, as Winsor recommended. All are required to be able to fulfil the 10 units of the Policing Diploma, and to have the required knowledge, skills, and attributes for competent performance of the associated tasks. In recognition of the fact that police services need to ensure that Constables (and other federated ranks) are widely deployable, the newly designed skills thresholds include reassessment of the 10 Policing Diploma components. Overtime is paid, so that services can have a flexible workforce willing to undertake extra duties and cope with surges of demand. The pay system also recognises that experience is vital, and that professional development is expected: again, the design of the skills assessments recognises this.
- 10.2.7 Key changes for Constables have included reduction in their numbers; and the need to investigate different types of crime (e.g. fewer traditional crimes such as burglary, but more crimes such as sexual violence). It would be appropriate to consider whether the changing workload requirements and skills needed are adequately rewarded.

10.2.8 In summary, then, the pay system needs to reward long service and experience as a Constable; protect deployability and flexibility on behalf of services, (and this can mitigate against having a system that only rewards certain skills); and encourage development throughout the whole career. The changing workload and skills requirement also needs to be considered: but a particular tension exists within the set of factors that drive pay, between the need to maintain deployability and flexibility, and the need to reward skills.

Superintending ranks¹⁴⁴

10.2.9 Superintending ranks make up less than 1% of the police service. Officers in these ranks have experienced at least four promotions through the ranks, and can therefore be expected to be driven, and motivated by the potential for still further career progression. Yet the likelihood of promotion has been much diminished in recent years both by the reduction in numbers of Chief Superintendent roles, and Chief Officer ranks above these. Furthermore, this will be exacerbated by the introduction of Direct Entry Superintendents and Chief Constables, for these recruits will take up a proportion of the remaining promotion opportunities. Consideration needs to be given as to whether this loss of opportunity, and the motivation promotion prospects afford, needs to be balanced by a positive change in the remuneration system.

¹⁴⁴ The case made here for reviewing the Superintending ranks' remuneration is endorsed by both the PSAEW and the Superintendents' Association of Northern Ireland (SANI).

10.2.10 The austerity measures have affected the numbers of Superintending ranks disproportionately, with a reduction in their numbers of approximately 25% in just over three years. This has resulted in significant changes to many roles. Like the Constables, Superintending ranks have had to deal with the changing landscape of policing, including changing crimes, that has come from largely external pressures such as social and economic change, and increased scrutiny and accountability. However, they have also had to deal with the managerial issues associated with changes resulting from internal pressures, such as restructuring, downsizing, collaboration, and regionalisation. Firstly, a number of police services have eliminated the Chief Superintendent rank, meaning that some Superintendents are performing roles previously filled at a higher rank, and with a higher salary. Additionally, in many services, there has been a devolvement of responsibility of those functions traditionally carried out at Chief Officer rank to members of the Superintending ranks. Secondly, a number of services have also changed either away from the BCU structure, which was a consistent model of policing across the UK, and created a force-wide functional model of command, or, where the BCU model has been retained, BCUs have been merged to create larger commands or “super-BCUs”. One of the consequences of these two actions is that there is now much more variability in the range of responsibilities and spans of command undertaken by officers who are designated as being at the same rank, and on the same pay scale. The data provided at Table 2.2 show that Superintendents can have spans of command covering several hundred officers and staff, or several thousand; they may have overall responsibility for protecting vulnerable people, or responsibility policing large and complex territorial policing areas, and in some cases, they have jurisdictions that are larger than those of some Assistant Chief Constable / Commander ranks. This suggests two key issues that need to be addressed within the pay system for Superintending ranks: the significant and changing skills and responsibilities required; and the variability. It cannot be right that

salary is only determined by length of service in the rank, and that all roles currently designated at these ranks attract the same salary levels, despite these variations. We believe that, whilst rewarding experience in the rank is important, the system of remuneration needs to recognise the differing requirements of roles, to ensure fairness; to incentivise officers to undertake the more arduous roles; and to help to ensure that Superintendents are incentivised to develop their skills ready for the next stage of their career. Within the current system, why should any Superintendent with comparatively narrower responsibilities move to a role with much broader and more demanding responsibilities? There is no additional reward for so doing, yet the service as a whole could lose out by failing to incentivise people to develop further. Likewise, why should officers below the rank of Superintendent currently apply for a promotion, if the only roles available are those with extremely high and increasing workloads and requirements, (perhaps even previously designated as Chief Superintendent) yet the pay differential is the same as for roles where the requirement is less? It is crucial for the service as a whole that officers aspire to the rank of Superintendent: otherwise talent is wasted and the service to the public is diminished. This needs to be recognised in the reward system.

10.2.11 A related point is that the pay system needs to be adequate to attract candidates of the required calibre to be Direct Entry Superintendents. The purpose of the direct Entry scheme is to attract high performing individuals with a proven track record of leadership and delivery into the police service at a senior level. The selection process for the initial cohort of the Direct Entry scheme attracted nearly 900 applicants, but resulted in fewer than 10 appointments, far fewer than required. This is an unusually high number of unsuitable candidates. One explanation might be that the salary was in line with the expectations of candidates of lower experience and calibre than the roles required. Work needs to be undertaken to understand the expectations of Direct Entry applicants with regard to pay, and to benchmark the remuneration package for this rank with that offered in roles with comparable responsibilities.

10.2.12 The forthcoming pensions' changes will also have a disproportionate impact on Superintending ranks. Pension is deferred salary, and, as such, is an important part of the remuneration package. The CARE scheme calculation as career average instead of final salary means that instead of rewarding officers who have reached Superintending ranks with a salary based on their last years' service, the pension will be determined by how long the officer took to get to the higher ranks. For Superintending ranks, the reduction will be significant. Officers will be expected to contribute approximately 13.7% of their salary, but will receive a pension worth approximately 20% of their final salary. Under the 1987 scheme officers contribute 15.05% of their salary to receive a pension worth approximately 66% of final salary. This reduction can be expected to create a considerable disincentive for highly able people to remain for a full career and achieve this rank.

10.2.13 In summary, some key drivers for the pay system for Superintending ranks include: the need to reward the additional responsibilities they face due to reducing numbers; increasing spans of command; changes in legislation; increasing scrutiny and accountability (e.g. protecting vulnerable people, covert investigations) and the level of personal / professional risk that brings; devolvement of responsibilities from higher ranks; and the need to acknowledge the variation in roles at the same rank, caused by the creation of super-commands and the reduction in numbers, and elimination - in some services - of the Chief Superintendent rank. Additionally, the remuneration system must be able to attract Direct Entry Superintendents of an appropriate calibre. There is already a suggestion that it currently cannot. Finally, whilst the impact of the CARE scheme will be felt by all, the impact is disproportionate on higher ranks who will lose more of their pension benefits when viewed as a proportion of their salary.

10.3 Conclusions

- 10.3.1 There is a significant challenge in designing a pay system that addresses these drivers appropriately at each rank. We believe this must be explicitly addressed, and would like this to be a priority within the 5 year remit.
- 10.3.2 We believe the lack of clarity over what is being rewarded by some elements of remuneration leads to perceptions of unfairness. In some cases, this may even result in legal challenges. We are concerned this may be the case with regard to the x-factor calculation. With regard to some regional allowances, the rationale has blurred over time: are they intended to compensate for cost of living, or particular aspects of the roles, or both? We would like to see a clear statement of what is rewarded by each element of the remuneration system. This should be linked to a job evaluation so that there is transparency over whether all aspects are rewarded appropriately. This should be a priority within the next 5 years.
- 10.3.3 We are concerned that the significant losses to members that may occur as a result of the introduction of the CARE scheme should be adequately compensated for in the remuneration package. Consideration should be given to this at the earliest opportunity.

10.4 Pay uplifts in the next five years

10.4.1 In chapter 7 we noted that pay settlements since 2010 have totalled 4.55%, with RPI at 18.3%. The continuation of the pay cap in 2015 will exacerbate this. Between 2010 and 2013 RPI has reduced the value of Constables' pay by about 6%.

10.4.2 Whilst we acknowledge that in this year the Pay Review Body has been required to keep within the Government's 1% cap, we believe that this policy is likely to damage the service's ability to recruit and retain officers of an appropriate calibre. We recommend that the economic data we have provided be considered in future pay uplifts, as demonstrating the need to make appropriate adjustments to ensure officers are not left behind others when the UK economy is more buoyant. We ask that the PRRB consider this at the earliest opportunity, and certainly as a priority within the five year plan.

10.5 Summary: Our overarching priorities for the next five years

10.5.1 The recent changes to the pay system have been wide-ranging. We would not wish to see further turbulence caused by changes that are not evidence based. However, we believe that officers deserve a remuneration system that attracts and retains officers who are representative of the public served; ensure officers believe there is organisational justice within the system; is based on evidence of need, and what works; facilitates deployability to a range of roles and requiring a range of skills; appropriately recognises the skills, knowledge, and attributes, and workload required

10.5.2 We believe existing anomalies in the system need to be addressed. These include the need for a clear rationale for each element of the remuneration package, and a comparison to jobs with similar knowledge, skills, and attribute requirements; consideration of the appropriateness of pay for differing ranks, and whether a single spine point based method for each rank addresses the different organisational and personal drivers of pay; and consideration of how changes to one element impact on the package overall, and its efficacy.

10.5.3 We ask that the Home Office gives a clear statement of the aims of the pay system; what it should achieve as a whole, and how elements contribute; and how changes will be monitored in future. In earlier chapters we made a case for an evidence based system with transparent, comprehensive, and reliable data.

10.5.4 Until this has been achieved, we ask that the economic data we have provided be used at the earliest opportunity to make appropriate uplifts to ensure officers are not left behind when the economy is more buoyant, and when the current cap of a 1% uplift is removed.

10.6 The Home Secretary's remit letter: list of priorities

10.6.1 The Home Secretary's remit letter outlines a number of changes, largely introduced as a result of the Winsor Review. We agree that some of these should be priorities: including the on-call allowance; and the management of officers on limited duties and the value of the deployment element of the x-factor. (Others that we would like to see included, but currently are not, are the fairness of the Constables' pay scale; pay progression; skills thresholds; and equality issues).

10.6.2 There are also a number of issues included in the current five year remit that we do not believe should be priorities.

10.7 On-call

- 10.7.1 The Staff Associations have lobbied for an on-call allowance for some years, to compensate officers for the restrictions placed on them for being on-call. Officers on-call must remain contactable, geographically located so that they can respond quickly, and fit for duty at all times. This can place restrictions on the officer's family too. Another consideration was to encourage police services not to use on-call unnecessarily, causing undue disruption to officers' lives.
- 10.7.2 Winsor recommended that a national on-call allowance for the federated ranks should be introduced, with £15 paid for each daily occasion of on-call, after the officer in question had undertaken 12 on-call sessions in a year. A national on-call allowance was introduced on 1 April 2013 following a Police Arbitration Tribunal (PAT) in 2012 which modified Winsor's recommendations, removing the requirement for 12 unpaid sessions. The award was based on an assurance by the Official Side that on call would remain a voluntary not a mandatory activity.
- 10.7.3 The PAT commented on the paucity of reliable data on the incidence of on-call and said that the matter should be reviewed two years after being introduced, in the light of progress made on data collection.
- 10.7.4 Winsor also recommended that the allowance should be reviewed by the new Police Pay Review Body in its first triennial review, when better management data would be available.
- 10.7.5 Evidence jointly gathered by the Official and Staff Sides of the PNB in 2008 from a sample of forces found that on average officers in on-call roles were placed on-call on 50 to 60 occasions during the course of the year, but in some forces the average was as high as 130 occasions.

- 10.7.6 Prior to its abolition many forces used Special Priority Payments (SPPs) to compensate officers for being on-call. SPPs were paid at a rate of £500-£3,000 per annum. These have now been abolished.
- 10.7.7 In 2011 an on-call allowance was introduced for police officers in Scotland, at a rate of £23 per session, with no qualifying sessions.
- 10.7.8 The guidance that accompanied the introduction of the allowance in Scotland requires forces to give full and fair consideration to both welfare and operational requirements before a role can be identified as having an on-call requirement. No such framework exists in England and Wales.
- 10.7.9 We are not aware of further work by the Home Office to consider whether the on-call allowance has been successful in reducing the usage of on-call, nor whether the allowance is considered by recipients to be fair recompense. Nor are we aware of any work to determine whether the differing arrangements in Scotland are more appropriate.

10.8 Summary

10.8.1 In summary, therefore, we believe that the use of on-call should be reviewed in the light of clear management data and that this should be done as a priority. We do not believe there is any evidence that £15 per on-call session sufficiently incentivises officers to undertake on-call voluntarily, nor that it provides sufficient disincentive for forces to rely on the use of on-call in order to help achieve a reasonable work-life balance for officers.

10.9 Questions arising

10.9.1 For the Review Body to consider this matter the following questions would need to be addressed:

- How many officers are required to be on-call, how often, by what rank, by role, by gender, by other protected characteristics, full time/part time?
- Are officers on-call on rest days, public holidays, annual leave days, free days?
- How are roles designated as having an on-call requirement?
- Have forces undertaken an EIA on on-call roles?
- Has use of on-call reduced since the introduction of the allowance?
- Has it remained voluntary or how many roles have an on-call requirement included in the person specification for the role thus blurring the lines between voluntary and mandatory?

10.10 Recommendation 7a

10.10.1 PFEW recommends that the use of on-call should be reviewed in light of clear management data as a priority, that the rate of the allowance should be reviewed and consideration be given to an annual uprating mechanism and a national framework for the operation of on-call.

10.11 The gap between Constable and Sergeant pay scales and between Inspector and Chief Inspector scales

10.11.1 The PRRB has been asked to give initial comments on increasing the gap between Constable and Sergeant pay scales and between Inspector and Chief Inspector scales.

10.11.2 In his review, Winsor stated that pay differentials should reflect the changes in the weight of the job and serve as a sufficiently attractive reward to encourage the best candidates to seek promotion into a more demanding rank. We agree with this statement. As part of the psychological contract any pay system must feel fair and pay must be commensurate with the requirements of a job, the skills that officers possess and the weights of the jobs they do.

Constable to Sergeant

10.11.3 Sergeants are the first managerial rank in the police service and are crucial to the effectiveness of policing. Sergeants are taking on greater managerial and leadership responsibilities particularly given the changes to incremental progression arrangements and linking pay to performance. Currently, the difference between the Constables' maximum and the Sergeants' minimum is £1,272, a gap of 3.4%. (The gap between the top of the Constables' and the top of the Sergeants' scale is 12%).

Inspector to Chief Inspector

- 10.11.4 The difference between the Inspectors' maximum and the Chief Inspectors' minimum is £1,059, a gap of 2%. The gap between the top of each scale is 6%. There is anecdotal evidence that this gap does not reflect the job weight for the Chief Inspector role, however it is unclear what robust evidence exists to support this view.
- 10.11.5 It would be helpful if the Home Office could clarify why it has identified these two particular gaps and explain what evidence it holds on job weighting by rank, vacancies, promotions and benchmarking data that would enable the PRRB to consider this matter.
- 10.11.6 We contend that these gaps should not be looked at in isolation. It is important that the pay scale is considered in its totality from Constable through to Chief Inspector, and on to Chief Superintendent and above. This would require a proper evaluation of roles on a rank basis to establish relative job weightings taking into account the skills, knowledge and aptitudes required and an examination of benchmarking data to better understand whether these gaps are typical.
- 10.11.7 In view of the changing nature and roles of the Superintending ranks, we would also wish to review whether the difference between their current pay scales and the remuneration of Assistant Chief Constables / Commanders is appropriate – particularly when the non-pay benefits of the latter are taken into account. (Albeit it is accepted that these vary between police services).

10.12 Summary

10.12.1 It is unclear why the differentials between these roles have been chosen for consideration. We do not believe it is appropriate to look at these differentials in isolation.

10.13 Questions arising

- Why have these roles been selected for consideration? Is consideration being given to differentials across the pay system?
- Has the Home Office gathered data to determine whether the pay differentials are sufficient to encourage officers to aim for promotion, or are they a disincentive?
- How can the gaps between pay scales be quantified in the absence of systematic job evaluation, taking into account the skills, knowledge, and aptitudes required in each rank?
- How can the gaps between pay scales be qualified in the absence of comprehensive benchmarking data?

10.14 Recommendation 7b

10.14.1 We recommend that the gap between the Constables' and Sergeants' pay scales and the Inspectors' and Chief Inspectors' pay scales should not be considered in isolation. The total pay scale end-to-end needs to be considered based on comprehensive job weighting and benchmarking data.

10.15 Buy-out of Sergeants' casual overtime

10.15.1 The Review Body has been asked to consider whether there is a case for the buy-out of Sergeants' casual overtime and whether it should be a priority in the five yearwork programme.

10.15.2 When Winsor referred to casual overtime in his recommendation he included all overtime payments paid at time and one third (i.e. not payments for working on rest days, public holidays or free days). This is different to the way in which the term casual overtime is generally used in the police service.¹⁴⁵

10.15.3 We assume that in this case the PRRB has been asked to consider the buy-out of all overtime paid at time and one third. However, we would like clarification.

10.15.4 We believe that overtime is a necessary consequence of the nature of policing work and that utilising existing officers in this way helps reduce the need to recruit more officers. Overtime is often the most efficient way of dealing with immediate needs and providing resources for emergency or public order situations. The bill for overtime for Constables and Sergeants is approximately 4% of the officer pay bill and 20% of that is made up of overtime paid to the Sergeant rank. The total cost of overtime for Sergeants is approximately £55.5 million per year. Not all officers receive this, but those who do receive an average of £3,400 per year.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁵ Casual overtime usually refers to overtime when an officer is not informed at the start of their shift that they will be required to stay on at the end of their shift. (In such circumstances the first half-hour is not paid, on the first four occasions in a week: this is known as the half-hour disregard).

¹⁴⁶ These figures are calculated from the Office of Manpower Economics, PNB Census of Earnings, Hours and Length of Service. Data available from PFEW on request.

10.15.5 Winsor stated that there is a lack of available data from which to calculate the rate of an overtime buy-out for Sergeants. He did not consider the available data to be sufficiently robust to recommend a change in his report. However, he recommended that the Annual Data Returns from forces should include separate breakdowns of overtime hours worked, and total overtime spend for Constables and Sergeants. Whilst data returns do now breakdown overtime by rank it is not possible to distinguish types of overtime undertaken by Sergeants alone.

10.15.6 We argue, however, that the monetary value should not be the sole criterion when considering the buy-out of Sergeants' overtime. This would require the collection and analysis of overtime data to identify the drivers for overtime and what overtime is predictable, and data regarding the potential impact on officers' workloads and work-life balance.

10.16 Previous overtime buy-out

10.16.1 An overtime buy-out has already been implemented within the Inspecting ranks and has resulted in unforeseen consequences that have had a detrimental effect on Inspectors and Chief Inspectors.

10.16.2 The Time for Justice Report (2012)¹⁴⁷ highlights some serious concerns resulting from the buyout. Overtime pay was 'bought out' of Inspectors' contracts in 1994, in essence removing the entitlement to payment for overtime, as well as compensation for working public holidays and rest days. This was in return for a £3,000 increase in pensionable pay¹⁴⁸.

¹⁴⁷ Turnbull, P., & Wass, V. (2012). Time for Justice? Long Working Hours and the Well-Being of Police Inspectors. Cardiff Business School. Retrieved from: <http://www.polfed.org/documents/Time-for-Justice-report-low-res.pdf>

¹⁴⁸ Turnbull, P., & Wass, V. (2012). Time for Justice? Long Working Hours and the Well-Being of Police Inspectors. Cardiff Business School. Retrieved from: <http://www.polfed.org/documents/Time-for-Justice-report-low-res.pdf>

10.16.3 Although these changes were not intended to (and should not have)¹⁴⁹ altered the average number of hours Inspectors work each week, Inspectors believe that the regulations are being misinterpreted and ‘exploited’ by many senior managers; resulting in the Inspecting ranks becoming the most “put upon” in the Service’¹⁵⁰. This has reportedly resulted in an increase in Inspectors’ working hours, often surpassing the guidance from the Working Time regulations of 48 hours per week as a maximum.

10.16.4 The Time for Justice Report (2012)¹⁵¹ used the following quotes to highlight this:

“There is an expectation that Inspectors will just get on with the job irrespective of the workload ... Inspectors are seen as a ‘free’ resource whereas lower ranks need to be paid overtime”.

(Male, Region 5 Community Inspector in service for 12 years).

“If my Force had to pay me and Ranks above me overtime I think they’d take it more seriously. I estimate that in the last couple of years if I got overtime it would cost £20K+ for my Force. I am not saying I should get overtime, I knew what I was signing up for, but extra hours on those who are not paid overtime is a very easy option”.

(Female, Region 3 DI in service for 22 years).

¹⁴⁹ HO circular 21/97. (1997)

¹⁵⁰ Turnbull, P., & Wass, V. (2012). Time for Justice? Long Working Hours and the Well-Being of Police Inspectors. Cardiff Business School. Retrieved from: <http://www.polfed.org/documents/Time-for-Justice-report-low-res.pdf>

¹⁵¹ Turnbull, P., & Wass, V. (2012). Time for Justice? Long Working Hours and the Well-Being of Police Inspectors. Cardiff Business School. Retrieved from: <http://www.polfed.org/documents/Time-for-Justice-report-low-res.pdf>

10.16.5 Substantial increases in working hours may have serious psychological and physical health consequences. According to Virtanen, Heikkilä, Jokela, Ferrie, Batty, Vahtera, and Kivimäki, (2012)¹⁵² some studies suggest associations between longer working hours and a range of problems, including fatigue¹⁵³ (;increased cortisol levels¹⁵⁴;elevated blood pressure¹⁵⁵;carotid intima-media thickness¹⁵⁶;anxiety and depression¹⁵⁷;type 2 diabetes¹⁵⁸, being overweight¹⁵⁹, and mortality¹⁶⁰. As police are already at high-risk of negative health effects due to working in shifts patterns¹⁶¹, these consequences should be taken seriously and considered carefully.

¹⁵² Virtanen, M., Heikkilä, K., Jokela, M., Ferrie, J. E., Batty, G. D., Vahtera, J., & Kivimäki, M. (2012). Long working hours and coronary heart disease: a systematic review and meta-analysis. *American journal of epidemiology*, 176(7), 586-596. <http://aje.oxfordjournals.org/content/176/7/586.full>

¹⁵³ Health and Safety Executive (2006). Managing shift work <http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/priced/hsg256.pdf>

¹⁵⁴ Lundberg U, Hellström B. (2012). Workload and morning salivary cortisol in women. *Work Stres*, 16, 4, 356-363.

¹⁵⁵ Hayashi T, Kobayashi Y, Yamaoka K, et al. (1996). Effect of overtime work on 24-hour ambulatory blood pressure. *J Occup Environ Med*, 38, 10, 1007-1011.

¹⁵⁶ Krause N, Brand RJ, Kauhanen J, et al. Work time and 11-year progression of carotid atherosclerosis in middle-aged Finnish men. *Prev Chronic Dis* 2009;6(1):A13. (http://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2009/Jan/pdf/07_0270.pdf).

¹⁵⁷ Shields M. Long working hours and health. *Health Rep* 1999;11(2):33-48; Virtanen M, Ferrie JE, Singh-Manoux A, et al. Long working hours and symptoms of anxiety and depression: a 5-year follow-up of the Whitehall II Study. *Psychol Med* 2011;18:1-10; Virtanen M, Stansfeld SA, Fuhrer R, et al. Overtime work as a predictor of major depressive episode: a 5-year follow-up of the Whitehall II Study. *PLoS One* 2012;7(1):e30719. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030719.

¹⁵⁸ Kawakami N, Araki S, Takatsuka N, et al. (1999). Overtime, psychosocial working conditions, and occurrence of non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus in Japanese men. *J Epidemiol Community Health*, 53,6, 359-363.

¹⁵⁹ Escoto KH, French SA, Harnack LJ, et al. Work hours, weight status, and weight-related behaviors: a study of metro transit workers. *Int J Behav Nutr Phys Act* 2010;7:91. (<http://www.ijbnpa.org/content/7/1/91>);

Lallukka T, Lahelma E, Rahkonen O, et al. (2008). Associations of job strain and working overtime with adverse health behaviors and obesity: evidence from the Whitehall II Study, Helsinki Health Study, and the Japanese Civil Servants Study. *Soc Sci Med*, 66, 8, 1681-1698.

¹⁶⁰ O'reilly, D., & Rosato, M. (2013). Worked to death? A census-based longitudinal study of the relationship between the numbers of hours spent working and mortality risk. *International journal of epidemiology*, 42, 6, 1820-1830.

¹⁶¹ Health and Safety Executive. (2006) Managing Shift Work: http://www.hseni.gov.uk/hsg256_managing_shift_work.pdf

10.17 **Staff association position**

10.17.1 We believe that it is important to understand the reasons for overtime.

This will help forces identify peak days and times, to better match demand for resources, and to improve workforce planning, thereby reducing the need for predictable overtime. However, overtime is also often the most efficient way of dealing with immediate needs and providing resources for emergency or public order situations. In such circumstances officers should be recompensed appropriately: particularly given the strain on individual officers and the impact on work-life balance.

10.17.2 PFEW is opposed to a buy-out of overtime for Sergeants. Overtime should remain as a separate remuneration package for Sergeants. PSAEW is also opposed. As senior managers within the service, Superintendents consider that payment of overtime is an effective management tool, and have no wish to see it bought out.

10.18 **Summary**

10.18.1 Overtime is a necessary feature of police work, and can be helpful to manage peaks and troughs of work. As such, it should be properly and fairly recompensed. We believe the requirement to pay overtime encourages services to consider their resourcing needs in advance, and plan properly.

10.18.2 The overtime buy-out for Inspecting ranks has resulted in unforeseen consequences that have had a detrimental effect on Inspectors and Chief Inspectors.

10.18.3 If overtime buy-outs are to be examined we recommend a full review regarding the efficacy of the buy-out. Its consequences for Inspecting ranks should be further examined as well, paying particular attention to the unforeseen consequences and highlighting any lessons that can be learned. As one Inspector commented:

“I do believe it unfair however, that whilst overtime was bought out many years ago, there has been no review of this position since. That is scandalous.”

(Male, Inspector)

10.19 Questions arising

10.19.1 Should the PRRB decide to give this matter consideration then the following questions must be considered as a part of that process:

- How do the Home Office define ‘casual overtime’, and does the remit letter actually refer to all Sergeants’ overtime?
- What are the main reasons for overtime? Is the information collected by police services and the Home Office?
- What has been the impact on the Inspecting ranks of their buy-out in terms of workload, well-being, morale and motivation? What has been the impact on Sergeants seeking promotion?
- Should an overtime buy-out be enacted, what safeguards will there be to prevent excessive workloads and protect the health, safety and welfare of officers?
- Has consideration been given to increasing part-time and flexible working opportunities as a direct means to provide additional resources at time of peak demand (which do not attract higher rates of payment)?
- What would the impact be on officers in roles with large overtime requirements, such as Firearms officers? Would they be more likely to leave? Has the HO modelled the likely impact on particular roles?
- What will be the implications for ensuring sufficient volunteers for overtime if there is no incentive? How will forces select fairly who will do it? Are there EIA considerations?

10.20 Recommendation 7c

10.20.1 We recommend that overtime should remain as a separate remuneration package for Sergeants. Any change should include a full analysis, including consideration of the unforeseen consequences that have been observed by Inspectors.

10.21 Management of officers on limited duties and the value of the deployment component of the x-factor

10.21.1 The Winsor Review (2012) set out specific recommendations on the procedure for determining the circumstances in which an officer may be placed on restricted duty (now called limited duty), the arrangements which a Chief Constable may make for these officers, and the adjustments to pay. The core of Winsor's proposals was:

- officers who are on restricted duty should have their deployability and capability to exercise police powers assessed one year after being placed on restricted duty;
- those who are not deployable and not capable of work which requires the Office of Constable should have their pay reduced (by loss of the deployment component of the x-factor); and
- after a further year, if they remain not deployable and not capable of work which requires the Office of Constable, then they should be removed from police service, and given ill health retirement or a staff role as most appropriate.

10.21.2 The matter went to the Police Arbitration Tribunal (PAT) and the PAT ruled in favour of the Official Side proposal. However, the specific detail of the scheme is still under discussion. These discussions are being conducted in the Police Advisory Board, and centre on the need for police services to determine which roles need to be fully deployable for resilience to be maintained. Following these discussions the Home Office will provide draft Regulations and Determinations to put the scheme into effect. The PAB is not considering the level of the x-factor. It remains to be seen if the new provisions will be implemented in a way that is fair and in line with equality legislation. Once the changes are implemented it will be vital to monitor the impact they have on officers: we believe this will fall under the PAB remit.

10.22 The x-factor payment

10.22.1 With regards to the deployment component of the x-factor, Winsor acknowledged that this is the hardest factor to quantify as there is no definitive labour market evidence on which to base quantification. However, he reasoned that “the fact that police officers can be redeployed at any time, to any place, into any role, when required by the Chief Constable means that all of those role-specific aspects of the x-factor are latent in the Office of Constable”¹⁶². He suggested two general approaches to valuing the x-factor. The first is to identify factors that are peculiar to policing, and give a value to the total. The second approach is to identify those elements of the x-factor that some officers do not meet, and establish a value for those. Winsor argued that a number of factors have been identified within previous reviews (by Desborough (1920), Oaksey (1949), the Royal Commission (1960), and Sheehy (1993)) on which there is broad agreement.

¹⁶² Winsor Review of Police Officer and Staff Remuneration and Conditions – Final Report, pg 430.

10.22.2 In conducting an initial valuation of the x-factor, Winsor was guided by the analysis of Professor Disney. Amongst other things, Professor Disney noted that jobs incurring exposure to stress tend to attract a premium of 8-9% over jobs not seen as stressful. Police officer roles were deemed to be particularly stressful, and the report implies this figure for that particular component of the x-factor. For the deployment component, however, there was “no definitive labour market evidence”¹⁶³. Nonetheless, a preliminary figure of 8% of a Constable’s salary was chosen. Whilst a rationale is given for using Constables to benchmark, it is not clear why 8% was chosen.

10.22.3 We have had no sight of the Home Office’s proposals for valuation of the deployment component of the x-factor in future. We believe that a fair and transparent process is needed.

10.22.4 We believe that financially penalising officers who become unfit for certain aspects of the role could have unintended consequences. It could potentially lead to a more risk-averse culture among officers, which would be contrary to the public interest. This should be taken into account in determining the level of the deployability component of the x-factor.

¹⁶³ Winsor Review of Police Officer and Staff Remuneration and Conditions – Final Report, pg 444.

10.23 Summary

10.23.1 The changes to the arrangements for management of officers on limited duty are significant. We therefore believe that it will be vital that there is consideration of the impact of the changes to the management of officers on limited duties.

10.23.2 Winsor said the deployability element of the x-factor was particularly hard to calculate, there being no “definitive labour market evidence”. It should be reviewed from time to time to take into account changes to policing. In order to do this the PRRB will require evidence on which to base any quantification. In the absence of comparative labour market data (such as exists for jobs deemed stressful), to determine the deployability component, what evidence can the Home Office provide to justify the value of the deployability component of the x-factor?

10.24 Questions arising

10.24.1 In this case, all questions should be broken down by rank, protected characteristics, role and time period.

- How can the deployment factor of the x- factor be quantified in the absence of comparative labour market data, establishing the premium normally paid for deployability?

10.25 Recommendation 7d

10.25.1 In order for the review body to review the value of the deployability component of the x-factor, definitive labour market evidence will be required. This would normally include comparison data, from organisations with similar requirements. In the absence of such data, how does the Home Office intend to value the deployability component?

10.26 Feasibility of attaining a greater degree of coherence between the terms and conditions of police officers and police staff

10.26.1 The police Staff Associations will not comment on the terms and conditions of police staff. Police officers are not “employees” in the usual sense. They are public servants holding a “common law” office, namely that of Constable. The range of rights and remedies available to police officers is therefore different to the range of rights and remedies available to employees, such as police staff.

10.26.2 Police officers do not work under contracts of employment. The contractual rights of employees derive from their individual contracts of employment. By contrast, the terms and conditions of police officers are set out in Police Regulations and Determinations 2003 (as amended). Issues of conduct and performance are dealt with by the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012, Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012 and Police (Performance) Regulations 2012 (as amended). Officers cannot, except in circumstances where they may have been victimised as a result of making a claim under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 take claims of constructive or unfair dismissal. A summary of the legal context for officers with regard to employment law is at Annex 10.1.

10.26.3 However, in some aspects of employment legislation, police officers are “deemed to be employees” and have rights under the following Acts:

- Equality Act 2010
- Employment Rights Act 1996 (insofar as claims relating to health and safety and whistleblowing” are concerned)
- Part Time Worker (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000
- Working Time Regulations 1998

10.27 Summary

10.27.1 The Office of Constable is and must remain the bedrock of British policing and nothing should be done that would jeopardise this. It ensures the operational independence of Chief Constables and enables police officers to discharge their duties without fear or favour. To move police officers onto contracts of employment would be inconsistent with the Office of Constable because they would become employees.

10.28 Questions arising

- How would greater coherence between the terms and conditions of police officers and police staff be of benefit to the public and the service?
- How would the Home Office ensure that the Office of Constable remains the bedrock of British policing?

10.29 Recommendation 7e

10.29.1 We believe that to move police officers onto contracts of employment would be inconsistent with the Office of Constable and any proposal to do so should be rejected.

10.30 Staff Association priorities: existing elements of the pay system

10.30.1 In addition to the issues raised in the remit letter we ask the PRRB to consider whether the following matters should also be included in the five year work programme:

10.31 Constables' pay scale (for officers who joined after 1 April 2013)

10.31.1 A new Constables' pay scale for officers who joined after 1 April 2013 was introduced following a PAT award, which accepted a proposal by the Official Side of PNB that modified Winsor's recommendation.

10.31.2 The new pay scale now has a lower starting salary for officers of £19,383 per annum compared to £23,727 per annum under the scale for officers currently in service. (Chief Constables have discretion over the exact starting salary, and the lower figure should only be for those with no policing experience). In addition, the incremental steps are uneven with an increase of over £4,000 to the penultimate pay point and over £5,500 to the top pay point.

10.31.3 In its award the PAT acknowledged Staff Side's contention that the Official Side's pay scale was unbalanced, because of the steep incremental steps between pay points 5, 6 and 7. Furthermore, the size of the proposed incremental steps did not appear to be underpinned by a full analysis. Staff Side had argued that the relatively limited value of incremental progression of £8,000 between point 0 and point 5 on the pay scale, compared with the much larger increase of over £9,500 between point 5 and point 7, was disproportionate to any increased skills and abilities at those later points in service.

10.31.4 Another area of concern for the Staff Side in relation to the proposed pay scale was a likely increase in the gender pay gap in basic pay for serving Constables. This had been 5.7% in 2009 and 6.6% in 2011. Quoting data from the 2011 PNB Census of Earnings, Hours and Length of Service, the Staff Side said that the Official Side's proposals would widen the gender pay gap further to between 7.5% and 8.1% in favour of men.

10.31.5 Staff Side asserted that the reduction in the starting salary from £23,259 to £19,000, (figures correct at the time the reduction was introduced), in both Winsor and the Official Side proposal was likely to have an impact on the ability of the service to recruit people of the right calibre and maturity. In this context, the Scarman Report had highlighted the need for the police service to attract mature recruits. The Staff Side said that the average age of new recruits, in times when forces were recruiting, was 27 years but in the Staff Side's view the proposed starting salary was set at too low a level to attract mature applicants. While the Tribunal was not persuaded by the Staff Side's argument that the Official Side's pay scale would deter more mature applicants or that it would fail to attract graduate applicants, it appeared to the Tribunal that an assessment of the impact of the new entrant salary levels should be undertaken with this issue in mind, after a period of operation.

10.32 Summary

10.32.1 PFEW remains concerned that the Constables' pay scale for those recruited after 1 April 2013 is unbalanced, will contribute to a widening of the gender pay gap and may impact on the ability of the service to attract mature applicants or graduate applicants. PFEW asks that the Review Body consider undertaking an assessment of the impact of the new entry levels on the ability of the Service to attract mature applicants and graduate applicants; to examine the incremental steps in the pay scale and to consider whether these reflect the skills and abilities required at those points; and to consider the impact on gender pay gap.

10.33 Questions arising

10.33.1 In doing so, the review body will need data on:

- What starting salaries have forces used?
- Numbers of applications
- What calibre of recruit is presenting? (Experience of policing, qualifications, skills, etc)?
- What is the average age of recruits?
- An equality impact assessment should be undertaken
- What evidence is available to justify the incremental steps between pay points 5, 6 and 7?
- What qualitative evidence will be gathered on the perceived fairness of the scale?

10.34 Recommendation 7f

10.34.1 The major reduction in starting salary for Constables from 1 April 2013 of over £4,000 will impact on the quality of candidates attracted to the police service. In addition, the uneven incremental steps and, in particular, the jump in the last pay point on scale of approximately £5,500 has created an unbalanced pay scale. These changes must be monitored and action should be taken to address any negative impact.

10.35 Pay progression

10.35.1 Whereas in the past pay progression has largely occurred at the end of each additional year served - on the assumption this brings additional experience - progression based on assessments of performance is being introduced. There will be differing assessments for particular spine points for example 4 and 7 for Constables, (see para 10.33 on skills thresholds), but for most the norm will be to use the Performance and Development Review (PDR).

10.35.2 An agreement was reached at the PNB arising from Winsor's recommendation 84. The PNB agreed that, subject to a number of caveats, pay progression for officers in the federated ranks should be subject to a satisfactory box marking in the annual appraisal. Those officers who receive a box marking of 'satisfactory contribution' or above should advance by one pay increment; those who receive an 'unsatisfactory contribution' box marking should remain on the same point for a further year. The agreement detailed that this should be introduced for Sergeants, Inspectors and Chief Inspectors in 2014-15 and for Constables in 2015-16. However, the agreement has not yet been implemented. (Superintending ranks have had incremental pay progression linked to satisfactory PDR gradings since 2004).

10.35.3 At the same time that the PNB agreement was under discussion, there was consideration of Winsor's recommendation that the College of Policing amend the PDR model to make it fit for use as the basis of contribution-related pay in the police service. As a result the PNB felt it appropriate to attach a number of caveats to the PNB agreement, these included:

- The provision of training for line managers should be achieved in advance of the introduction of the changes.
- The use of forced distribution (discretionary): placing an officer in the bottom 10% of the distribution would not result in the automatic denial of incremental progression.
- Implementation of the changes to the pay progression arrangements would be based on a PDR model developed by the College of Policing.
- Pay progression would operate on an assumption of competence unless there was evidence to the contrary: in the absence of a PDR progression would be automatic.
- Any denial of progression would only occur if an officer was subject to formal unsatisfactory performance at the time of their appraisal.

10.35.4 At the time of writing, the College of Policing has provided some guidance on the PDR. No standardised national system has been designed. Regulations are to be drafted. It is not clear to what extent some of the safeguards the PNB agreement captured will actually be in place.

10.36 Summary

10.36.1 We believe there is a need to monitor the impact of the new assessing competency framework on incremental pay progression across England and Wales, once it is implemented. It is vital that it is implemented in a fair and consistent manner across all forces in England and Wales. This is a key issue for police officers and any inconsistencies or lack of clarity in how the system should operate will create discord amongst officers. It is vital that the caveats agreed by the PNB are implemented fully.

10.36.2 It is not yet clear how the implementation will be monitored. While the College of Policing has a role to play, it would seem appropriate for the PRRB to oversee the impacts on pay, and in particular the impacts on pay equality.

10.37 Questions arising

- What is the impact on officers: how many officers receive an annual increment, how many do not? How is this broken down by gender, BME, age etc
- Are the PNB's caveats being adhered to?

10.38 Recommendation 7g

10.38.1 We recommend that the Review Body consider the impact of the changes to pay progression for officers in the federated ranks, including the impact on incremental pay progression of officers with protected characteristics.

10.39 Skills thresholds

10.39.1 The Home Secretary directed PNB to reach agreement on the pay consequences of the Winsor proposals for Foundation and Specialist (now referred to as 'Advanced') Skills Thresholds; the detail of the schemes themselves is a matter for the College of Policing.

10.39.2 The College proposals are for a more comprehensive scheme of continuing professional development which builds on, but goes beyond, the recommendations of the Winsor Report. These assessments cover all officers and all roles, such that no officer would be denied the opportunity to reach their scale maximum. They include assessment of the 10 components of the Policing Diploma, which demonstrates the degree to which all officers are expected to be able to fulfil a very wide range of tasks, demonstrating broad knowledge, skills, and aptitudes.

10.39.3 Much of the detail which will be needed to enable Regulations and Determinations dealing with the pay consequences of the schemes to be drafted is not yet available. The detail will need to be tested through pilots organised by the College. However, the PNB did agree that incremental pay progression at relevant points on the pay scale should be dependent upon success in the threshold assessments. The relevant points on the pay scale are:

Foundation skills threshold – 4th point on Constables' pay scale

Advanced skills threshold – 7th (final) pay point of all police officer pay scales up to and including the rank of chief superintendent.

10.40 Summary

10.40.1 The pay consequences of failing a threshold assessment will be substantial. It will be important for the continuing impact of the schemes to be monitored to guard against any risk of a disproportionate number of officers with protected characteristics not attempting or not succeeding in assessment for progression to the scale maximum. The College of Policing is conducting a pilot project over one year to make preliminary judgements on, and amendments to, the assessment process. However, there will not be adequate numbers of certain groups (e.g. those with protected characteristics) to conduct definitive analysis; not all police services are taking part in the pilot, so evidence of the scheme's operation in some services will be lacking, and it will not be possible to ensure the process is standard throughout; and it would be appropriate for an organisation that does not design the process to oversee the results of evaluation of the scheme. While the College of Policing is responsible for monitoring the pilot, it is not yet clear who will be responsible for monitoring the implementation. It seems appropriate that the PRRB should have a role in this, because of the pay implications.

10.41 Questions arising

- How many officers have been assessed (by rank, and by protected characteristics)?
- How many officers have been successful broken down (by rank, and by protected characteristics)?
- What evidence is available to demonstrate any impact on officers with protected characteristics?

10.42 Recommendation 7h

10.42.1 PFEW and PSAEW ask that the review body consider the impact of the threshold assessments on incremental pay progression including the impact on incremental pay progression of officers with protected characteristics.

10.43 Away from home overnight allowance

10.43.1 This allowance was introduced following a Police Arbitration Tribunal in 2012 which modified Winsor's recommendation on compensation for officers held in reserve away from their normal place of duty.

10.43.2 The PAT set out that there should be an element of additional compensation for officers who are held in reserve and unable to return home (whether this is in their own force or on mutual aid operations) and the Tribunal calculated, by reference to the hourly rate for an 8-year Constable), that an amount of £50 should be paid as an 'Away From Home Overnight Allowance'.

10.43.3 Following the PAT award a Regulation 34, Annex U was amended to make provision for the payment of the Away from Home Overnight Allowance. This included a definition of held in reserve which states that a member is held in reserve 'if the member is serving away from his normal place of duty (whether because the member has been provided for the assistance of another police force under section 24 of the Police Act 1996 or otherwise) and is required to stay in a particular, specified place rather than being allowed to return home. However, when the provision was put into Determinations, a caveat was introduced which prevented the allowance being paid if the officer is serving away from his or her normal place of duty by reason of carrying out routine enquiries or being on a training course.

10.43.4 The inclusion of the term 'routine enquiries' has caused great difficulties for forces and was the subject of much discussion at the PNB prior to its abolition. The term is not defined in the Determination and inconsistencies have arisen across England and Wales. Unfortunately the PNB was unable to agree on any guidance on this matter and at the time of writing this submission the Home Office is consulting on a revised Determination that is intended to bring further clarity to the provision. However, PFEW believes that the amendments proposed by the Home Office may not provide the clarity that is being sought and may well confuse forces further.

10.44 **Summary**

10.44.1 PFEW believes that it is vital to monitor the payment of the allowance and also to monitor the impact of any future changes to the wording of the Determination. In addition, the value of the allowance should be kept under review to ensure that it provides sufficient recompense to officers who are held in reserve and unable to return home.

10.45 **Questions arising**

- How many officers receive the away from home overnight allowance broken down by rank, gender, role?
- What are the reasons for making the payment?

10.46 **Recommendation 7i**

10.46.1 PFEW asks that the review body review the Away from Home Overnight allowance and monitor any impact of any changes to the provisions for making the payment.

10.47 **Motor Vehicle Allowances**

10.47.1 Motor Vehicle Allowances (MVAs) have not been reviewed since 2010. Historically, the allowances for police officers have followed the local Government rates and in 2010 a new PNB agreement was reached which increased the allowances in accordance with the increase being given to local government workers. This didn't actually take effect until April 2012 and the allowances for police officers have not been updated since then as the local government rates have not been reviewed. This is because the Local Government Employers' Side wish to agree an alternative method of recompense.

10.47.2 It seems unsatisfactory that the rates for MVAs for police officers remain unchanged while an alternative method of recompense for another group of workers is being sought on which police officers' representatives will have no input. Regulation 34, Annex U, provides that a Chief Constable may authorise a police officer to use his or her own motor vehicle where the officer's duties require it. We believe that it is essential that officers who are required to use their own cars for police duties should receive a MVA that reflects the costs to officers of using their own vehicles.

10.48 **Summary**

10.48.1 MVAs have not been reviewed since 2010. As things currently stand, MVAs for police officers who are required to use their own vehicle for work will not be reviewed until negotiations within local government are concluded.

10.48.2 We ask the Review Body to consider whether there is a case for ensuring there is a mechanism to adjust MVAs for officers, outside the local government provision.

10.49 **Questions arising**

- How many officers are designated essential or casual car users?
- What information is available on mileage?

10.50 **Recommendation 7j**

10.50.1 We ask that the current rates of MVAs be reviewed and the review body consider whether there is a case for a new formula for recompensing officers who use their own vehicle for police duties.

10.51 **Equality issues**

10.51.1 10.52.1 The PNB spent time looking at equality issues through the Gender Equality and Work Life Balance working group. Through this working group the PNB commissioned an Equal Pay Audit of the gender outcomes of the pay arrangements for police officers' in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland in 2009, 2011 and 2012.

10.51.2 The pay audits were completed using the same methodology from the Equality and Human Rights Commission's (EHRC) Equal Pay Toolkit and used data from the PNB Pay and Earnings Census. The EHRC's toolkit recommends that an organisation should investigate any pay gap that is more than 5% or more than 3% if there is a pattern of difference at most or all levels of an organisation.

10.51.3 Equality of terms legislation (ie, equal pay) is part of the Equality Act 2010. It requires that men and women are paid the same for performing the same work, work rated as equivalent under a job evaluation scheme and work that is of equal value. If there is a difference in pay an employer must show that the whole of the difference is the result of a material factor that is not related to sex.

- 10.51.4 In 2012, the audit found that the pay gap in respect of basic pay and total pay for full-time federated officers had increased at almost every rank since the 2011 audit. The Constables' basic pay gap was 7.6% in favour of men having increased one percentage point since 2011 without any real changes to the pay structure. The pay gap for Constables' total pay was 11.3%.¹⁶⁴
- 10.51.5 The pay gap in basic and total pay is the greatest at Constable then reduces at every rank up to Chief Inspector, rises slightly at Superintendent and then falls to the smallest gap at Chief Superintendent: 0.6% basic pay and 1.4% total pay.
- 10.51.6 An equal pay audit has not been carried out using the latest information from the latest PNB Census. The PRRB will need this information in order to consider the impact of recent changes to pay and allowances.
- 10.51.7 The 2012 audit also showed a reduction in the number of part-time officers, of almost 3,000. There were 8,502 part-time officers in 2011 but just 5,301 in 2012. The reduction represented 38% of those working part-time in 2011; the vast majority of whom were women.
- 10.51.8 This could be linked to difficulties in retaining women officers if they find it difficult to secure flexible working patterns.
- 10.51.9 Police officers can apply for part-time working under the Police Regulations 2003. However, the right to request flexible working, under the Employment Rights Act 1996, does not apply to police officers. Many forces do have policies and procedures in place which allow them to consider requests for flexible working; however, this is by no means consistent across England and Wales.

¹⁶⁴ PNB. (2012) Police Negotiating Board Equal Pay Audit 2012

10.51.10 Flexible working should provide benefits to both officers and the force as a whole and should be another tool with which a force can provide a comprehensive demand-led service to the public. It should also provide a way to retain valuable experience. However, it is unclear if sufficient regard is being given to requests to work part-time or flexibly. Anecdotal evidence suggests that opportunities to work part-time or flexibly are on the decrease. Whilst forces have policies in place to enable all officers to apply for part-time working in reality officers are being discouraged from even considering applying for such working. As a result, forces could lose many talented officers from the service, most of whom are women, but also for promotion to higher ranks. This is contrast to the Service's stated aims of seeing more women and BME officers seeking and being successful in promotion processes and that the Service reflects the communities it serves.

10.52 **Summary**

10.52.1 PFEW and PSAEW believe that equal pay audits should continue to be carried out and that the PRRB should consider the equality impact assessment (EIA) of any recommendations it makes to the Home Secretary, to address the gender pay gap and to monitor the levels of part-time and flexible working in the Service.

10.53 Questions arising

- Who will carry out the equal pay audits?
- What is the gender pay gap for 2013?
- How many officers work part-time broken down by gender, rank, age, disability, length of service?

10.54 Recommendation 7k

We recommend that full consideration be given to equality issues and that equal pay audits continue to be undertaken. The Review Body should consider the EIA of any recommendations made.

Annex 1.1 - Police Remuneration Review Body (PRRB) remit letter



HOME SECRETARY
2 Marsham Street, London SW1P 4DF
www.homeoffice.gov.uk

David Lebrecht
Chair, Police Remuneration Review Body
Office of Manpower Economics
8th Floor,
Fleetbank House,
2-6 Salisbury Square,
London.
EC4Y 8JX

03 NOV 2014

Dear Mr Lebrecht

Police Remuneration Review Body (PRRB) Remit

I write following the Chief Secretary to the Treasury's letter of 29 July confirming the Government's approach to public sector pay for 2015/16. I look forward to seeing the PRRB's consideration of police officer pay and conditions, for the first time based on your objective, independent and comprehensive assessment of the evidence. I am confident that you will help deliver pay and conditions that are not only fair to police officers, but are fair to the public as well. You are aware that this remit is in addition, and complementary, to your remit in relation to the National Crime Agency. You also expect a remit from the Minister for Justice, Northern Ireland.

In considering your recommendations I would ask you to have regard to:

1. The need to ensure that the proposals reflect the Government's policy on public sector pay, for average awards in 2015/16 of up to 1%;
2. The Government's continued commitment to maximising flexibility for chief constables and Police and Crime Commissioners to manage their workforce in the most efficient way possible at a local level;
3. The role and nature of the office of constable in British policing;
4. The prohibition on police officers being members of a trade union or withdrawing their labour;
5. The need to recruit, retain and motivate (including to seek promotion) suitably able and qualified officers that reflect the communities they serve;
6. The affordability of any recommendations;
7. The levels of pay for operational police leaders, especially in respect of Chief Superintendents and coherence of pay with the chief officer ranks; and
8. The work of the College of Policing in identifying skills requirements at the various levels in policing.

You will be aware that the recommendations of Tom Winsor's *Independent Review of Police Officer and Staff Remuneration and Conditions* have strongly influenced the Government's approach in this area. In shaping your remit for this first year and the five year programme for the body, I set out below a number of issues from the Winsor Review that were specifically deferred for the PRRB to consider.

I refer for your consideration in this first remit:

1. What adjustments should be made to pay and allowances for police officers up to and including the rank of Chief Superintendent, having regard to the Government's policy that public sector pay awards in 2015/16 average up to 1%;
2. Whether the additional amount paid to the inspecting ranks in the London forces ("the London lead") should be retained;
3. Observations on the level and scope of existing arrangements for differentiation of police officer pay and allowances at the regional and local level, with a view to making substantive recommendations in subsequent years, with a focus on local labour markets.

The remit of the PRRB will inevitably develop over the coming years. This will reflect the continuing need for the police to have an effective, efficient and flexible workforce to deliver best value for taxpayers' money. Given your strategic role on police pay, I would welcome your initial comments on priorities for a five year work programme including those issues deferred by the Winsor review for the PRRB to consider:

1. Review the national on-call allowance;
2. Consider whether to increase the gap between the constable and sergeant pay scales, and between the inspector and chief inspector scales;
3. Consider whether there is a case for the buy-out of sergeants' casual overtime;
4. Consider the impact of changes to the management of officers on limited duties, including reviewing the value of the deployment component of the X-factor;
5. Assess the feasibility of attaining a greater degree of coherence between the terms and conditions of police officers and police staff.

I look forward to receiving your recommendations no later than 19 June 2015.

Yours sincerely



The Rt Hon Theresa May MP

Annex 2.1 - Robert Peel's Nine Principles of Policing

- 1) To prevent crime and disorder, as an alternative to their repression by military force and severity of legal punishment.
- 2) To recognise always that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect.
- 3) To recognise always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public means also the securing of the willing co-operation of the public in the task of securing observance of laws.
- 4) To recognise always that the extent to which the co-operation of the public can be secured diminishes proportionately the necessity of the use of physical force and compulsion for achieving police objectives.
- 5) To seek and preserve public favour, not by pandering to public opinion; but by constantly demonstrating absolutely impartial service to law, in complete independence of policy, and without regard to the justice or injustice of the substance of individual laws, by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of the public without regard to their wealth or social standing, by ready exercise of courtesy and friendly good humour; and by ready offering of individual sacrifice in protecting and preserving life.
- 6) To use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient to obtain public co-operation to an extent necessary to secure observance of law or to restore order, and to use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective.

- 7) To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police, the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.

- 8) To recognise always the need for strict adherence to police-executive functions, and to refrain from even seeming to usurp the powers of the judiciary of avenging individuals or the State, and of authoritatively judging guilt and punishing the guilty.

- 9) To recognise always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.

Key



Those that are currently published by the Home Office and/or HMIC



No currently published by the Home Office and/or HMIC

Annex 4.1 Workforce planning evidence base: required data

Matrix of information relevant to pay and conditions that should be collated and reported on a regular basis by the Home Office and/or HMIC in order to; inform decision making, monitor and plan the police workforce, and promote evidence based policies.

Measure	Basic break down by						Provided by	Requested Improvements /Additions	Rationale for Data collection
	Gender	Ethnicity	Rank	Force	Age	LoS			
Basic Demographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	HO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased frequency of reports Age and disability breakdown LoS is only provided by force, this should also be provided by gender and ethnicity and rank 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Diversity purposes Comparing workforce profiles
Joiners	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	NA	HO & HMIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased frequency of report Age and ethnicity breakdown Breakdown between internal (i.e. promotion, secondment, transfer) and external recruitment Qualifications of appointed persons 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Diversity purposes Recruitment monitoring Talent flow monitoring
Leavers	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	HO & HMIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased frequency of report Age, ethnicity and length of service Breakdown between voluntary and mandatory turnover Breakdown between internal (i.e. promotion, secondment, transfer) and external outflow Breakdown by reason (inc. more detail on medical/normal retirements by rank, gender, age etc.)¹⁶⁵ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Diversity purposes; examine gender and BME differences in respect of length of service on leaving Retention monitoring Talent flow monitoring
Planned workforce (total number of posts, fill and unfilled)	✗						No centralised standard reporting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Total number of filled posts and total number of unfilled posts Breakdown by Force, rank, specialism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recruitment and retention monitoring

¹⁶⁵ Armed Forces/Fire service can be used as examples of good practice; they record much for detail, e.g., resignation due to harassment or discrimination, poor performance/efficiency, move to other employment (including re-employment as support staff).







Measure	Basic break down by						Provided by	Requested Improvements /Additions	Rationale for Data collection
	Gender	Ethnicity	Rank	Force	Age	LoS			
Applications received			✘				No centralised standard reporting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Total number of applications received, total number of vacant posts and total number of applicants appointed Breakdown by Force, rank, specialism, gender, ethnicity, qualifications/quality of applicants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recruitment and retention monitoring
Diversity	✔	✔	✔	✔	✘	✘	HO & HMIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ethnicity by rank is currently reported as a total number of minority ethnic officers per rank. Further detail on ethnicity required Age and LoS breakdown A full report/data is required on workforce characteristics identified by the Equality Act 2010 Annual equal pay audit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To meet legal requirement according to the Public Sector Equality Duty Enable assessment of any disadvantages for groups under the Equality Act and to monitor any such pay gaps over time
Time of in Lieu			✘				No centralised standard reporting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of days owed per officer Broken down by, Force, ethnicity, gender and rank 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Work force planning and monitoring. More specifically problems are reported with claiming outstanding days owed
Acting up			✘				No centralised standard reporting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of officers acting up Broken down by, Force, ethnicity, gender and rank 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> New regulation on payment arrangements; may need monitoring of numbers involved on a quarterly basis Monitoring of the new acting up arrangements
Maternity/Paternity/A doption leave			✘				No centralised standard reporting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Numbers taking maternity, paternity and adoption leave Numbers returning from such leave, Numbers not returning (and why) Broken down by Force, ethnicity, gender (where appropriate) and rank 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Workforce resilience, planning and monitoring Diversity purposes
Career breaks			✘				No centralised standard reporting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Numbers taking career breaks Numbers returning from such leave, Numbers not returning (and why) Broken down by Force, ethnicity, gender and rank 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Workforce resilience, planning and monitoring Diversity purposes

Measure	Basic break down by						Provided by	Requested Improvements /Additions	Rationale for Data collection
	Gender	Ethnicity	Rank	Force	Age	LoS			
Restricted Duties	✘	✘	✘	✔	✘	✘	HMIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased frequency of report Broken down by ethnicity, gender and rank More details on type of restricted duties More details on causes of restricted/recuperative duties (e.g. injury, illness, disability) whether or not this was a result of working as a police officer, and the reasons for restrictions (e.g. management, medical) Length of time held on restricted duties Numbers of officers on restricted duties losing the x-factor 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Workforce resilience, planning and monitoring Particularly as the Home Office has been showing interest in exiting officers on restricted duties
Sickness rates	✘	✘	✘	✔	✘	✘	HMIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased frequency of report Include number of sickness episodes over the year and number of hours lost to sickness to supplement 'snapshot' data Broken down by down by Force, ethnicity, gender and rank Reason for sickness (e.g. anxiety, stress, injury, flu, migraine etc.) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Workforce resilience, planning and monitoring Sickness absence data can also be an indication of workforce motivation and morale
Mutual aid	✘						No centralised standard reporting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Numbers of officers on each occasion of mutual aid, length of time on continuous mutual aid, and officer characteristics. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Needed for monitoring the extent of mutual aid, and for assessing the new pay arrangements - for hours actually worked
Fatalities and injuries	✘						No centralised standard reporting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Severity/type of injury Breakdown by activity (e.g. on duty/off duty as minimum)¹⁶⁶, gender, ethnicity, rank and Force 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Workforce resilience, planning and monitoring Health and safety monitoring and role evaluation

¹⁶⁶ Dept for communities and local government can be used as example of good practice; they collect this information for firefighters and publishes it in its Fire and Rescue: Operational Statistics Bulletin for England. They distinguish between injuries sustained during training, operational incidents and routine activities. Since officers are often involved in Road Traffic Accidents it would be appropriate to extend recording to such incidents on Health & Safety grounds.

Measure	Basic break down by						Provided by	Requested Improvements /Additions	Rationale for Data collection
	Gender	Ethnicity	Rank	Force	Age	LoS			
Assaults			✘				No centralised standard reporting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Severity of assault Breakdown by gender, ethnicity, rank, Force and whether the assault was sustained on or off duty Information on loan working status on at time of assault would be helpful given reducing staff numbers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Workforce resilience, planning and monitoring Health and safety monitoring Role evaluation
Workforce attitudes: Morale			✘				No centralised standard reporting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Officer satisfaction in regards to various role related issues, such as pay and conditions ¹⁶⁷ Broken down by gender and ethnicity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Workforce resilience, planning and monitoring Especially important in the light of the changing nature of the service with fast-track promotion and direct entry Inclusion of demographic characteristics will also allow for observing the attitudes of various sub-groups, including protected characteristics
Use of A19 and voluntary severance			✘				No centralised standard reporting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Full demographics on gender, ethnicity, age and role in respect of both Broken down by Force and rank 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Workforce resilience, planning and monitoring Also important given the Official Sides' reliance on both as a means of reducing the size of the workforce
Police Pensions Opt-out			✘				No centralised standard reporting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Full demographics on gender, ethnicity, age, LoS Broken down by Force and rank 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In light of changes to police pensions, including contribution rates, need to make its monitoring more transparent as to the effect on opt-outs
Training			✘				No centralised standard reporting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No. of officers trained with specific skill sets; broken down by gender, ethnicity and Force Basic training . Including detailed breakdown on 'drop-out' rates by gender, ethnicity, age and qualifications on entry 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Workforce resilience, planning and monitoring Skill mix evaluation Intangible benefits in terms of total reward Equal opportunity for career progression/development through specialisms

¹⁶⁷ Armed Forces can be used as a good example of this is the Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Surveys (AFCAS)

Measure	Basic break down by						Provided by	Requested Improvements /Additions	Rationale for Data collection
	Gender	Ethnicity	Rank	Force	Age	LoS			
Roles							HO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased frequency of report Breakdown by gender, ethnicity and rank 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Important in respect of equal opportunity for career progression/development through specialisms

Annex 4.2: Gender and BME reference list

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Annex 4.3: Data sources for Graph 4.1 and Graph 4.2

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All HMIC data listed above (excluding those sent via personal communication) were retrieved from: <http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/data/value-for-money-data/>

Annex 10.1 - Legal context

This Annex sets out those relevant legal obligations on the police service of England and Wales, including anti-discrimination legislation. It provides a summary of recent legislative changes to employment law which do not automatically apply to police officers.

Equality and employment law

Police officers are not “employees” in the usual sense. They are public servants holding a “common law” office, namely that of Constable. The range of rights and remedies available to police officers is therefore different to the range of rights and remedies available to employees, such as police staff.

Police officers do not work under contracts of employment. The contractual rights of employees derive from their individual contracts of employment. In contrast, the terms and conditions of police officers are set out in Police Regulations and Determinations 2003 (as amended). Issues of conduct and performance are dealt with by the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012, Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012 and Police (Performance) Regulations 2012 (as amended).

However, in some aspects of employment legislation, police officers are “deemed to be employees” and have rights under the following Acts:

- Equality Act 2010
- Employment Rights Act 1996 (insofar as claims relating to health and safety and whistleblowing” are concerned)
- Part Time Worker (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000
- Working Time Regulations 1998

Officers cannot, except in circumstances where they may have been dismissed as a result of making a protected disclosure or for carrying out health and safety activities, take claims of constructive or unfair dismissal under the Employment Rights Act 1996.

Equality Act 2010

For the purposes of the Equality Act 2010 police officers are treated as employees of the Chief Officer under whose direction and control they are serving. As in all walks of life there are situations and circumstances that occur in the police service where people are treated unfairly. That treatment can only be unlawful if it is on one or more grounds identified by the Equality Act.

- *Protected characteristics* – the Act sets out nine ‘protected characteristics’ that are covered by the law in some or all circumstances: namely, age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, disability, sex, religion or belief and sexual orientation.
- *Equal pay* – the Act provides for the provision of equal pay between women and men who are undertaking like work, work of equal value or work rated as equivalent.
- *Unlawful discrimination* – the Act sets out four main types of unlawful discrimination: direct discrimination, indirect discrimination, victimisation and harassment.
- *Disability discrimination* – the Equality Act 2010 provides disabled people with protection from discrimination in a range of areas, including employment. It is unlawful to discriminate against workers because of a physical or mental disability or fail to make reasonable adjustments to accommodate a worker with a disability. Under the Equality Act 2010 a person is classified as disabled if they have a physical or mental impairment, which has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on their ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. In addition to the four main types of discrimination, the Act incorporates two specific types of discrimination in respect to disability: discrimination arising from disability and duty to make reasonable adjustments.
- The Public Sector Equality Duty – the duty applies to all organisations listed in the Act. All Chief Constables and police and crime commissioners are covered as is the Home Office. There is a general equality duty set out in s149 of the Act that requires those subject to the equality duty, in the exercise of their functions, to have due regard to the need to:
 - Eliminate unlawful discrimination, harassment and victimisation and other conduct prohibited by the Act.
 - Advance equality of opportunity between people who share a protected characteristic and those who do not.
 - Foster good relations between people who share a protected characteristic and those who do not.

Specific duties are imposed by secondary legislation and require Chief Constables in England and Wales to publish equality information to demonstrate their compliance with the general PSED and equality objectives it should achieve to comply with the PSED.

In some circumstances it may be lawful for an employer to treat people differently, for example, if there is a genuine occupational requirement or to implement a policy

of positive action. In these circumstances an employer would need to show that the measure adopted is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

Part Time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000

For the purposes of the Part Time Workers Regulations police officers are treated as employees. Under these regulations a part time worker has the right not to be treated by his or her employer less favourably than the employer treats a comparable full time worker as regards the terms of his or her contract (Police Regulations and Determinations 2003 in the case of police officers) or by being subjected to any other detriment by any act, or deliberate failure to act, of his or her employer. The protection only applies if the treatment is on the grounds that the worker is a part time worker and the treatment is not justified on objective grounds.

Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (“whistleblowing”)

The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 protects workers (including police officers) from being victimised and/or losing their job if they report suspected malpractice by their employer, colleagues or third parties. Uniquely the provisions in respect of unfair dismissal apply to police officers who, except for health and safety reasons, are not able to bring claims of unfair dismissal in any other circumstances.

Working Time Regulations 1998

The Working Time Regulations 1998 (WTR) implement the European Working Time Directive. The Directive is based on the need to ensure a better level of protection of the safety and health of workers. The Regulations make express provision for the police service. The main provisions give workers the right to:

- a limit on average weekly working hours of 48
- a limit on night workers average normal daily hours of 8
- health assessments for night workers
- a minimum daily rest period of 11 consecutive hours
- a minimum weekly uninterrupted rest period of 24 hours (or 48 hours per fortnight)
- rest breaks at work (where the working day is more than 6 hours, an uninterrupted period of not less than 20 minutes)
- 4 weeks paid annual leave

Working time is any time during which a worker is working, at the employer's disposal and carrying out the employer's activity or duties and any period during which the worker is receiving relevant training and any additional period which is to be treated as working time under a relevant agreement for instance Regulation 22 of Police Regulations 2003 provides that time spent in travel outside of rostered duty hours to and from duty at a place other than the normal place of duty, should be treated as duty time.

There are some exclusions in certain circumstances. This would generally happen where the WTR conflict with the specialist characteristics of the police service such as when a planned operation changes or there is an exceptional event. In view of the health and safety basis of the Regulations these exceptions should be interpreted in a very limited manner.

In addition, the WTR cannot be used to reduce existing provisions contained in Police Regulations and determinations 2003.

Other relevant legislation

As explained above, police officers are officers of the crown and not employees in the usual sense. When the Government introduces reforms to employment legislation that apply to all workers, in most cases they do not apply to police officers. Recent examples of this include the Work and Families Act 2006, the Additional Paternity Leave Regulations 2010 and most recently the Children and Families Act 2014.

When the Police Negotiating Board was in existence it provided a route for the Staff Side to seek agreement that Police Regulations and determinations be amended to ensure that police officers could benefit from the same entitlements as other workers. Staff Side was instrumental in securing such agreement in the recent cases of the Work and Families Act 2006 and the Additional Paternity Leave Regulations 2010. This is a vital undertaking that ensures police officer terms and conditions do not significantly lag behind the terms and conditions of other employees throughout England and Wales. In addition, it helps to ensure a level of consistency between police officers and partners who work in other sectors. For example, if regulations and determinations were not amended it could mean that partners of police officers (as well as the officers themselves) might not be able to benefit from their statutory entitlements in the case of shared parental leave for example.

The Children and Families Act 2014 remains outstanding in that it has not yet been translated into Regulations and determinations. Before it was abolished the PNB reached agreement that police officers should benefit from the entitlements contained within the Act, unless otherwise justified, and it noted that the precise detail of implementation would be considered by the newly formed Police

Consultative Forum. The Forum has recently written to the Home Office detailing the provisions it would like to be included in Regulations and determinations.

In addition to this, police officers are not covered by the Right to Request Flexible Working, as set out in the Flexible Working Regulations 2014. Whilst Police Regulations place no restrictions on police officers applying to reduce their hours or to work flexibly there is no provision under which an officer has a specific right to request to work flexible hours or hours outside the usual shift pattern. However, a refusal to allow an officer to work part time or flexibly could give rise to a separate legal challenge of unlawful discrimination under the Equality Act 2010.